Speak as I say: an examination of legal standards applied to compelled speech in public high schools by Sullivan, Nora Anne
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
SPEAK AS I SAY: 
AN EXAMINATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS APPLIED TO 
COMPELLED SPEECH IN PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS 
 
 
 
 
 
Nora Anne Sullivan 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the School of 
Journalism and Mass Communication 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by:       
 
Cathy Packer, Ph.D. 
 
Michael Hoefges, Ph.D., J.D. 
 
Anne Klinefelter, J.D.	   	  
	  	   ii	  
	  	  	  	  	  
ABSTRACT 
 
NORA SULLIVAN: Speak As I Say: An Examination of Legal Standards Applied to 
Compelled Speech in Public High Schools 
(Under the direction of Dr. Cathy Packer) 
 
 First Amendment protections against the government compulsion of student 
speech in public high schools have been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court on two 
occasions and by lower courts in seventeen additional cases.  This thesis examines those 
nineteen cases to determine what level of First Amendment protection courts previously 
have recognized to protect against different types of compelled student speech.  From this 
analysis of the cases, four categories of compelled student speech were identified – 
compelled recitations, compelled speech for mandatory education efforts, compelled 
speech as a form of punishment, and compelled speech that is both part of mandatory 
education efforts and a form of punishment. Utilizing these categories, a framework for 
courts to use in the future is proposed; this framework ensures that courts recognize the 
proper level of First Amendment protection against compelled student speech while also 
safeguarding the schools’ ability to carry out their educational mission.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPELLED STUDENT SPEECH 
For nearly seventy years the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the First 
Amendment prohibits the government from censoring and compelling speech,1 thus 
protecting an individual’s right to decide “both what to say and what not to say.”2  The 
Court noted that recognizing First Amendment protection against government-compelled 
speech is essential to protecting the structure of the American democracy.  The Court 
explained that the government is formed on the “consent of the governed” and that 
“[a]uthority [] is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority.”3  
Failing to recognize constitutional protection against government compulsion of 
individual speech would give rise to the concern that public discourse does not truly 
reflect the beliefs of the American people.4  There are, however, limits to this 
constitutional protection.  In approximately thirteen cases since 1943,5 the Supreme Court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (recognizing that the First Amendment 
guards against a school compelling students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance). 
2 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
3 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. 
4 See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1974) (finding that the government 
cannot compel newspapers to grant a right-to-reply to political candidates because “treatment of public 
issues and public officials — whether fair or unfair — constitute the exercise of editorial control and 
judgment”); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).  
5 The Court handed down the decision in Barnette in 1943; that opinion signaled the Court’s acceptance of 
the notion that compelled speech is fully protected against by the First Amendment.  See generally 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 
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has balanced the First Amendment rights of individuals against any government interests 
that are advanced by the compulsion of speech in order to assess the constitutionality of 
the government action.6 
The issue of compelled speech has arisen in a variety of settings, including in 
public high schools where applying current case precedents has been particularly 
difficult.  A line of cases dealing with the censorship of student speech has acknowledged 
that a lower standard of First Amendment protection may be afforded to public high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915-16 (2010) (finding that disclosure 
requirements related to third-party advertising in political campaigns did not violate the First Amendment 
because the public’s interest in knowing the identity of the speaker was sufficient to justify the compulsion 
of the disclosure); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 67 (2006) 
(noting that requiring law schools to allow military recruiters on campus supports the government’s interest 
of “raising and supporting the Armed Forces”); Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995) (“While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of 
harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved 
message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the 
government.”); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (holding that must-carry provisions 
for cable providers were constitutional after finding that the government interests in protecting free, local 
broadcast stations and ensuring competition in the market for television broadcasters were significant 
enough to overcome the First Amendment protections against compelled speech); Riley, 487 U.S. at 798 
(finding that a state’s interest in full disclosure of the percentage of money collected by fundraisers actually 
given to charity did not override First Amendment protection against compelled disclosure); Pacific Gas & 
Elec., Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1986) (holding that a state commission’s 
requirements that a utility company disseminate specific information on its billing envelopes violated the 
First Amendment because the requirements were not “narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling 
state interest”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (assessing whether the State of New 
Hampshire presented any “countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify” the prohibition of 
citizens covering up the state’s motto on their license plates); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247-54 (discussing the 
government’s interest in ensuring that a wide range of viewpoints reach the public).  See also Johanns v. 
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562-65 (2005) (distinguishing the analysis for compelled speech 
cases from the analysis for compelled subsidy cases); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 
424 (2001) (noting that the Court has “found Barnette and Wooley, and all of ‘our compelled speech case 
law . . . clearly inapplicable’ to compelled financial support of generic advertising.”); Bd. of Regents v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 219 (2000) (addressing a compelled subsidy case, the Supreme Court found that 
“[t]he First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a 
program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral.”); Lehnert v. Ferris 
Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (1991) (holding that “the State constitutionally may not compel its 
employees to subsidize legislative lobbying or other political union activities outside the limited context of 
contract ratification or implementation”); Abood v. Detriot Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) 
(holding that the government cannot require public employees to pay union dues that are used in part to 
support “expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of 
other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative”); Torcaso v. 
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (holding that the state of Maryland could not require that a person 
profess his or her belief in God before he or she could serve as a notary). 
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school students in certain situations.7  Supreme Court precedent and subsequent lower 
court cases have failed, however, to clarify the appropriate tests for assessing the 
constitutionality of a school’s ability to compel student speech in these same settings.  
Courts have been fractured in their approach to compelled student speech cases.  
The Supreme Court spoke on the issue in 1943 and failed to articulate a precise standard 
that could apply to future cases.8  Instead, the Court noted in that case that the 
government compulsion of the Pledge of Allegiance in schools was unconstitutional 
because the compulsion “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose 
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”9  With 
little more to work with, lower courts have applied different tests to compelled student 
speech, ranging from tests designed to assess the constitutionality of government 
censorship in public schools10 to a more vague “reasonableness” standard.11  Another 
court declared that the case law points to the notion that different levels of scrutiny apply 
depending on whether the government compelled speech that requires adoption of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that school 
officials violated students’ First Amendment rights when they suspended students for wearing black 
armbands to protest the Vietnam War); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that the 
First Amendment did not bar a school district from suspending a student for giving a sexually suggestive 
speech at a school assembly); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that a 
school district did not violate the First Amendment by refusing to print a story about teen pregnancy and a 
story about divorce in a newspaper published by students and supported with funds from the board of 
education); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding that a school district did not violate the First 
Amendment by punishing a student who displayed a banner that read “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” at an off-
campus school-sponsored event).   
8 See generally Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 
9 Id. at 642. 
10 Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1231 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a school district 
may compel an apology as long as the speech for which she is forced to apologize is “school-sponsored” 
and the apology “is related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose”). 
11 Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that a high school coach 
could require a student to issue an apology for distributing a letter containing the word “bullshit” to teams 
because such a punishment was “reasonable”). 
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particular viewpoint.12  In the close to seven decades since the Court has addressed this 
issue, there appears to be no consensus among lower courts on the proper constitutional 
standard to apply. 
While a clear standard has not been established, cases addressing the issue have 
sprung up around the country over the past forty years.  Prior research conducted by the 
author of this thesis has pointed to three types of compelled student speech and argued 
that different tests should be applied to each type.13  These three types of compelled 
student speech include: compelled recitations, compelled speech for mandatory education 
efforts, and compelled speech as a form of punishment.14  The case law illustrates these 
different types of compelled student speech.  The Supreme Court case addressing the 
constitutionality of the government requiring students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance 
exemplifies the category of compelled recitations.15  Compelled speech as part of 
mandatory education efforts is demonstrated by a case in which a Utah university sought 
to compel a theatre major to deliver all of the content of assigned scripts, including 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 188 (3d Cir. 2005). 
13 See generally Nora Sullivan, Note, Insincere Apologies: The Tenth Circuit’s Treatment of Compelled 
Speech in Public High Schools, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 533 (2010). 
14 Id. at 569.  That note argued: 
[C]ourts should apply the following scheme to compelled student speech cases. In cases 
involving compelled recitations, courts should follow Barnette and strike down such 
policies on First Amendment grounds. In cases involving “mandatory education” efforts, 
courts should allow a school's compelled speech requirement to stand in order to give 
teachers enough power to teach critical thinking skills. In all other cases involving 
compelled student speech, courts should apply the balancing test used in Wooley. The 
court must determine whether the compelled speech raises First Amendment concerns, 
and then the court must balance those concerns, if any, against the government's interest. 
In order to pass constitutional muster, the government's interest must be “sufficiently 
compelling” to outweigh any First Amendment concerns. 
Id. 
15 See generally Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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certain expletives and references to God, during her classroom acting exercise.16  Cases 
involving compelled speech as a form of punishment are perhaps the most common type 
addressed by the courts.  For example, a high school student in Georgia was suspended 
for five days and told that she would not be able to return to school unless she issued an 
apology in front of her whole class.17  The apology was meant to punish the student who 
entered into a verbal altercation with a classmate outside of English class and then, after 
being reprimanded, told her teacher to “check the Declaration of Independence,” 
apparently in reference to her speech rights.18  The constitutionality of schools 
compelling apologies has been examined by courts in a number of other contexts, 
including when students were forced to issue apologies for: sending and receiving 
“sexts,”19 advising a graduation audience to embrace Jesus,20 calling a coach’s actions 
“bullshit” in a letter to teammates,21 and reporting a locker room assault to the police.22  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2005).  While the First Amendment may be 
more protective of the rights of college students, the case is still illustrative because a federal appeals court 
applied a test that had been developed through high school student speech cases.  Id. at 1291-93 (applying 
the standard laid out in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)).  See also Healy v. 
James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (finding that college students, unlike high school students, are entitled to 
full First Amendment protection). 
17 Kicklighter v. Evans County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 714 (S.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 1043 
(11th Cir. 1998). 
18 Id. 
19 Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2010).  The court defined “sexting” as “the practice of 
sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, including nude or semi-nude 
photographs, via cellular telephones or over the Internet”  Id. at 143.  While this case was brought against 
the district attorney, rather than the school district, the court still considered the constitutionality of 
compelling minors to speak.  Id. at 151-52. 
20 Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2009). 
21 Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 770, 772 (8th Cir. 2001). 
22 Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1024 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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While this framework from prior research is an essential starting off point for this 
thesis, a review of the case law also points to the possibility that other categories of 
compelled student speech may exist.  For example, one court looked at whether a survey 
compiled by community leaders and administered at three public schools to gauge 
students’ attitudes and behaviors related to a range of issues, including alcohol, drugs, 
sex, and suicide, constituted constitutionally impermissible government action to compel 
speech.23  In addition to the possibility that other categories of compelled student speech 
exist, a comprehensive review of all the cases addressing the issue of compelled student 
speech has never been conducted.    
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the issue of compelled speech in public 
high schools by reviewing all the federal and state court opinions that have addressed the 
issue.  This thesis starts with an examination of the three forms of compelled speech that 
were previously identified – compelled recitations, compelled speech for mandatory 
education efforts, and compelled speech as a form of punishment.  This research focuses 
on determining if there are any other categories of compelled student speech and will 
determine what, if any, constitutional tests courts currently apply to each type of 
government compelled student speech.  Ultimately this thesis concludes by presenting a 
summary of findings and proposing a framework that would aid educators who are 
presented with this issue as well as courts reviewing these cases. This research addresses 
an important topic that has not been fully addressed in scholarly literature or by the 
Court.  It is an essential step forward in helping to clarify one aspect of the compelled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 161-62, 167-68, 189 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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speech doctrine, which, as First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla noted, “may have 
especially subtle and difficult applications in a school setting.”24 
Background on Supreme Court Precedents 
 Much of the literature addressing First Amendment protection against government 
compulsion and censorship focuses on the various rules advanced by the Supreme Court 
in the landmark cases dealing with these issues.  A review of the Supreme Court 
precedents on the issues of student speech rights and First Amendment protection against 
compelled speech, thus, is necessary to frame a discussion of the scholarly literature.  
This section discusses the Court’s major decisions in the student speech and compelled 
speech cases.  After this background is presented, the scholarly literature on both issues is 
discussed. 
Student Speech Cases 
The Supreme Court has delivered four landmark opinions in the realm of student 
speech rights.  In 1969, the Supreme Court famously stated students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”25  In 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,26 decided in 1969, the 
Court held that the First Amendment protected public high school students’ right to wear 
black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War.27  While recognizing the “special 
characteristics of the school environment,”28 the Tinker Court stated that student speech 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 17:1.50 (2d ed. 2010). 
25 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 514. 
28 Id. at 506. 
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may only be curtailed if the speech threatens to cause a material interference or a 
substantial disruption with school activities.29   
 The Court’s seemingly broad protection of student speech in Tinker was limited 
by three subsequent opinions, Bethel School District v. Fraser in 1986,30 Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier in 1988,31 and Morse v. Frederick in 2007.32  In Fraser, the 
Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a school district from suspending a 
student for giving a sexually suggestive speech at a school assembly.33  It its analysis, the 
Court focused on the lewd nature of the student’s speech, noting that this speech given in 
a different context by an adult would enjoy full First Amendment protection.34 
 In Hazelwood,35 the Court held that a school district did not violate the First 
Amendment by refusing to print a story about teen pregnancy and a story about divorce 
in a newspaper published by students and supported with funds from the board of 
education.36  The Court distinguished Hazelwood from Tinker by noting that the former 
dealt with a situation where the school was being asked to promote the student’s speech, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Id. at 514. 
30 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
31 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
32 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
33 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690.  
34 Id. at 682-83.  The Court noted, “First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the 
otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually 
explicit and the audience may include children.”  Id. at 684.  Notably, in contrast, the Court specially 
mentions that “tolerance of divergent political and religious views” is at the cornerstone of our society.  Id. 
at 681. 
35 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260. 
36 Id. at 263. 
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namely by publishing the articles in dispute, rather than simply to tolerate it.37  In 
Hazelwood, the Court established a new standard for determining when a school may 
properly censor school-sponsored speech38 without violating the First Amendment.  
According to the Hazelwood Court, a school may censor school-sponsored speech so 
long as the censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”39  The 
Court further limited the application of the Tinker standard in Morse.40  In Morse, the 
Court held that a school district did not violate the First Amendment by punishing a 
student who displayed a banner that read “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus, 
school-sponsored event.  The Court, also distinguishing the case from Hazelwood,41 
stated that schools may “restrict student speech that they reasonably regard as promoting 
illegal drug use.”42  While courts have differed in their application of Tinker and the 
subsequent limiting precedents, it is generally accepted that school officials are granted 
broad deference to determine what types of speech may be censored without violating the 
First Amendment.43  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Id. at  270-71. 
38 School-sponsored speech is that which “students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably 
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”  Id. at 271. 
39 Id. at 273. 
40 Morse, 551 U.S. 393.  “Today, the Court creates another exception.  In doing so, we continue to distance 
ourselves from Tinker, but we neither overrule it nor offer an explanation of when it operates and when it 
does not.”  Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
41 Id. at 405-06.  The Court noted that unlike in Hazelwood, no one would reasonably believe that the 
banner at issue assumed the school’s imprimatur. 
42 Id. at 408.  In his concurrence, Justice Alito focused on the narrow holding in Morse and stressed that the 
opinion should not extend beyond situations where the banned speech was advocating the use of illegal 
drugs.  Justice Alito also warned that this opinion stands “at the far reaches of what the First Amendment 
permits.”  Id. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).   
43 See, e.g., Thomas Patterson, Chalk Talk: ‘Shedding Their Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate’: Morse v. 
Frederick and The Student’s Right to Free Speech, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 545 (2009) (noting that the Court has 
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Compelled Speech Cases 
The Supreme Court has found government compulsion of speech unconstitutional 
on First Amendment grounds several times,44 most notably in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette in 1943,45 Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo in 
1974,46 Wooley v. Maynard in 1977,47 and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind in 
1988.48  In this line of cases, the Court consistently recognized that the First Amendment 
protects against government-compelled speech and found that the government interests at 
stake did not outweigh this First Amendment protection.49  In Barnette, the Court held 
that a State Board of Education violated the First Amendment by forcing students to 
recite the Pledge of Allegiance.50  The Court noted that, unlike the case of censorship, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
long held that viewpoint discrimination is not permissible under the First Amendment, but arguing that the 
opinion in Morse allows “limitation on speech simply because of its message or content”). 
44 For a complete list of compelled speech cases in the U.S. Supreme Court since 1943, see supra note 6.  
This discussion only covers select cases that are relevant in the discussion throughout this thesis.  For 
instance, several cases discussing compelled commercial speech were omitted from this analysis because 
the Court has recognized different First Amendment standards for commercial speech. See, e.g., Johanns v. 
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (distinguishing between “true ‘compelled-speech’ cases, 
in which an individual is obliged by the government personally to express a message with which he 
disagrees; and ‘compelled-subsidy’ cases, in which an individual is required by the government to 
subsidize a message he disagrees with, expressed by a private entity”). 
45 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
46 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
47 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
48 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
49 See, e.g., id. at 797. 
50 Id. at 642.  In Barnette, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution requiring all 
public school teachers and students to salute the flag and stated that refusal to do so would be treated as an 
act of insubordination.  Several Jehovah’s Witnesses were expelled from school when they refused to salute 
the flag, a practice they believed conflicted with their religious beliefs.  Id. at 626-30. 
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compelling speech removes two options from the speaker, the option to remain silent and 
the option to change his or her message.51  
In Tornillo, the Court dealt with Florida’s right-to-reply statute, which required 
newspapers to publish a response when they criticized a political candidate.  The Tornillo 
Court noted that the statute, which compelled speech, “operates as a command in the 
same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding [the newspaper] to publish in a particular 
manner.”52  The Court went on to explain that because of the costs associated with 
printing a reply, the statute served as a disincentive for editors to publish news or 
commentary on political candidates.53  By avoiding the topic altogether, the newspapers 
would never risk invoking the statute and being forced to publish a reply from a 
candidate.54  The Tornillo Court noted that the particular statute in that case not only 
compelled speech, but also may have had the effect of chilling speech.55   
In Wooley, the Court held that the state of New Hampshire could not prosecute 
Jehovah’s Witnesses for covering up the state’s “Live Free or Die” motto on their license 
plates.56  The Wooley Court applied a balancing test when it examined the government’s 
interests as well as the First Amendment concerns raised by the compelled speech, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Id. at 633-34.  The Court noted that the clear and present danger test was in place for censoring speech at 
the time of the Barnette opinion and noted that remaining silent during a flag salute did not appear to 
present a clear and present danger.  Therefore, the Court reasoned, “It would seem that involuntary 
affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.”  Id. at 
633. 
52 Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).  
53 Id. at 256-57. 
54 Id. at 257. 
55 Id.  The Court noted that, “under the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage 
would be blunted or reduced.”  Id.  
56 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1977).  The Maynards claimed that the state motto was in 
conflict with their religious, moral, and policy beliefs.  Id. at 707. 
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ultimately found that the government’s interests were not “sufficiently compelling” to 
outweigh the constitutional concerns.57  The Court noted, “The right to speak and the 
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 
‘individual freedom of mind.’”58   
In Riley, the Court held that a North Carolina law requiring professional 
fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the percentage of donations actually turned 
over to charities during the course of the past twelve months violated the First 
Amendment.59  The Court noted that it would be constitutional for the state to publish the 
same information itself, but that the First Amendment was violated when the state forced 
private actors to do this.60   
From this line of cases, it is clear that the First Amendment provides broad 
protections against compelled speech.  The issue of compelled speech in public high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Id. at 716-17.  “The two interests advanced by the State are that display of the motto (1) facilitates the 
identification of passenger vehicles, and (2) promotes appreciation of history, individualism, and state 
pride.”  Id. at 716.  The Wooley Court found that the government’s interest must be “sufficiently 
compelling” and that the government’s interest “‘cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle 
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved . . . .’”  Id. at 716 (quoting 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).  This standard may be likened to a “strict scrutiny” test.  As 
one scholar explained, the strict scrutiny test requires a two-pronged inquiry: 
Courts first determine if the underlying governmental ends, or objectives, are 
“compelling . . . .” Because the government is impinging upon someone’s core 
constitutional rights, only the most pressing circumstances can justify the government 
action. If the governmental ends are compelling, the courts then ask if the law is a 
narrowly tailored means of furthering those governmental interests. Narrow tailoring 
requires that the law capture within its reach no more activity (or less) than is necessary 
to advance those compelling ends. An alternative phrasing is that the law must be the 
“least restrictive alternative” available to pursue those ends. This inquiry into “fit” 
between the ends and the means enables courts to test the sincerity of the government’s 
claimed objective. 
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal 
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800-01 (2006). 
58 Id. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).   
59 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795, 800 (1988). 
60 Id. at 800. 
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schools raises a more complex problem; this exact topic was directly addressed by the 
Court in Barnette where full First Amendment protection was granted to the students.  
The Court’s ruling in Barnette, however, was handed down more than 25 years before the 
Court first started to recognize that a lower standard of First Amendment protections may 
be afforded to public high school students in certain situations.61  
Literature Review 
 While much has been written separately about student speech rights and 
compelled speech, there are only three articles that deal directly with the intersection of 
compelled speech prohibitions and student speech rights in a high school setting.62  One 
of these articles touches on, but does not focus on, the appropriate standards to protect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Barnette was decided in 1943 and Tinker, the first of the student speech cases, was decided in 1969.  See 
319 U.S. 624 (1943); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  For a 
discussion of the student speech cases, see supra pp. 7-9. 
62 This paper will not discuss the four recent articles that addressed compelled student speech because those 
articles discussed the rights of college and university students, not high school students.  See generally, 
e.g., Brook Bristow, King Solomon: Did the Supreme Court Make a Wise Decision in Upholding the 
Solomon Amendment in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 58 MERCER L. REV. 
815 (2007) (noting that the Court distinguished FAIR from other Supreme Court cases dealing with 
compelled speech because the government did not provide specific content to the law schools in FAIR; it 
only required that they accommodate military recruiters); Matthew K. Brown, Note, First Amendment and 
Congress's Spending Clause Power — The Supreme Court Supports Military Recruiters and the United 
States Military's Discrimination Against Homosexuals Despite Law Schools' Protests, 29 U. ARK. L. REV. 
345 (2007) (noting the significance of the FAIR opinion as the first delivered by Chief Justice Roberts); 
Michael Joseph Palumbo, Comment, How Solomon and His Army of Military Recruiters Destroyed 
Academic Superfree Speech But in Turn Saved Academic Freedom, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 199 (2007) 
(noting that while the Court ruled in favor of the government in FAIR, in cases that involve a government 
interest less compelling than national security, academic freedom is more likely to be protected); Emily S. 
Wilbanks, Comment, Speaking With Your Mouth Shut? Exploring the Outer Limits of First Amendment 
Protection in the Context of Military Recruiting on Law School Campuses, 59 FLA. L. REV. 437 (2007) 
(arguing that the First Amendment should not protect a law school’s exclusion of military recruiters 
because this action does not equate to speech).  See also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (holding a law that allowed federal funds to be withdrawn from universities that 
failed to allow military recruiters on campus did not violate the schools’ First Amendment rights when the 
schools sought to exclude the recruiters because of the military’s policy related to sexual orientation).   
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against compelled student speech,63 and the two other articles discuss the Tenth Circuit’s 
treatment of two different compelled student speech cases.64  
Beyond these three articles that directly deal with compelled student speech, more 
than seventy-five articles have been written about general student speech rights since the 
Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the topic in 2007.65  Of these articles, only 
those interpreting the current state of the major student speech tests are relevant for the 
analysis in this thesis.66  Like the literature on student speech, scholarly discussion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong With Compelled Associations, 99 NW U. L. REV. 
839, 884-85 (2005). 
64 See generally Brandon C. Pond, Note, To Speak or Not to Speak: Theoretical Difficulties of Analyzing 
Compelled Speech Claims Under a Restricted Speech Standard, 10 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 149 (2010) 
(discussing the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson and arguing that courts should consider 
whether speech was “school-mandated”); Sullivan, supra note 13 (arguing that the Tenth Circuit’s holding 
in Corder v. Lewis Palmer School District was incorrectly decided and proposing a new framework for 
compelled student speech cases that focuses on the compelled speech, rather than the student speech, line 
of cases). 
65 In 2007, the Court held that a school district did not violate the First Amendment by punishing a student 
who displayed a banner that read “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus, school-sponsored event.  
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
66 The post-Morse literature dealing with the limited issue of student speech and new technology will not be 
reviewed because it only focuses on the extent to which schools may censor, but not compel speech in very 
specific circumstances.  These same issues are dealt with more broadly in the review of the literature that 
discusses the current state of student speech tests.  See generally, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student 
Speech Rights In the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008) (arguing that student speech tests should not 
apply to cyberspeech because the common justifications allowing schools to censor speech do not apply in 
the Digital Age); Sarah O. Cronan, Grounding Cyberspeech: Public Schools’ Authority to Discipline 
Students for Internet Activity, 97 KY. L.J. 149 (2008/2009) (arguing that tests for student speech over the 
Internet should focus on the effect in the school setting); Jessica Moy, Note, Beyond ‘The Schoolhouse 
Gates’ and into the Virtual Playground: Moderating Student Cyberbullying and Cyberharassment after 
Morse v. Frederick, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 565 (2010) (explaining the various approaches that courts 
have applied to student cyberspeech outside of schools post-Morse and noting that a modified version of 
the Tinker test may be suitable for regulating this type of speech); Tova Wolking, Note, School 
Administrators as Cyber Censors: Cyber Speech and First Amendment Rights, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1507 (2008) (discussing how courts have applied student speech tests for school punishment of  
cyberspeech).  This thesis will also not review the literature that debates whether Morse was correctly 
decided based on the specific facts in that case.  See generally, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the 
Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205 (2007) (arguing the Court’s decision in 
Morse and its treatment of the student speech issue more generally exemplifies the Court’s movement away 
from serving a guidance function for lower courts); Justin Lee Bell, Note, Morse v. Frederick: A Dubious 
Decision Shows a Need for Judicial Restraint by the Supreme Court, 53 S.D. L. REV. 100 (2008) (arguing 
the Court should have decided Morse on qualified immunity grounds); Jeremy Jorgensen, Note, Student 
Rights Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court’s Clouded Judgment in Morse v. Frederick, 25 TOURO L. REV. 
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First Amendment protection against compelled speech focuses on a wide range of issues.  
The discussions of the justifications for restricting compelled speech based on the 
interests of the speaker, listener, and society as a whole are applicable to this study and 
are reviewed below.67  
Compelled Speech in Public High Schools 
Of the three articles dealing directly with compelled speech in schools, two 
student-written law review articles discuss the Tenth Circuit’s treatment of compelled 
student speech.  Brandon Pond, a law student at Brigham Young University, wrote a 
piece discussing the court’s holding in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson.68  In that case, the 
University of Utah sought to compel a theatre major to deliver all of the content of her 
assigned scripts, including certain expletives and references to God, during a classroom 
acting exercise.69  While this case deals with the rights of college students, it is relevant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
739 (2009) (discussing the notion that Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse have been interpreted broadly by 
lower courts and arguing that the Court should clarify that these opinions must be read narrowly to prevent 
widespread censorship). 
67 This thesis will not review the literature dealing with First Amendment issues arising out of the use of 
student fees because this research focuses on actual student speech, not speech subsidized by fees.  See Bd. 
of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (holding that the mandatory university student fees used to 
support groups with views that conflicted with some students’ personal beliefs did not violate the First 
Amendment so long as the university’s administration of the fees was viewpoint neutral).  See generally, 
e.g., Kim Hudson, To Fee or Not to Fee: The Use of Mandatory Student Activity Fees to Fund Private 
Organizations that Engage in Political or Ideological Speech or Activity, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 277 (2000) 
(discussing the lower courts’ treatment of mandatory student fees and the Court’s decision in Southworth). 
This thesis will also not focus on the literature covering compelled speech in the context of government 
regulations of certain industries, such as the food industry, nor will it focus on government-mandated 
advertising programs because those topics are outside the scope of this thesis.  See generally, e.g., Mark 
Champoux, Uncovering Coherence in Compelled Subsidy of Speech Doctrine: Johanns v. Livestock, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107 (2006) (discussing the line of compelled speech cases dealing with 
agricultural promotions for certain producers that were mandated by the USDA); Brent Bernell, Article, 
The History and Impact of the New York City Menu Labeling Law, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 839 (2010) 
(discussing the provision of the federal healthcare bill that requires chain restaurants to include nutritional 
information on their menus and the First Amendment challenge to New York City’s landmark labeling 
law). 
68 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). 
69 Id. at 1282-83. 
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because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied a test announced in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,70 a high school student speech case dealing with 
censored speech, to determine whether the university violated the First Amendment by 
compelling the student’s speech.71  The court held that the speech was school-sponsored 
and that the compulsion was related to a legitimate pedagogical concern and, thus, the 
compelled speech requirement did not violate the First Amendment on its face.72  In 
addition to Pond’s analysis of Axson-Flynn, the author of this thesis also wrote a law 
review note discussing the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Corder v. Lewis Palmer School 
District.73  The Corder court relied on Axson-Flynn and applied the Hazelwood test to an 
apology that school officials compelled a high school valedictorian to issue after she 
deviated from her pre-approved graduation speech by urging the audience to find Jesus.74  
The Tenth Circuit in that case held that the compelled apology did not violate the First 
Amendment because, like in Axson-Flynn, the graduation speech was school-sponsored 
and was related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.75 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  Under Hazelwood, a school may censor school-sponsored speech when the 
censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Id. at 273. 
71 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289 (noting that although the court was using a test arising from a high school 
student speech case, it would factor in the “[a]ge, maturity, and sophistication level of the students” in 
applying the test). 
72 Id. at 1291-93.  The university claimed that it promoted three interests by compelling speech in this case: 
“(1) it teaches students how to step outside their own values and character by forcing them to assume a very 
foreign character and to recite offensive dialogue; (2) it teaches students to preserve the integrity of the 
author’s work; and (3) it measures true acting skills to be able convincingly to portray an offensive part.”  
Id. at 1291.  In this case, the student was a Mormon and argued that the university’s stated purposes for the 
requirement that students perform the scripts as written was simply a “pretext for religious discrimination.”  
The case was remanded to determine whether the justifications given by the university were presented only 
to veil religious discrimination.  Id. at 1293. 
73 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009). 
74 Id. at 1230-32. 
75 Id.  Josie Foehrenbach Brown argued that the speech in Corder was not actually school-sponsored 
because a valedictorian is clearly not “the school’s delegate delivering an official message.”  Josie 
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Pond focused on both the distinctions between compelled and censored speech 
and the result of applying the Hazelwood test to compelled speech cases to argue that the 
Tenth Circuit erred in its application of this test in Axson-Flynn.  Pond asserted that the 
dissimilarities between the motivations to censor and the motivations to compel speech 
suggest that the First Amendment protections against each should differ.76  He noted that 
one might seek to censor speech because of a “disagreement with the viewpoint, the 
content is offensive, or the time, place, or manner is inappropriate.”77  On the other hand, 
“[m]otivations to compel speech could be as mundane as creating the appearance that the 
citizenry upholds a particular viewpoint, to more offensive motives such as attempting to 
actually mandate compliance with a particular viewpoint.”78  Pond, thus, argued that 
there are incidences where the motivations for compelling speech are more invidious than 
the motivations for censoring speech and, in those situations, First Amendment 
protections should be greater.79   
The author of this thesis also argued that there are inherent differences between 
compulsion and censorship.  Instead of focusing on motivations, this author looked at the 
available alternatives to illuminate the differences.  “A censored party has the option to 
remain silent or reframe his or her point to comply with the censorship restrictions; a 
compelled party is required to make statements that reflect the beliefs or opinions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Foehrenbach Brown, Representative Tension: Student Religious Speech and the Public School’s 
Institutional Mission, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 67 (2009).  Brown also faulted the school district for failing to 
establish a clear policy or engage in a meaningful dialogue with students regarding what was within the 
scope of acceptable topics for the speech.  Id. at 67-68. 
76 Pond, supra note 64, at 156-57. 
77 Id. at 156. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 156-57. 
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another party and has no alternative.”80  Compelling speech, therefore, may raise greater 
First Amendment concerns because of the lack of alternate courses of action.  
Furthermore, this author advanced the idea that there are unique harms that are caused by 
compelled speech that justify different standards from censored speech.81   
In addition to these distinctions between censorship and compulsions, Pond 
further argued that the application of censored-speech tests to compelled speech has the 
effect of granting too much deference to school officials.  In applying the Hazelwood test, 
the Axson-Flynn court noted that it was extremely deferential to school officials in 
determining what constitutes a pedagogical concern and that most justifications would 
satisfy this prong of the test, except a justification that was nothing more than “a pretext 
for invidious discrimination.”82  Pond then went on to apply the test articulated in Axson-
Flynn to the facts of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,83 the well-known case 
where the Supreme Court held that a school could not require students to recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance.84  Pond argued that the case would have been decided differently 
under the Axson-Flynn test.  He said the compelled Pledge would have been held 
constitutional because reciting the Pledge would be considered a school-sponsored event 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Sullivan, supra note 13, at 556. 
81 Id. at 560-65.  For a further discussion of these unique harms caused by compelled speech, see infra pp. 
22-26. 
82 Pond, supra note 64, at 157. 
83 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
84 Id. at 641-42. 
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and requiring students to recite it would be related to a pedagogical concern, teaching 
civics to the students.85   
Based on this analysis, Pond suggested that courts should consider “school-
mandated” speech as a separate category of student speech, distinct from school-
sponsored speech.86  He argued that the appropriate test for evaluating the 
constitutionality of a school’s ability to mandate speech is as follows: “The court would 
first decide whether the speech is in fact compelled, and if so, whether the compulsion 
‘invades the sphere of intellect and spirit’ proscribed [sic] by the First Amendment.”87  
The second part of the test proposed by Pond requires an analysis of “whether the 
government action compels espousal of any particular view, belief, or ideology.”88  Pond 
argued that the government has violated the First Amendment only when the school 
mandates speech that requires the espousal of a particular view.89  Applied to the facts of 
Axson-Flynn, Pond found that the compelled speech in that case did not violate the First 
Amendment because the student was only required to repeat words that she found 
offensive while playing a character, but was not required to “espouse or endorse a 
particular idea or belief.”90 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Pond, supra note 64, at 157-59.  In Barnette, the Court looked to see “whether the curricular requirement 
invaded ‘the sphere of intellect and spirit’ proscribed by the First Amendment.”  Id. at 159 (quoting 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642). 
86 Pond, supra note 64, at 159. 
87 Id. at 169.  This is a version of the test originally articulated in Barnette and applied by the District Court 
in Axson-Flynn before that standard was rejected by the Tenth Circuit.  Id. 
88 Id. at 160. 
89 Id. (“In effect, what offends the First Amendment is not the compulsion of any particular type of speech, 
but rather compulsion that requires espousal or endorsement of any particular idea.”). 
90 Id. at 161-62. 
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Instead of focusing on a distinction between “school-mandated” speech and other 
types of student speech, Seanna Valentine Shiffrin, a UCLA law professor, argued that 
compelled student speech cases should be divided into two categories based on the type 
of speech: compelled recitations, like the Pledge of Allegiance, and “mandatory 
education efforts,” like classroom exercises designed to teach and persuade.91  She argued 
that the latter category is less troubling from a constitutional perspective because the 
teacher in that situation is attempting to help students think critically and “arrive at 
conclusions that are truly their own,”92 rather than showing an indifference for the 
students’ judgment.93   
Building off of Shriffin’s distinctions, the author of this thesis proposed three 
categories of compelled student speech – compelled recitations, compelled speech for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 884-85.  For example, a teacher may require a student to argue a particular side 
in the course of a debate or write a research paper on a particular topic.  The general tension between the 
compelled speech doctrine and the necessity to compel speech in the educational setting was discussed by 
Rodney Smolla in a treatise.  SMOLLA, supra note 24, at § 17:1.50.  Smolla explained: 
The First Amendment’s proscription of compelled speech does not turn on the ideological 
content of the message that the speaker is being forced to carry.  The constitutional harm 
— and what the First Amendment prohibits — is being forced to speak rather than to 
remain silent.  This harm occurs regardless of whether the speech is ideological.  Schools 
routinely require students to express a viewpoint that is not their own in order to teach the 
students to think critically. 
Id. 
92 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 884.  Vincent Blasi and Seana Valentine Shiffrin noted two problems with 
compelled recitations: (1) the indifference toward the speakers’ beliefs is “at odds with an underlying 
constitutional respect to develop, voice, and exercise independent opinions and commitments,” and (2) the 
fact that compelling recitations places the speaker in a situation where he may either refuse to follow the 
rules or “fail to practice the character virtue” of sincerity.  Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of 
Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 433, 458-61 (Michael C. Dorf, ed., 2004). 
93 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 884.  Shiffrin’s approach was adopted by the author of this thesis in an 
analysis of the compelled student speech issues.  See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 567-69.  Blasi and Shiffrin 
noted the distinction between “compulsory education” meant to “convey information, arguments, ideas, and 
views to children, often by means of required exercises” and “compulsory inclination” meant to “requir[e] 
[a student] to agree with the position or represent as sincerely embracing it.”  Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 
92, at 464. 
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mandatory education efforts, and compelled speech as a form of punishment.94  This 
author argued that compelled recitations should always be found unconstitutional because 
of the reasons advanced by Shiffrin, mainly that they fail to engage the student in the 
process of forming a judgment about the validity of the speech.95  In cases involving 
compelled speech for mandatory education efforts, this author argued that courts should 
find the government action constitutional given that such an exception is important 
because it “recognizes the special mission of schools to teach children.”96  Finally, this 
author concluded that the Wooley test was appropriate for cases dealing with compelled 
speech as a form of punishment because it strikes the appropriate balance between the 
government’s interest in compelling speech in certain circumstances and a student’s right 
to be free from being coerced by the government to speak.97  In applying the test, this 
author asserted: “The court must determine whether the compelled speech raises First 
Amendment concerns, and then the court must balance those concerns, if any, against the 
government’s interest. In order to pass constitutional muster, the government’s interest 
must be ‘sufficiently compelling’ to outweigh any First Amendment concerns.”98  While 
these articles provide some insight into the problems courts have encountered when 
dealing with the intersection between compelled and student speech, none of these 
articles provides a comprehensive analysis of all compelled student speech cases.  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Sullivan, supra note 13, at 569. 
95 Id. at 567. 
96 Id. at 569. 
97 Id. at 567-68. 
98 Id. at 569 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977)). 
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thesis will seek to fill that gap in the literature by examining the different types of 
compelled student speech and the tests applied by courts to each type. 
Compelled Speech in Non-School Settings 
Much of the scholarly literature on compelled speech has sought to characterize 
the harms caused by compulsion in order to understand why it should be prohibited by 
the First Amendment.  The harm issue has been analyzed from three perspectives – the 
perspectives of the speaker, the listener, and society as a whole. 
Speaker-Based Harms 
The courts have traditionally focused on the effect of compelled speech on the 
speaker when considering whether compelling the speech was permissible.99  Shiffrin 
argued that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Barnette100 and Wooley101 rested on a 
“speaker-based rationale.”102  Shiffrin identified two main justifications for the holdings 
in this line of cases: (1) compelled speech interferes with freedom of thought; and (2) 
compelled speech conflicts with the virtue of sincerity.103  Shiffrin argued that “what one 
regularly says may have an influence on what and how one thinks”104 and that because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 337-60 
(2008) (tracing the courts’ focus on the “freedom of mind” justification in compelled speech cases). 
100 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that a State Board of Education violated the First Amendment by forcing 
students to salute the flag). 
101 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that the state of New Hampshire could not prosecute Jehovah’s Witnesses 
for covering up the state’s “Live Free or Die” motto on their license plates). 
102 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 853.  
103 See id. at 852-63.  Two other scholars argued that the First Amendment jurisprudence protecting against 
compelled speech focuses more on “freedom of thought,” rather than on freedom of speech, because “the 
right to speak freely is meaningless if the speaker has not been permitted to freely formulate her thoughts 
prior to speaking.”  Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free 
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 76 (2002). 
104 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 854. 
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compelled speech is delivered without rational deliberation by the speaker, it is 
particularly dangerous.105  Shiffrin further stated that sincerity is one of the “character 
virtues that [is] reasonably precious to citizens, both as individuals and as First 
Amendment actors,”106 and that compelling speech undermines this value. 
 Larry Alexander rejected Shiffrin’s argument that compelled speech causes harm 
to a speaker107 and, instead, argued that prohibiting compelled speech is unnecessary 
because there is no evidence that compelling speech causes such harm.108  Alexander 
surmised compelled speech might create four potential harms by forcing a speaker to 
present a false front, to undermine his or her own beliefs, to undermine his or her 
personal integrity, and/or to risk divine retribution.109  He concluded that none of these 
potential harms, so far as he could find, actually occurred.  Alexander noted coerced 
speakers have the option to explain their true beliefs;110 compelled speech does not 
undermine the rational decision-making process because individuals still have the ability 
to make an independent determination about the validity of any speech that they are 
compelled to deliver;111 rational people understand that when certain recitations are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See id. 
106 Id. at 860. 
107 See Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 147, 155 (2006).  Alexander pointed 
to “grammar, arithmetic, spelling, [and] world capitals” as examples of speech that students are required to 
listen to and learn in public schools, but noted that schools present this information as fact rather than one 
possible viewpoint.  Id.  
108 See id. at 161. 
109 See id. at 153-59. 
110 See id. at 153. 
111 Id. at 155-56. 
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required, these words do not reflect the actual beliefs of the speaker;112 and compelling 
speech does not alter one’s true beliefs.113  Alexander concluded that the line of Supreme 
Court holdings recognizing full First Amendment protections for compelled speech were 
unwarranted because the compelled speech did not cause harm to the speakers.114     
Listener-Based Harms 
 Laurent Sacharoff rejected the courts’ focus on speaker-based analyses in 
compelled speech cases, arguing that compelled speech cases always deal with at least 
two competing speakers, the government and the actor who objects to the compelled 
speech.115  Since there are always competing speaker-based interests in a compelled 
speech case, Sacharoff found that an analysis focusing on the speaker gives little 
guidance as to which side should prevail.116  Sacharoff argued that courts should consider 
adopting a framework that considers listener interests in addition to those of the speakers 
in compelled speech cases.117  Sacharoff noted that compelled speech leads to a 
“distortion of the total mix of information.”118 He stated that this happens in a number of 
ways, including through misattribution where the listener alters the weight that he or she 
gives to information based on the identity of the speaker,119 the government’s ability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Id. at 160. 
113 Id. at 158. 
114 Id. at 161.  
115 See Sacharoff, supra note 99, at 335. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 384. 
118 Id. at 385. 
119 Id. 
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use compulsion as a form of free advertising for its viewpoint,120 and group ritual and 
recitation where the government is able to amplify its own message.121  Sacharoff further 
argued that generally listeners have an interest in being put on notice if a message is 
compelled by the government so that they can properly evaluate it.122 
Society-Based Harms 
Scholars also have noted that beyond speaker and listener harms, there are broad 
societal harms that are avoided by limitations on compelled speech.  In a Cornell Law 
Review article, Martin Redish and Kevin Finnerty noted that government-compelled 
speech is troubling because it “breaches the barrier between government and private 
individuals and threatens to skew the political marketplace to further governmental goals 
and interests.”123 
Shiffrin pointed out that sincerity of speech underlies several First Amendment 
values including the search for the truth, individual autonomy, and self-expression.124  By 
compelling speech, Shiffrin argued, the government may undermine the First 
Amendment culture by “encourage[ing] cynicism and ambivalence about the value of the 
truth.”125  Sacharoff also argued that compelled speech runs counter to First Amendment 
theory.  He noted compelled speech may inhibit the promotion of self-governance by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Id. at 398. 
121 Id. at 400. 
122 Id. at 401-02. 
123 Redish & Finnerty, supra note 103, at 75. 
124See Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 862 (“[P]art of the value of the First Amendment rests upon our joint 
interest in approaching and appreciating the truth.”). 
125 See id. 
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limiting or altering political discourse126 and may reduce the effectiveness of the 
checking function by limiting access to truthful information on government officials and 
government action.127 Alexander, however, rejected the notion that government-
compelled speech violates some underlying societal norm.128  Alexander argued that such 
a norm would exist only if it was clear that compelled speech caused harm in society.129   
While scholars have presented various justifications for prohibiting or not 
prohibiting compelled speech, the constitutionality of the government compulsion of 
speech in the distinctive setting of a public high school has not been fully explored.130 
Student Speech Rights 
Forty years after the Court’s decision in Tinker, the status of student speech post-
Morse has generated attention from many legal scholars.  While the literature on student 
speech rights addresses a broad range of topics, three bodies of literature are relevant for 
this analysis.  The first is a general discussion of the level of First Amendment protection 
against school censorship in light of the Court’s holding in Morse.  The second proposes 
different tests to analyze future student speech cases.  The third deals with special 
considerations for the after-the-fact punishment of student speech.131 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See Sacharoff, supra note 99, at 377. 
127 Id. at 380.  Sacharoff explained the checking function as follows: “speech functions to check abuse of 
government authority and improve government, because government officials will avoid corruption if they 
think a free press will catch and expose them.”  Id. 
128 See Alexander, supra note 107, at 157-58. 
129 See id. 
130  The author of this thesis discussed how these harms were applicable to the specific compelled student 
speech issue in Corder v. Lewis Palmer School District, 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009), but a more general 
analysis has not been put forward.  See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 560-65. 
131 This discussion was included and highlighted in a separate section because several of the compelled 
student speech cases deal with school-mandated apologies for conduct. 
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First Amendment Protection Against School Censorship 
 Prior to the Court’s holding in Morse, “Tinker was ostensibly the de facto test 
where the types of speech carved out in Fraser and [Hazelwood] were inapposite.”132  
With the Court recognizing yet another exception from the broad speech-protective test in 
Tinker, many commentators have pointed to Morse as a signal that courts will continue to 
be extremely deferential to school administrators.133  That prediction, in fact, may already 
be coming to fruition despite the fact that two Justices who joined the 6-3 opinion134 did 
so only so far as it was understood to allow censorship of speech that “advocat[es] illegal 
drug use.”135  Just one year after the Court handed down its opinion, a review of lower 
courts’ application of Morse found that it was frequently being used “to censor speech 
that has absolutely nothing to do with illegal drug use but that has everything to do with 
subjects such as violence and homophobic expression.”136 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Joseph O. Oluwole, The Genesis of Gangrenes in the Student Free Speech Taxonomy, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. 
JUV. L. & POL’Y 299, 327 (2009). 
133 See, e.g., id. at 329 (“[I]t took less than four decades for the Court to move from a stringent protection of 
student free speech rights to aggressive protection of school police powers over student speech.”). 
134 Some consider Morse as a 5-4 decision, depending on the reading of Justice Breyer’s concurrence and 
dissent.  See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 425-33 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring & dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court should have decided only the qualified immunity question in Morse and then 
remanded the case).   
135 Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).  In his concurrence in Morse, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, 
explained:  
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold 
that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech 
that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including 
speech on issues such as “the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for 
medicinal use.” 
Id. 
136 Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts: Stretching the High Court’s 
Ruling too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008). 
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 This movement toward greater power for school administrators has led scholars to 
call for a return to the Tinker “material interference or substantial disruption” standard.137  
Clay Calvert, for instance, noted that although “Tinker may not be looking fabulous at 
forty,” it is still binding precedent.138  In addition to recommending against any additional 
exceptions to Tinker, he asserted that courts should afford less deference to school 
officials by requiring evidence that the censorship was necessary.139  Douglas Laycock 
also pointed to placing a higher evidentiary burden on school officials as crucial to the 
protection of students’ First Amendment rights.140  He concluded, “No other doctrine can 
safely substitute for Tinker’s requirement that if school officials want to suppress high-
value student speech, they must demonstrate that suppression is necessary to prevent a 
material and substantial disruption.”141    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969).  See generally Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Teaching that Speech Matters: A Framework for Analyzing Speech Issues in Schools, 42 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 825, 836-41 (2009) (arguing that Tinker should apply to all non-curricular student 
speech). 
138 Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still Standing, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
1167, 1190 (2009).   
139 Id. at 1191. 
140 Douglas Laycock, High-Value Speech and the Basic Educational Mission of a Public School: Some 
Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 111, 128 (2008). 
141 Id. at 128.  Laycock argued that the more deferential tests are not appropriate for “high-value” speech 
such as political and religious speech.  Id. at 123-24.  He warned that the more deferential tests allow 
“school officials [] unfettered discretion to ban speech that the school subjectively determines is 
inconsistent with its educational mission.”  Id. at 128.  Several student authors also called for a 
strengthening of the Tinker standard to protect student speech rights.  See, e.g., Jennifer A. Giuttari, Note, 
Morse v. Frederick: Locking The “Schoolhouse Gate” On The First Amendment, 69 MONT. L. REV. 447, 
456 (2008) (“The Supreme Court's decision in Morse makes a clear statement to the American public that 
the First Amendment only protects student speech in public schools when school officials determine that 
the speech is not too controversial. Instead of sending this message to the public, the Court should have re-
affirmed Tinker . . . .”); Angie Fox, Note, Waiting to Exhale, How “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” Reduces Breathing 
Space for Student Speakers & Alters the Constitutional Limits on Schools’ Disciplinary Actions Against 
Student Threats in Light of Morse v. Frederick, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 473-74  (2008) (noting that 
Tinker has been reaffirmed in each subsequent case and, thus, the analysis should always start with the 
presumption that student speech is protected); Adam K. Nalley, Note, Did Student Speech Get Thrown Out 
with the Banner? Reading “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” Narrowly to Uphold Important Constitutional Protections 
	  	   29 
While some scholars were alarmed by the Court’s opinion in Morse, others have 
pointed to it as an inevitable move by the Court.  The latter group of scholars argued that 
the tragedies at Columbine and Virginia Tech were the reason why the Court continued to 
show deference to school officials in Morse.142  One student author found that increased 
regulation of speech in schools is a sign of the times because “parental guidance of 
children is declining,” resulting in “a shift of the burden of child rearing away from 
parents and onto school systems.”143  Erwin Chemerinsky noted that the opinion in Morse 
is consistent with other post-Tinker Supreme Court and lower court cases in which 
“schools have won virtually every constitutional claim involving students’ rights.”144  He 
asserted, however, that the decision was contrary to other First Amendment precedent 
because it “upheld a viewpoint-based restriction in a public forum.”145  Chemerinsky 
opined, “[T]he Court underestimates the danger of government power in the school 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for Students, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 615, 642-47 (2009) (arguing that Tinker remains the default test in student 
speech cases and is still the appropriate test for speech related to social issues, religion, and politics).  
142 See Caroline B. Newcombe, Morse v. Frederick One Year Later: New Limitations on Student Speech 
and the “Columbine Factor”, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 427, 450-51 (2009) (arguing that the Morse opinion 
and its application by lower courts was driven by “overwhelming concern for student safety and that this 
concern cannot be understood without reference to the Columbine factor”).  See also Calvert, supra note 
138, at 1170-72 (discussing a Fifth Circuit case where a student threatened a Columbine-like attack in a 
journal); Fox, supra note 141, at 436 (“In the wake of high-profile shootings, (such as Columbine, and 
more recently Virginia Tech), and the accompanying perception of increased school violence, educators, 
administrators, and policymakers have been re-assessing the scope of schools’ disciplinary authority to 
respond to students' conduct, writings, and speech before they erupt in tragedy.”). 
143 Brittany Love, Note, Today’s Inconsistencies, Tomorrow’s Problems: An In Depth Consideration of the 
Challenges Facing School Administrators in Regulating Student Speech, 35 S.U. L. REV. 611, 628 (2008).  
The author also contended schools should have more discretion because “students have become 
increasingly undisciplined, and administrators and teachers are finding it very difficult to teach their 
students important, valuable lessons.”  Id.  
144 Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17, 25 
(2008). 
145 Id. at 19. 
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context” and pointed to Justice Alito’s concurrence as hope that the holding in Morse 
would be construed narrowly.146  
Different Modes of Analysis Under the Current Framework 
Some scholars have sought to make sense of the line of student speech cases by 
focusing on various aspects of the cases.  Through these analyses, they have made 
suggestions about the best approaches to dealing with future student speech cases.  
Generally, scholars have approached student speech cases by either focusing on the role 
the school is assuming with regard to the speech or the type speech the student delivers. 
Two scholars pointed to the role of the government as an important factor in 
determining whether censorship of student speech violates the First Amendment.  Josh 
Davis and Josh Rosenberg argued that government could play one of two roles that have 
the potential to interfere with speech.147  The first role is that of the regulator where 
“government does not undertake its own acts but rather discourages private conduct.”148  
The second role is that of the patron where “government itself acts . . . by communicating 
a message or subsidizing expression.”149  In the patron role, the government may also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Id. at 24.  Chemerinsky’s concern stems from his belief that school officials may be inclined to punish 
speech or students they do not like. Id. at 24-25. 
147 See Josh Davis & Josh Rosenberg, Government as Patron or Regulator in the Student Speech Cases, 83 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1047 (2009). 
148 Id. at 1051.  Davis and Rosenberg give the example of the government prohibiting the distribution of 
pamphlets on a public street to illustrate the government working in this role.  Id. 
149 Id.  “[T]he government might campaign against use of illegal drugs, putting up posters in public schools 
and on billboards. Government may even sponsor speech by private actors—offering a prize, for example, 
for the best essay demonstrating the ill effects of the abuse of illegal drugs.”  Id. at 1051-52. 
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need to undertake some managerial functions that require ensuring employees and private 
individuals do not act or speak in a manner that “interfere[s] with tasks it undertakes.”150   
Davis and Rosenberg contended that the First Amendment is invoked when the 
government is serving as a regulator and in limited situations where the government is 
serving as a patron.151  They explained: 
There are limits on the role of a school as patron, limits which vary with 
the particular function a school performs. In addition to acting as a speaker 
or sponsor, among the less controversial tasks of the public school as 
proprietor are conveying technical knowledge, maintaining order, ensuring 
the safety of students, and controlling the curriculum.   More controversial 
tasks include protecting students from obscene, lewd or offensive 
language, and inculcating values and behaviors in students.152 
 
To clarify this point, they reviewed the student speech cases by focusing on the 
role of the government.153  For example, the school in Fraser may have been seen as 
serving the patron role because it sought to punish the student who gave the lewd speech 
in order to disassociate itself and to protect other students from the content of the 
speech.154 Applying this approach to Morse, Davis and Rosenberg noted that the school 
may have been serving the patron role by protecting students from the dangers of drug 
use, but that the Court’s analysis does little to help define the outer limits of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Id. at 1052.  The authors noted that in a post office, the government can stop employees from 
communicating incorrect information about postal rates and can stop citizens from disrupting the service in 
the post office.  Id. 
151 Id. at 1058-59. 
152 Id. at 1082-83. 
153 See id. at 1082-94.  For example, the authors pointed to the Hazelwood school as playing the classic role 
of a patron.  In Hazelwood, the Court’s analysis focused on the notion that the articles in the student 
newspaper could be viewed as speech that the school had sponsored.  Davis and Rosenberg noted that this 
focus on “school-sponsored” speech is analogous to situations where the school is acting a patron.  Id. at 
1087-88. 
154 Id. at 1085-86.   
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constitutionally permissible conduct while serving this function.155  As they explained, 
“Morse appears to grant schools a license to inculcate values — and to silence student 
speech that might interfere with that effort — in a way that none of the earlier school 
speech cases suggested was permissible.”156  While focusing on the role of government 
may provide some insight into the understanding the Court’s rulings in the student speech 
cases, Davis and Rosenberg seemed to find that the government may be acting as a patron 
even when censoring a broad range of student speech, including that in Fraser and 
Morse. 
 Rather than concentrating on the different roles of government, Chemerinsky 
maintained that cases should be distinguished by “speech of the government institution 
and the speech of the students.”157  The distinction between school speech and student 
speech158 provides a different approach than the one adopted by the Court in the student 
speech quartet of cases.  Chemerinksy argued that schools serve as speakers when they 
make decisions about the substance of the school’s curriculum and, when censorship 
deals with curricular decisions, the schools have a wide range of power.159  This power, 
however, “does not then carry over to allow the school to regulate student speech.”160  
Under Chemerinsky’s framework, a school is free to determine what books it places in its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Id. at 1090-91. 
156 Id. at 1094. 
157 Chemerinsky, supra note 137, at 834. 
158 Id. at 832. 
159 Id.  
160 Id. 
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library,161 but it may not censor what a student says about those books.162  “There is a 
clear difference between the government choosing the curriculum it will teach and the 
government deciding that it does not like a certain message, such as a banner that the 
principal interprets as encouraging illegal drug use.”163 
Instead of focusing on the government’s role in a particular case as Davis and 
Rosenberg as well as Chemerinsky advocated, Laycock argued that the type of student 
speech is essential to determining the scope of a school’s censorship authority.164  The 
Court has held that public schools are not the proper place to “inculcate religion among 
students.”165  For this reason, Laycock argued that religious speech is not part of the 
educational mission of schools and, therefore, schools should not be able to censor 
religious student speech because it will never conflict with the school’s ability to carry 
out its mission.166  Similarly, school officials cannot constitutionally force students to 
adopt a particular political view or punish a student simply because they disagree with a 
student’s professed political beliefs.167  Following this logic, political, like religious, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 See id. at 832-33 (discussing Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 
853 (1982)). 
162 Chemerinsky does not give this specific example, but does describe the importance of allowing students 
to speak.  He is particularly mindful of the school’s role in teaching students about their constitutional 
rights and notes the irony of teaching these rights but then refusing to extend them to the students.  Id. at 
834-36. 
163 Id. at 836. 
164 See Laycock, supra note 140 (arguing that certain types of speech are at the core of the First 
Amendment and, thus, cannot be censored by a school). 
165 Id. at 124. 
166 Id. at 124-25. 
167 Id. at 117-120.  Laycock noted that it is difficult to draw a clear line in some circumstances. “We are 
unlikely to find a bright line between ‘Don’t hit’ and ‘Support the Republican Party.’  There is a continuum 
from uncontroversial ideas to controversial ones, from ideas that are accepted as part of the school’s 
mission to ideas that almost certainly would not be if the issue were squarely raised.”  Id. at 119. 
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speech is at the core of the First Amendment and should be fervently guarded from 
school censorship.168  Laycock then proposed that a focus on the type of student speech 
was the appropriate starting point for a First Amendment analysis of student speech: “If a 
student speaks in his or her private capacity, without school sponsorship, then political 
speech, religious speech, and other speech about serious ideas is protected by Tinker, 
unless the speaker causes material and substantial disruption of the school.”169 
 Emily Gold Waldman also considered the importance of certain core First 
Amendment types of speech when addressing how courts should treat potentially hurtful 
speech, such as speech used to bully another student.170  Waldman advanced the idea that 
potentially hurtful speech can be divided into two categories: “(1) speech that identifies 
particular students for attack; and (2) speech . . . that expresses a general political, social, 
or religious viewpoint without directly naming or speaking to particular students.”171  
Waldman argued that schools may properly censor hurtful speech that is directed at a 
particular student because the primary purpose of the speech is to disparage another.172  
When speech is not directed at an individual, Waldman argued, Tinker should apply and, 
thus, the speech is presumptively constitutional, but that courts should consider the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Id. at 120, 123-24.  “What is true of political issues entrusted to other organs of government is equally 
true of religious issues entrusted to churches, synagogues, families, and individual conscience.  Religious 
speech, like political speech, is at the core of the First Amendment.”  Id. at 123-24.   
169 Id. at 129. 
170 Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students’ Potentially Hurtful Speech (Religious 
and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 492 (2008). 
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 492-96.  Waldman indicated that even speech that appears to be political or religious in nature, but 
is directed at an individual, falls into this category.  As she explained, “[A] student can express his belief 
that Jesus Christ is the only path to salvation, or that homosexuality is sinful, without singling out non-
Christian or gay students and telling them that they are going to Hell or calling them derogatory names.”  
Id. at 494-95. 
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“psychological well-being” of students as an important government interest.173  These 
various approaches to dealing with student speech cases shed light on the compelled 
student speech cases because they provide a complete set of considerations to apply when 
examining any type of school restriction on speech. 
 Special Considerations for Punishment of Student Speech 
In many cases, schools have sought to punish students for speech that they already 
delivered; in some cases this punishment may include a compelled apology. Waldman 
argued that schools do have the power to censor student speech, but when they are 
unsuccessful in censorship, they may not have the right to subsequently punish the 
student.174  Waldman noted that after-the-fact punishment of speech should be treated 
differently because it raises three concerns.175   
First, she noted that the Court has relied on educational and protective 
justifications for suppressing student speech.176  Applying these rationales to punishment 
of speech, Waldman found that the justifications are not convincing when the student is 
not first given notice that the school wants to suppress the speech.  This is true because 
after the speech is delivered, the listeners are already exposed to the potentially harmful 
effect of the message.  School officials are presented with a missed opportunity to give 
the student speaker a “lesson” on appropriate communication after the speech is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Id. at 503. 
174 See Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment, 85 IND. L.J. 
1113 (2010). 
175 Id. at 1119-20. 
176 Id. at 1122.  Waldman explained that the “basic goal [of the protective function] is to shield other 
students and the school environment from being exposed to the harmful speech in the first place.”  Id.  She 
noted that the purpose of the educational function is “to teach students to speak civilly or (in the context of 
school-sponsored speech) to speak in a way that comports with a particular curricular lesson . . . .”  Id. at 
1123.    
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delivered.177  Second, Waldman argued that a lack of prior notice “forces speakers to take 
an undefined risk” because speakers will never know if they will be punished when they 
speak.178  Finally, Waldman pointed out that a school’s ability to impose an after-the-fact 
punishment may be limited by a student’s due process rights.179  In light of these three 
considerations, Waldman proposed that a proper analysis of after-the-fact punishment for 
student speech first requires that the school show that the speech could first be suppressed 
under the current Supreme Court framework.  After that, schools would have the burden 
of showing that “(1) the student speaker had adequate prior notice that the speech was 
prohibited and (2) the actual punishment was reasonable.”180  
From this review, it is clear that there is a significant gap in the scholarly 
literature.  While much has been written about both compelled speech and student speech 
generally, compelled student speech has largely been ignored.  The literature on 
compelled speech generally indicates that the compulsion of speech is different from the 
censorship of speech because compulsion raises unique speaker-based, listener-based, 
and societal harms.  This literature suggests that assessing the constitutionality of the 
government’s compulsion of speech in all settings requires a specialized standard that 
addresses these potential harms.  The student speech literature tracks the trend of the 
Court continuing to show greater deference to school officials to censor speech.  Scholars 
have presented different suggestions for the most effective way to analyze student 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Id. at 1123.   
178 Id. at 1124. 
179 Id. at 1131.  Waldman pointed to the Court’s opinion in Fraser to support this view.  She argued that 
punishing students for speech without “adequate notice of what the applicable rules are in the first place” 
may violate due process.  Id. at 1131-32. 
180 Id. at 1114. 
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censorship cases, by focusing either on the role that the government is assuming or the 
type of speech that the government is attempting to censor.  Of particular relevance to the 
issue of compelled speech as a form of punishment, at least one scholar has argued that 
the power to punish speech after it has been delivered is wholly different from the power 
to censor that speech in the first place. 
This thesis seeks to provide a missing piece in the literature by providing a 
comprehensive review of all the state and federal compelled student speech cases.  The 
law review note written by the author of this thesis serves as a starting point for the 
subsequent analysis.  In particular, this thesis will explore the three types of compelled 
speech previously identified in that note: compelled recitations, compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts, and compelled speech as a form of punishment.  After a 
review of the cases, any other types of compelled student speech that have not been 
discussed previously will be identified and included in this research.  First, the different 
types of compelled speech will be categorized and defined, using the framework as a 
starting point.  Next, this thesis will review the tests that have been applied by the courts 
to these different categories.  Finally, an approach for assessing the constitutionality of 
the government’s compulsion of student speech will be presented.  Developing a 
complete structure for handling future compelled student speech cases appears 
particularly important given the lack of a clear approach either articulated by the 
Supreme Court or adopted by lower courts. 
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Research Questions and Methodology 
 A comprehensive examination of the First Amendment protection against the 
government compulsion of student speech requires an evaluation of the following 
research questions: 
• What types of compelled speech in public high schools have courts examined?   
• What First Amendment standards have courts used to assess the 
constitutionality of each type of compelled student speech in public high 
schools?  
• What changes to the existing framework,181 if any, are needed to ensure that 
there are proper protections against government compulsion of speech for 
public high school students?  
 To answer these questions, all the federal and state cases since 1940, the year that 
the Court first spoke on the issue,182 dealing with the constitutionality of the 
government’s compulsion of student speech will be examined.  Cases were identified 
using both LexisNexis and Westlaw databases to ensure that all available cases were 
located.  Searches were conducted using the following parameters: “compelled speech” 
AND “high school.”  The search results were then reviewed to determine if the cases 
addressed the issue of compelled student speech.   Additional cases were identified by 
reviewing cases cited within those identified in the LexisNexis and Westlaw population 
as well as by Shepardizing the cases pulled through the searches.  Cases dealing with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 The “existing framework” refers to the approaches currently used by courts assessing the 
constitutionality of compelled student speech.  This framework is discussed in the analysis of the cases 
presented in Chapters II-IV, and is summarized in Chapter V. 
182 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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college and private school students were included in the sample only if tests applied were 
derived from high school speech cases or if the analysis was useful to a discussion of 
compelled speech in public high schools. Based on these parameters, nineteen cases183 
were identified for this research.  
Limitations 
 Cases addressing the issue of compelled commercial speech were omitted because 
the Court has recognized different First Amendment standards for commercial speech.184  
Furthermore, this thesis only seeks to understand the First Amendment protections 
against compelled speech of public high school students and does not extend to students 
in private school or to college students.  Cases discussing private school and college 
students are included only to the extent that they provide useful guidance for 
understanding public high school student speech cases. Cases discussing the rights of 
college students are not otherwise included because the Court has recognized that college 
students have greater First Amendment protection than high school students.185  Also, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586; Miller v. Mitchell, 598 
F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009); Head v. Bd. of 
Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 315 F. App’x 7 (9th Cir. 2008); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 
2005); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004); Wildman v. Marshalltown 
Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001); Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000); Poling v. 
Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989); Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 
F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973); Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 
450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971); Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cook, No. 08 C 2270, 2008 WL 5387642 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 23, 2008); Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007) aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 
2008); Kicklighter v. Evans County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 1043 
(11th Cir. 1998); Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. A.1:95CV167-D-D, 1996 WL 671410 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 
1996) aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Sheldon v. 
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).   
184 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 
(2010) (noting the different First Amendment standards that apply to misleading and nonmisleading 
commercial speech). 
185 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (finding that college students, unlike high school students, 
are entitled to full First Amendment protection).   
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thesis is restricted to public rather than private schools because censorship and 
compulsion in private schools do not involve state action and, thus, do not trigger a First 
Amendment analysis.  This thesis also does not cover the compelled speech cases dealing 
with the issue of compelled subsidy of speech because this thesis focuses on actual 
student speech, not speech subsidized by fees.186 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See, e.g., supra note 67 for more discussion on the First Amendment concerns related to student fees. 
	  	  
 	  
CHAPTER II  
COMPELLED RECITATIONS 
Compelled recitations occur when the government mandates a student to say 
specific words or to engage in an activity that amounts to implicit expression.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding in Barnette v. West Virginia Board of Education187 makes clear 
that there is strong First Amendment protection against government compulsion of 
recitations in public schools.   This chapter discusses the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
compelled recitations, including a detailed analysis of the Barnette holding, the six 
subsequent lower court cases addressing the constitutionality of compelled recitations, 
and the relevant scholarly literature.  Four key points about judicial treatment of 
compelled recitations emerged from this research: (1) the wide range of justifications for 
strong First Amendment protections against compelled recitations; (2) compelled 
recitations include situations beyond those in which students are required to actually 
speak; (3) the special considerations that support recognizing strong First Amendment 
protection against compelled recitations when the compulsion takes place in a school 
setting; and (4) there are some situations in which Barnette controls and other situations 
in which Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,188 a Supreme 
Court case dealing with censorship of student speech, controls. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
188 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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First, this chapter defines the category of compelled recitations by reviewing the 
pertinent literature and providing examples from cases.  Second, this chapter analyzes the 
cases that have addressed the constitutionality of compelled recitations.  This section first 
provides a discussion of the two Supreme Court cases directly on point and then provides 
an analysis of the six lower court opinions discussing compelled recitations.  Finally, this 
chapter concludes by summarizing the findings and highlighting the main points that 
were distilled from the research presented in this chapter. 
Definition of Compelled Recitations 
A review of literature and cases dealing with compelled recitations makes clear 
that recitations must be defined in a way that covers actual speech as well as other types 
of expressive activity.  This section presents a definition of compelled recitations based 
on the distinctions presented by courts and scholars between speech that falls in this 
category and other types of compelled speech. 
Compelled recitations are government-mandated reiterations of specific words 
and government-mandated participation in expressive activities that equate to “speech.”  
These two forms of compelled recitations are best illustrated by examining the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Barnette189 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 
opinion in Lipp v. Morris.190   
The first type of compelled recitation is exemplified by the speech at issue in 
Barnette. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state board 
of education’s resolution requiring all teachers and students to participate in pledging 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 319 U.S. 624. 
190 579 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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allegiance to the American flag.191  The Court described the compelled recitation required 
by the board’s mandate as follows: 
What is now required is the “stiff-arm” salute, the saluter to keep the right 
hand raised with palm turned up while the following is repeated: “I pledge 
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic 
for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for 
all.”192 
 
The students who failed to participate in this compelled recitation were found to be 
insubordinate and were subject to expulsion from school.193  In Barnette, the Court held 
that the board of education resolution was unconstitutional, noting that First Amendment 
protections should ensure that “ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a 
compulsory routine.”194 
 Building off of Barnette, lower courts applied that precedent in cases involving 
compelled recitations where the students were not required to speak at all.  In Lipp v. 
Morris, the Third Circuit found that a state statute that required public school students to 
“stand at attention during the salute to the flag,” but did not require that students recite 
the Pledge, violated the First Amendment.195  Following Supreme Court precedent from a 
different compelled speech case, Wooley v. Maynard,196 the Third Circuit noted forcing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626. 
192 Id. at 628-29.  The Court noted that prior to accepting this formulation, “the Parent and Teachers 
Association, the Boy and Girl Scouts, the Red Cross, and the Federation of Women’s Clubs” were 
concerned that the required salute was similar to that of the salute to Hitler.  Id. at 627-28.   
193 Id. at 629. 
194 Id. at 641.  In its decision, the Barnette Court expressly overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 
310 U.S. 586 (1940), where the Court held that a Pennsylvania board of education could compel students 
and teachers to participate in saluting the flag and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance just three years earlier.  
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.   
195 Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834, 835 (3d Cir. 1978). 
196 430 U.S. 705 (1974) (holding that the enforcement of a state statute allowing criminal sanctions against 
persons who covered up the state motto on their licenses plates violated the First Amendment). 
	  	   44 
students to stand during the salute equated to “requiring a student to engage in what 
amounts to implicit expression” and, thus, the compulsion of this expression violated the 
First Amendment.197  The Lipp court specifically looked to the Court’s holding in Wooley 
to support the notion that the government does not necessarily need to force the 
individual to actually speak in order to raise First Amendment concerns related to 
compelled speech.198  As the Wooley Court noted, the First Amendment not only protects 
against the government compelling a person to announce specific words by speaking, as 
was the case in Barnette, but also more broadly protects a citizen’s right “to refuse to 
foster . . . an idea they find morally objectionable.”199  The expressive activity in Lipp 
demonstrates the type of compelled recitations that do not require actual speech, but 
rather “implicit expression,” usually through requiring a student to engage in specific 
expressive conduct that amounts to “speech.” 
 Vincent Blasi and Seana Shiffrin were the first scholars to argue that compelled 
recitations may constitute a unique category of compelled student speech, raising distinct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Lipp, F.2d at 836 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1974)). 
198 Lipp, 579 F.2d at 836. 
199 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.  In Wooley, the Court noted that there were distinctions between the type of 
speech at issue in Barnette and Wooley, but found that the differences were slight.  For this reason, the 
same level of First Amendment protection against compelled speech appeared to be recognized.  The 
Wooley Court explained: 
The Court in Barnette . . . was faced with a state statute which required public school 
students to participate in daily public ceremonies by honoring the flag both with words 
and traditional salute gestures . . . . Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute 
involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act of 
carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the difference is essentially one of degree. 
Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part 
of his daily life – indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view – to be an 
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds 
unacceptable. In doing so, the State “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is 
the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control.” 
Id. at 714-15 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
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First Amendment considerations.200  The scholars argued that First Amendment 
protection against most types of compelled speech is justified because compulsion of 
speech violates an individual’s right to refrain from speaking or to refrain from delivering 
speech others might believe is a reflection of the speaker’s beliefs.201  Compelled 
recitations are different, however, because the audience is usually aware that the speech 
is part of a government-mandated exercise and, thus, is unlikely to attribute the speech to 
the speaker’s own beliefs.202  The real problem, Blasi and Shiffrin asserted, is that not 
participating in the government-mandated exercise causes “self-exposure” because the 
audience will likely infer that the nonparticipant does not agree with the message.203  The 
speaker who does not agree with the government-compelled recitation then is left with 
two options, not participate and raise awareness of his or her disagreement, or participate 
insincerely so as not to risk revealing his or her actual beliefs.204 
 Shiffrin advanced this discussion in a separate law review article and sought to 
explain the First Amendment issues raised by government-compelled recitations.  She 
explained that compelled recitations fail to recognize a distinction between “the 
proponent of the views (the state) and the intended audience (the students).”205  Instead of 
allowing the student to understand, deliberate, and evaluate information, during a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 See generally Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92.  
201 Id. at 456. 
202 Id.  The Ninth Circuit adopted this view in a challenge the constitutionality of school-mandated 
uniforms for students.  The court found that requiring students to wear uniforms did not equate to 
compelled speech, because “it is unlikely that anyone viewing a uniform-clad student would understand the 
student to be communicating a particular message via his or her mandatory dress.”  Jacobs v. Clark County 
Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 428 (9th Cir. 2008). 
203 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 456. 
204 Id. 
205 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 884. 
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compelled recitation, a student is simply “corralled” into speaking the words required by 
the government.206  Because individual reflection is not part of the process, Shiffrin 
argued, compelled recitations do not allow students to “arrive at conclusions that are truly 
their own.”207  Government-compelled recitations, whether they require the student to 
actually say specific words or to participate in other “implicit expression,” raise unique 
First Amendment concerns, at least according to Blasi and Shiffrin.  However, while 
Blasi and Shiffrin have argued that compelled recitations may be a distinct category of 
compelled speech, deserving of unique considerations under the First Amendment, courts 
have yet to explicitly accept that view. 
Courts’ Treatment of the Constitutionality of Compelled Recitations 
This section reviews the eight court opinions that have addressed the 
constitutionality of compelled recitations.  The first part of this section discusses the two 
Supreme Court cases on point and provides a summary of the Court’s analysis in 
Barnette.  Barnette is useful for this discussion not only because it remains binding 
precedent, but also because some elements of the opinion are important to develop a 
complete understanding of the proper level of First Amendment protection against 
compelled recitations.  For example, the Court presented an interesting justification for its 
decision, namely that the Framers’ understood the First Amendment to protect against 
compelled recitations like the one at issue in the case.  The Court also seemed to find that 
First Amendment protection against compelled recitations might need to be particularly 
strong in the school setting. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Id. 
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The second part of this section discusses the six lower court cases dealing with the 
constitutionality of compelled recitations.  Those cases provide an analysis of the 
difference between situations where Barnette applies and where Tinker, a Supreme Court 
student speech censorship case, applies.  The lower court cases also provide other 
information important to understanding the constitutionality of school-compelled 
recitations.  The cases include discussion of the view that compelled recitations include 
government-mandated speech as well as implicit expression, like standing at attention 
during the Pledge; recognition of additional justifications for strong First Amendment 
protections against compelled recitations, like the rationale that compulsion of speech 
may have a chilling effect on the speech of other students; and development of one 
special consideration that supports recognizing strong First Amendment protection 
against compelled recitations in a school setting, namely that compelled recitations in a 
school setting may be particularly problematic because of the power imbalance between 
students and teachers and administrators.  The following section reviews the eight 
compelled recitation cases. 
Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Constitutionality of Compelled Recitations 
 The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of First Amendment protections 
against government-compelled recitations imposed on public school students in only two 
cases.  The Supreme Court first dealt with the issue in the 1940 case Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis.208  In that case, two school children and their parents challenged the 
students’ expulsions from public school for violating a Pennsylvania board of education 
policy that required all students to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance by reciting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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Pledge and standing with their hands over their hearts.209  The students, who were 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, asserted that they refused to participate because they believed that 
“such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by command of scripture.”210  
Ultimately the Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Felix Frankfurter, held that the 
policy requiring students to participate in the Pledge was constitutional.211  
 In its analysis of the First Amendment issued raised in Gobitis, the Court focused 
on whether requiring students to participate in the Pledge violated the free exercise of 
religion, rather than the free speech, clause of the First Amendment.212 The Gobitis Court 
did briefly note the possibility that compelling recitations might raise free speech 
concerns, but did not explore the nature of First Amendment protections derived from the 
free speech clause.  The Court instead asserted that even if the First Amendment 
“includes freedom from conveying what may be deemed an implied but rejected 
affirmation,” the government interest in “national cohesion” still overrides this 
protection.213  In brushing aside the free speech issue, the Court noted that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Id. at 591.  The phrase “participating in the Pledge” is used throughout this thesis and includes both the 
actual recitation of the words of the Pledge as well as any expressive activities, like standing at attention or 
placing one’s hand over one’s heart, that were compelled while the Pledge was recited.  For a discussion of 
the different policies related to the Pledge, see infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text. 
210 Id. at 592. 
211 Id. at 600. 
212 See id. at 593-95 (discussing whether mandating that public school students must participate in the 
Pledge violates their right to religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment). The Court found that 
one main goal of the free exercise clause was to promote religious toleration, but the Court asserted that the 
protection of this goal should be balanced against the ability of government to promote the common good.  
Id. at 593-94.  Here, the Court argued that the purpose for requiring students to participate in the Pledge 
was to build a “free society,” which is accomplished through a “cohesive sentiment.”  Id. at 596.  
Furthermore, the Court noted that just because some individuals may hold religious beliefs that conflict 
with a particular law does not mean that law violates the First Amendment’s free exercise clause.  Id. at 
594-95.  The Court found that the board of education policy did not violate the students’ right to freedom of 
religion protected by the First Amendment because the policy was “a general law not aimed at the 
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”  Id. at 594.   
213 Id. at 595. 
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government’s interest in promoting national unity and, through that, national security was 
“an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values.”214  After its determination 
that the government interest in the case trumped any First Amendment concerns, the 
Court held that schools could compel students to participate in the Pledge, pointing out 
that people who opposed policies like the one at issue in Gobitis may attempt to effect 
change through the legislative process.215 
Finally, while Gobitis was decided before the Court expressly recognized that 
public school students may have less First Amendment protection than adults,216 the 
Court did deem it noteworthy that the plaintiffs were students.  The Court noted that the 
Pennsylvania policy was justified by the “belief in the desirable ends to be secured by 
having its public school children share a common experience at those periods of 
development when their minds are supposedly receptive to its assimilation . . . .”217  
While the Court did not expressly state that its holding was based, at least in part, on the 
fact that the plaintiffs were public school students, the fact that this policy was imposed 
in schools seemed to be one reason why the Court was deferential to the government.218  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Id. at 595.  After the Court asserted the importance of the government’s interest in promoting national 
unity, it reframed the issue before it.  The Court stated the question was “whether the legislatures of the 
various states and the authorities in a thousand counties and school districts of this country are barred from 
determining the appropriateness of various means to evoke that unifying sentiment without which there can 
ultimately be no liberties, civil or religious.”  Id. at 597. 
215 Id. at 600. 
216 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
217 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597. 
218 Id. at 597-98.  The Court noted that: 
To stigmatize legislative judgment in providing for this universal gesture of respect for 
the symbol of our national life in the setting of the common school as a lawless inroad on 
that freedom of conscience which the Constitution protects, would amount to no less than 
the pronouncement of pedagogical and psychological dogma in a field where courts 
possess no marked and certainly no controlling competence. 
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From the opinion, it is unclear whether the Court would have recognized stronger free 
speech protections for adults. 
 Regardless of the Court’s justifications for its holding in Gobitis, the power of the 
decision was short-lived. The ruling was overturned by the Court in 1943, just three years 
later, in the seminal case dealing with compelled recitations in schools, West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette.219  Barnette also involved a challenge by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to a board of education resolution that required all public school students to 
recite the Pledge of Allegiance.220  Unlike in Gobitis, however, the Barnette Court 
focused its analysis on the free speech, rather than freedom of religion, issues raised by 
the compelled recitations.221   
 The Court noted that while the plaintiffs in both Gobitis and Barnette objected to 
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance because of religious reasons, this was not the central 
issue in either case.222  The Court said the flaw in the Gobitis opinion was the assumption 
that the government’s compulsion of the Pledge was constitutional in the first place, 
regardless of the religious basis of the objections raised by the plaintiffs.223  In its 
decision to overrule Gobitis, the Court made clear that the proper First Amendment 
challenge to the constitutionality of the government-compelled Pledge focused on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Id. 
219 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
220 Id. at 629. 
221 See id. at 635 (noting that the Gobitis Court “only examined and rejected a claim based on religious 
beliefs of immunity from an unquestioned general rule”); supra note 212 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Gobitis Court’s focus on freedom of religion in its analysis of the constitutionality of the 
board of education’s policy). 
222 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-36. 
223 Id. at 635-36. 
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restriction it placed on free speech.224 A proper analysis, the Court reasoned, should turn 
on “whether such a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be 
imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to any 
political organization under our Constitution.”225  If the Court found that the government 
may compel students to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance, then the Court could 
examine the constitutionality of the statute based on the religious objections raised by the 
plaintiffs.226  The Barnette Court, however, never reached the free exercise challenge 
because it held that the government compulsion of the Pledge of Allegiance violated any 
protesting student’s First Amendment rights, not just the rights of those students who 
objected on religious grounds.227   
The Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Robert Jackson, noted that schools 
have a valid interest in promoting patriotism.  The real issue in Barnette then, the Court 
reasoned, was not the goal that the school was trying to accomplish through the 
compelled recitation, but rather the means through which it attempted to reach this 
goal.228  The Barnette Court asserted that the proper, albeit somewhat vague, test for 
assessing the constitutionality of the policy was to determine if the government 
compulsion of speech in this case was “a permissible means” for the government to reach 
its goal.229  Justice Jackson characterized the means employed by government as follows: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 See id. at 635. 
225 Id.  
226 Id. (“It is not necessary to inquire whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute 
unless we first find power to make the salute a legal duty.”). 
227 Id. at 642. 
228 Id. at 631. 
229 Id. at 640. 
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[W]e are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief. They 
are not merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that they may be 
informed as to what it is or even what it means. The issue here is whether 
this slow and easily neglected route to aroused loyalties constitutionally 
may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory salute and slogan.230 
 
The Court then considered the nature of First Amendment protections in order to 
assess the constitutionality of the board of education policy.  The Court found that 
protection against government compulsion of speech meant to demonstrate “adherence to 
government as presently organized” was implicit in the Framers’ understanding of free 
speech.231  While it was, at the time, commonly understood that the First Amendment 
protected against government censorship of speech with the exception of speech that 
would cause a clear and present danger, the Court noted that compelled speech may be 
guarded against by even stronger First Amendment protections.232  The Court stated that 
government could justify compelling speech “only on even more immediate and urgent 
grounds” than it could justify censoring speech.233  
While this conclusion is strongly worded, it is difficult to distill from the Barnette 
opinion when, if ever, government compelled recitations in public schools may pass 
constitutional muster.  What doctrinal test can be taken away from Barnette?  It is clear 
that the Court examined the government interest as well as the means used to reach that 
goal and applied some form of balancing test.234  It is unclear whether a compelled 
recitation is ever a constitutional means to reach even a legitimate governmental goal.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Id. at 631. 
231 Id. at 633. 
232 Id.  
233 Id. 
234 See discussion supra note 229 and accompanying text; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640. 
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What does appear clear is that, at least in 1943 when Barnette was handed down, the 
Court explicitly stated that it could not name an exception to its finding.235  Furthermore, 
although the Barnette Court dealt specifically with the issue of government-compelled 
recitations, it is unclear whether the applicability of its analysis is limited to that specific 
type of compelled speech. 
In addition to recognizing strong First Amendment protection against compelled 
recitations, the Barnette Court did not seem persuaded by the notion that students in 
public schools should receive a lower standard of First Amendment protection than 
adults, at least based on the facts in that case.236  The Court noted that provisions enacted 
by boards of education, just like those enacted by any other government-entity, must pass 
constitutional scrutiny.  The Court reasoned:   
[Boards of education] have, of course, important, delicate, and highly 
discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the 
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms 
of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and 
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.237 
 
Based on this rationale, it appears that the Barnette Court not only believed the First 
Amendment rights of students to be equal to those of adults, at least in this particular 
situation, but also found that there might be a greater need for protection in schools 
because of schools’ important role in educating young people.238  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
236 See id. at 637-38. 
237 Id. at 637. 
238 See id.  The Supreme Court has since found that, at least in the case of school censorship of speech, 
students may be afforded less First Amendment protections than adults.  As the Court explained:  
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Finally, after concluding that the board of education policy that compelled 
students to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance violated the students’ First Amendment 
rights, the Court’s conclusion reaffirmed the importance of the issues at stake in Barnette: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances 
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.239 
 
 Although Barnette leaves many important issues open, it is essential to understand 
the Court’s reasoning in Barnette because it is the only compelled student speech case 
decided by the Supreme Court that is still binding precedent.240  Furthermore, several 
important points can be understood from Barnette: (1) the First Amendment protects 
against government compulsion of speech to the same extent, or possibly more, than it 
protect against government censorship of speech;241 (2) schools serve an important role in 
society and, in recognition of that important role, there may be situations where First 
Amendment protections should be greater for public school students than for adults;242 
and (3) even when there is an important government interest at stake, the practice of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
It does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an offensive form of 
expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political 
point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school . . . . [T]he 
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings.   
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
239 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
240 As previously mentioned, Barnette overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 
(1940).  Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
241 See discussion supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text. 
242 See discussion supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. 
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compelling recitations is a “short-cut”243 to reaching that government goal, raising serious 
First Amendment concerns.244   
Lower Courts’ Treatment of the Constitutionality of Compelled Recitations  
 Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Barnette, the constitutionality of compelled 
recitations has been addressed six times by lower courts.245  In the wake of Barnette, 
many lower courts struggled to determine what action, if any, the government could 
require of students choosing not to participate during the Pledge of Allegiance in public 
schools.  Some schools and states instituted policies requiring students to silently stand 
during the Pledge,246 while others required non-participating students to leave the room247 
or choose between leaving the room and standing.248  Courts addressing the 
constitutionality of these provisions sometimes applied Barnette and sometimes applied 
the test announced by the Supreme Court in Tinker, a case dealing with the censorship of 
student speech.  The courts discussing the distinction between Barnette and Tinker found 
that Barnette only applied to assess the constitutionality of the school policies and not the 
First Amendment protection for the students’ actions in resistance to the policies.  Some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631. 
244 See discussion supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text. 
245 See generally Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004); Lipp v. Morris, 
579 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973); Banks v. Bd. of Public 
Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971); Frain v. Baron, 
307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).  This analysis does 
not include cases where the court deemed that recitations were not compelled.  For example, the Tenth 
Circuit in Bauchman v. West High School found that a student was not compelled during choir to sing 
religious songs because she was not actually forced to participate.  132 F.3d 542, 558 (10th Cir. 1997). 
246 See Lipp, 579 F.2d at 835 n.2 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-3); Banks, 314 F. Supp. at 303 n.3, aff’d 
mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (noting that a Florida school board policy required students to stand during the Pledge 
and the National Anthem). 
247 Frain, 307 F. Supp. at 30 (citing a policy of the New York City Superintendent of Schools). 
248 Goetz, 477 F.2d at 636 (discussing the option of standing or leaving the room during the Pledge that was 
offered to students in a New York high school). 
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of the lower court cases also provide useful discussion of the justifications for guarding 
against compelled speech and the special considerations that support recognizing strong 
First Amendment protection against compelled recitations when the compulsion takes 
place in a school setting. 
 The courts addressing the First Amendment concerns surrounding these new 
Pledge policies often sought to distinguish the protections recognized in Barnette from 
the protections subsequently recognized by the Supreme Court in a student speech 
censorship case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.249  The 
U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of Florida 
and the District of Arizona provided useful discussion of when courts should apply 
Barnette and when courts should apply Tinker.    
In Frain v. Baron,250 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
found a difference between Barnette-like and Tinker-like cases in a challenge to a New 
York City policy that required non-participating students to leave the room during the 
Pledge of Allegiance.251  The court explained that Barnette alone was not controlling in 
that case because Barnette dealt with a policy that actually compelled students to recite 
the Pledge, whereas the Frain policy only required students to leave the classroom.252  
The court found that Tinker was controlling since the real issue in this case was not the 
constitutionality of a compelled recitation, but rather the censorship of the students’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 393 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that public high schools students’ right to wear black armbands in protest 
of the Vietnam War was protected by the First Amendment). 
250 307 F. Supp. 27. 
251 Id. at 30. 
252 Id. at 31. 
	  	   57 
expression, namely the students’ demonstration of their disagreement with the Pledge by 
remaining silently in the room.253  The court explained the distinction between situations 
where Barnette would apply versus situations where Tinker would apply as follows: “The 
original concern with limitation of the state’s power to compel a student to act contrary to 
his beliefs has shifted to a concern for affirmative protection of the student’s right to 
express his beliefs.”254  Following this reasoning, the court found that Barnette should be 
used to assess the First Amendment protection against government compelled recitations 
whereas Tinker should be used to assess the First Amendment protection for students to 
express their beliefs, even when their conduct violates a school policy.  In other words, 
Barnette controls what a government cannot do, and Tinker controls what a student can 
do.  Based on Tinker,255 the Frain court ultimately granted the student’s motion for 
preliminary injunction against the school and held that the school had the burden of 
establishing that allowing students to remain seated during the Pledge “materially 
infringed the rights of other students or caused disruption.”256 
This practice of distinguishing between the First Amendment protections in 
Barnette and those in Tinker was adopted by the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida in Banks v. Board of Public Instruction.257  In that case, a Florida high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Id. at 30-31. 
254 Id. at 30. 
255 Id. at 31 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker makes it unnecessary to explore further the 
differences between Barnette and the present case.”). 
256 Id. at 32-33. 
257 See Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 303 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 450 F.2d 
1103 (5th Cir. 1971).  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially issued an opinion 
in Banks.  This opinion was subsequently affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.  See Banks, 450 F.2d 1103.  The 
reasoning discussed in this section comes from the district court opinion.  See generally Banks, 314 F. 
Supp. 285. 
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school student challenged a school board regulation under which he was punished for 
refusing to stand during the Pledge of Allegiance.258  Unlike the district court in Frain, 
the Banks court accepted that both Barnette and Tinker applied when assessing the 
constitutionality of that policy.259  The Banks court reasoned that the student’s refusal to 
stand was a form of expression similar to that recognized as protected under the First 
Amendment in Tinker.260  The court found that refusing to stand was an act of expression 
because it was meant as a “protest against black repression in the United States.”261  
Furthermore, the court noted that the policy requiring students to stand was like the 
school policy at issue in Barnette requiring students to actually recite the Pledge.  The 
Banks court explained that the school policy was like the one in Barnette because “the 
regulation required the individual to communicate, by standing, his acceptance of and 
respect for all that for which our flag is but a symbol.”262  Thus, the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida affirmed the view that the student’s refusal to stand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Banks involved a student who refused to stand during the Pledge of Allegiance.  The district court 
explained the applicability of Barnette and Tinker in that case as follows: 
 
Without more Barnette would be dispositive of this matter for Andrew Banks was 
suspended for his refusal to act in accordance with a regulation, the operation of which 
prevented him from exercising his First Amendment rights. Yet, the tenor of Barnette is 
negative. It prohibits the state from compelling individuals to act in a certain manner; it is 
not a recognition of student’s [sic] rights. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's 
decision in [Tinker] speaks affirmatively. There the court held that public school students 
could not be suspended for wearing black arm-bands to protest American involvement in 
Vietnam, a form of silent protest and non-disruptive First Amendment expression in the 
classroom. 
Id. at 295 (citations omitted).  
258 Id. at 287. 
259 Id. at 295-96. 
260 Id. at 295. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 296. 
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was protected by the First Amendment as discussed in Tinker and the school’s regulation 
that required students to stand during the Pledge was unconstitutional under Barnette.263   
Beyond these cases that dealt with the compulsion of the Pledge of Allegiance in 
public schools, a federal district court addressed the constitutionality of an Arizona Board 
of Education policy that required students to stand during the National Anthem.264  While 
this case was decided before Tinker, it still provides useful insight into when Barnette, 
rather than Tinker, should apply.  Similar to the facts in Barnette, the students in Sheldon 
v. Fannin refused to stand during the National Anthem and were expelled as a result of 
that action.  The students in Sheldon believed that standing during the anthem ran counter 
to their religious beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses.265  While the students raised First 
Amendment claims based on the free exercise clause, the court ultimately found that 
Barnette was controlling and issued a permanent injunction, barring the school from 
expelling or suspending students for refusing to stand during the National Anthem.266  In 
its decision, the court characterized Barnette as a decision grounded in both the free 
exercise and free speech clauses.267  The court explained that Barnette stood for the 
principle that “the governmental authority may not directly coerce the unwilling 
expression of any belief, even in the name of ‘national unity’ in time of war.”268  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 See id. at 295-97. 
264 Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 769 (D. Ariz. 1963). 
265 Id. at 768. 
266 Id. at 774-75. 
267 Id. at 775. 
268 Id. 
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case was handed down six years prior to the Court’s decision in Tinker.269  Nevertheless, 
the federal district court noted an exception to student speech rights in dicta, explaining 
that the First Amendment does not protect “unruly or boisterous conduct” that might 
disrupt “order and discipline” in the classroom.270  From Sheldon, it appears that Barnette 
applies to cases even where a student’s objections are not based on religion, but a 
student’s objections cannot cause a disruption as the Court later declared in Tinker. 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits squarely addressed 
the issue of what actions outside of actually requiring a student to speak amounted to 
compelled recitations and, thus, were subject to First Amendment protection under 
Barnette.  In Goetz v. Ansell,271 the Second Circuit grappled with a school policy that 
required non-participating students to stand during the Pledge of Allegiance or leave the 
room.272  A high school student challenged the constitutionality of that policy, arguing 
that it was his First Amendment right to silently remain seated in the classroom during 
the Pledge.273  The Second Circuit agreed, finding that the two alternatives offered to 
students under the policy violated their rights.  Relying heavily on Barnette, the court 
noted that compelling students to stand during the Pledge is just as troubling from a First 
Amendment perspective as compelling them to actually recite the Pledge.274  Like the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  
270 Sheldon, 221 F. Supp. at 775. 
271 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973). 
272 Id. at 636. 
273 Id. at 637. 
274 Id. at 637-38.  “[T]he alternative offered plaintiff of standing in silence is an act that cannot be 
compelled over his deeply held convictions. It can no more be required than the pledge itself.”  Id. at 638. 
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Banks court,275 the Second Circuit reasoned that standing was an act that expressed 
respect for and affirmation of the Pledge and the symbolism of the flag.276  The court, 
thus, found that Barnette applied to the school policy based on the logic that if the school 
“cannot compel participation in the pledge, it cannot punish non-participation.”277  While 
the Second Circuit mainly relied on Barnette, the court did mention Tinker in its opinion.  
The Goetz court also noted that sitting silently, as the plaintiff wished to do, did not cause 
a “substantial and material disruption” under Tinker and, thus, could not be precluded 
from First Amendment protection under that precedent.278  Finally, the court noted that 
the policy was not saved by the fact that non-participating students had the option to 
leave the classroom.  The court reasoned that requiring non-participating students to 
leave the classroom could be viewed as a punishment and, thus, was not a reasonable 
alternative.279  The Second Circuit’s approach rested most strongly on the notion that 
compelling a student to stand during the Pledge violated a student’s First Amendment 
rights in the same way as compelling a student to actually recite the words of the 
Pledge.280  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 See discussion supra notes 262 and accompanying text. 
276 Goetz, 477 F.2d at 637-38. 
277 Id. at 638. 
278 Id.  
279 Id. 
280 Id. at 638 (noting that with the provision allowing the student to leave the room, “the effect upon the 
plaintiff of adhering to his convictions is far less drastic than in Barnette,” but still recognizing that 
“standing ‘is no less a gesture of acceptance and respect than is the salute or the utterance of the words of 
allegiance’”) (quoting Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 296 (S.D. Fla.1970), aff’d mem., 
450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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Similar to the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit relied heavily on Barnette in 
reaching its finding that a New Jersey statute requiring students to “stand at attention”281 
during the Pledge violated the First Amendment.  In Lipp v. Morris, a high school student 
objected to standing during the Pledge and argued that she did so “only because she had 
been threatened.”282  The Third Circuit, citing Banks and Goetz, found that the requiring 
students to stand during the Pledge “amount[ed] to implicit expression”283 and that 
government compulsion of such expression violated the First Amendment rights of the 
students.284  This characterization that “implicit expression” outside of actual speech 
constitutes compelled recitations supports the definition presented earlier in this chapter 
and presents a standard that could be used in future cases. 
The most recent compelled recitation case, decided in 2004, dealt with a school 
punishing a student for failing to recite the Pledge of Allegiance despite a state statute 
noting that student participation in the Pledge was voluntary.285  This case includes a 
pertinent discussion of an audience-based justification for strong First Amendment 
protection against compelled recitations and as well as a discussion of the power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834, 835 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-3). 
282 Id. at 835. 
283 Id. at 836. 
284 Id.  Unlike the other lower courts, the Third Circuit did not discuss Tinker; this was perhaps because 
Lipp was the only case in which the student adhered to the policy in school and only challenged it in court, 
thus failing to raise the issue of whether the manner in which the student refused to participate was 
constitutionally protected.  See id. at 835.  See also Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 636 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(noting that the high school student “refuses to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance”); Banks v. Bd. of 
Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 287 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(discussing that the student was suspended for refusing to stand during the Pledge); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. 
Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (noting that the junior high and high schools students who brought that case 
refused to stand during the Pledge as required by New York City school policy). 
285 Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing ALA. CODE 
§§ 16-6B2(h), 16-43-5). 
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imbalance in schools which is a special consideration supporting the notion that there 
should be strong First Amendment protection against compelled recitations that take 
place in a school setting. 
In Holloman v. Harland, an Alabama high school student remained silent and 
raised his fist in the air during the Pledge of Allegiance, apparently in protest after his 
teacher reprimanded a classmate on the previous day for not reciting the Pledge.286  
Holloman, the student, was chastised in front of the class and sent to the principal’s office 
where he was told that he would not be given his diploma until he spent three days in 
detention.  The incident happened late in the school year, however, so there was not 
enough time for Holloman to complete his punishment prior to graduation.  The principal 
“consequently offered Holloman the opportunity to receive a paddling instead.  Holloman 
agreed and, with [the teacher] watching, was paddled by [the principal].”287  The federal 
district court granted summary judgment to the principal and teacher in Holloman, but the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed that holding in part because it 
found that Holloman’s First Amendment rights were violated.288   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1260-61.  The other student who was previously reprimanded for not 
participating was originally listed as a plaintiff in the suit, but was later dropped from the suit in an 
amended complaint.  Id. at 1262.  The teacher apparently took exception to the fact that he remained silent 
during the Pledge, especially because he was the recipient of a U.S. Air Force Academy scholarship.  Id. at 
1260.  The teacher ordered the student to issue an apology to the class and also threatened to report him to 
his Air Force Academy recruiter and the Congressman who recommended him for the Academy.  Id.  After 
that, the teacher went to a physics class and declared that anyone who “‘refused to say the pledge or 
committed similar action would be punished.’”  Id. (quoting the teacher who demanded an apology and 
threatened to report the student).  
287 Id. at 1261. 
288 See id. at 1260, 1294-95.  The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
based on a finding that they had qualified immunity.  Id. at 1260.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, noting 
that its findings on the constitutional claims in the case were binding and stating that “Holloman has 
successfully articulated claims against the School Board for violations of his Speech Clause right to be free 
from compelled speech.”  Id. at 1264 n.7, 1294-95. 
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The Eleventh Circuit noted that the First Amendment protects against government 
compulsion of speech and that this right “unquestionably exist[s] in public schools.”289  
Citing Barnette, the court noted that several assertions supported the claim that Holloman 
was disciplined for remaining silent during the Pledge: (1) the incident the day before in 
which a classmate was threatened for non-participation; (2) the teacher’s deposition in the 
case which reflected that she was “deeply offended by the notion of Americans not 
wanting to salute the flag”; (3) the teacher’s threat that students who refused to 
participate would be punished; and (4) Holloman’s account of the incident, including his 
claim that he was told that he was being punished for refusing the recite the Pledge.290  
The Eleventh Circuit found that if these facts were proven at trial, they would establish as 
a matter of law that the school and its officials violated Holloman’s First Amendment 
right against government compulsion of speech.291 
Citing Barnette, the court found that a school may not compel a student to recite 
the Pledge and, thus, “any ‘reasonable person would have known’ that disciplining 
Holloman for refusing to recite the pledge impermissibly chills his First Amendment 
rights.”292  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that punishing Holloman had a potential 
chilling effect upon other students, especially since Holloman was reprimanded and 
punished by authority figures “whose words carry a presumption of legitimacy.”293  The 
court further noted that the chilling effect of the punishment may be heightened in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Id. at 1264. 
290 Id. at 1268. 
291 Id. at 1268-69. 
292 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
293 Id. at 1269. 
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school setting “‘where . . . the risk of compulsion is especially high’” and, therefore, 
pressuring student conformity “may not be used to deter, even if ‘subtl[y] or indirect[ly],’ 
the exercise of constitutional rights.”294  Unlike the approach of other circuits,295 the 
Eleventh Circuit rested its holding on the compelled speech issue, at least in part, on the 
notion that Barnette also protects against the potential effect that the compulsion and 
subsequent punishment for noncompliance may have on students other than the 
speaker.296 
Conclusions on the Constitutionality of Compelled Recitations 
 Four key points emerged from this analysis of the literature and cases addressing 
compelled recitations.  The first key point is that there is a wide range of justifications for 
strong First Amendment protections against compelled recitations.  While courts and 
scholars presented several reasons why government compulsion of recitations violates the 
First Amendment, there was not one universal justification that emerged. The second key 
point is the recognition that compelled recitations include situations beyond those where 
students are required to actually speak.  The third key point is the acknowledgment of 
special considerations that support recognizing strong First Amendment protection 
against compelled recitations when the compulsion takes place in a school setting.  The 
fourth key point is the difference between situations where Barnette controls and 
situations where Tinker controls.  It is important to note that regardless of the approach 
adopted by the courts, the students prevailed over the schools in every post-Barnette case 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)). 
295 See supra notes 251-80 (discussing the distinction other courts adopted in applying Barnette and 
Tinker). 
296 See Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1269. 
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discussed in this chapter.297  This section will discuss, in turn, the findings related to each 
key point. 
 The first key point derived from this discussion is the wide range of justifications 
for strong First Amendment protections against compelled recitations.  Both courts and 
scholars reasoned that compelled recitations violate the First Amendment, but they 
presented a wide range of justifications for that conclusion.  As Blasi and Shriffin noted, 
one major problem with compelled recitations is that “[t]hese methods constitute efforts 
forcible to inculcate and to instill rather than to persuade through direct, transparent 
arguments, reasons, or even direct, transparent emotional appeals.”298  The scholars 
further noted that one particular issue unique to compelled recitations is self-exposure 
through non-participation by the speaker.299  The Supreme Court in Barnette, on the other 
hand, seemed persuaded by the notion that the Framers understood the First Amendment 
to protect against the government compelling speech that reflects “adherence to 
government as presently organized.”300  The Eleventh Circuit in Holloman expressed 
concern that compelling recitations and subsequent punishments for refusal to comply 
with these compelled recitation policies would have the effect of chilling the speech of 
other students, not just the speech of the speaker.301  Other courts appeared to apply a 
speaker-based approach, finding that schools could not compel recitations because the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Gobitis was the only case where the school won and was subsequently overturned by Barnette.  See 
Barnette v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S 624, 642 (1943). 
298 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 458. 
299 Id. at 456. 
300 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633; supra note 231-32 and accompanying text. 
301 Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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compulsion violates the speaker’s right to free expression.302  While one pervasive 
justification does not arise from the scholarly discussion and the courts’ treatment of 
compelled recitations, it generally appears that government compulsion of recitations 
seems at odds with the First Amendment because it disregards the true beliefs of the 
speaker, forces dissenters to participate or expose their thoughts, and may have the effect 
of chilling the speech of others who witness the punishment of peers for noncompliance. 
 The second key point derived from this discussion is recognition that compelled 
recitations include situations beyond those where students are required to actually speak.  
The analysis of the compelled recitations cases demonstrated the courts’ acceptance that 
compulsion of both words and actions are protected against by the First Amendment.303  
As the Third Circuit explained in Lipp, precedent makes clear that the state cannot 
compel “a student to engage in what amounts to implicit expression,” like requiring a 
student to stand during the Pledge.304  Thus, First Amendment protection extends to 
guard against the government compulsion of actions that constitute “implicit expression” 
as well as government compulsion of actual speech. 
 The third key point derived from this discussion is the special considerations that 
support recognizing strong First Amendment protection against compelled recitations 
when the compulsion takes place in a school setting.  Through this analysis, it appears 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 See, e.g., Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that requiring a student to stand 
during the Pledge “is an act that cannot be compelled over [the student’s] deeply held convictions”); Banks 
v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 296 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 
1971) (finding that standing during the Pledge reflects “acceptance of and respect for all that [] our flag” 
represents): Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963) (noting that “governmental authority 
may not directly coerce the unwilling expression of any belief”).   
303 See Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834, 836 (3d Cir. 1978); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 637-38 (2d Cir. 
1973); Banks, 314 F. Supp. at 295-96; Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27, 30-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Sheldon v. 
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963). 
304 Lipp, 579 F.2d at 836. 
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that the First Amendment protection against compelled recitations is extremely strong 
even in a school setting.  In fact, the dicta in some of the cases seems to indicate that the 
First Amendment should be more protective in the school setting than in a different 
setting.  As the Barnette Court noted, there should be “scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual” in schools because of their role in educating 
the citizenry.305  Blasi and Shiffrin also argued that the Barnette holding rested on the 
notion that compelled recitations are particularly troubling in a school setting: 
[The holding in Barnette] derives from the assumption that a person’s 
youth and schooling are the primary time and place at which the moral, 
civic, and intellectual virtues, virtues essential to the functioning of a 
democratic society are developed.  Sincerity, authenticity, tolerance, 
responsibility for one’s beliefs, and intellectual independence cannot 
emerge and flourish in a context of inculcation and are not easily or 
reliably acquired later in life.  Hence the importance of the developmental 
years to the realization of a culture that sustains and celebrates the 
freedom of speech.306 
 
The Holloman court also noted that protecting against government compulsion in 
student speech was particularly important because of the power imbalance between 
students and teachers, which may lead to a chilling effect on other students’ speech.307  
Furthermore, as Shriffin recognized, some of the issues raised by compulsion of speech 
are particularly troubling in a school setting because they undermine the students’ critical 
thinking skills, the very thing that schools are designed to teach.308  All of these rationales 
further validate the trend of the courts’ willingness to find government compulsion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637. 
306 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 465. 
307 Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004). 
308 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 884. 
	  	   69 
student speech unconstitutional, starting with the Supreme Court’s holding in Barnette309 
and continuing on through the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Holloman.310   
 The fourth key point derived from this discussion is the difference between 
situations where Barnette controls and situations where Tinker controls.   In the view of 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York311 and the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida,312 the constitutionality of the government’s 
compulsion of a recitation should be assessed under Barnette.  In situations where a court 
is assessing the constitutionality of the action taken by the student in lieu of participating 
in the Pledge, such as in Banks where the student refused to stand,313 courts found Tinker 
should control.314  While the courts do not appear to adopt a particular test from Barnette, 
when Barnette was found to be controlling, the school policy was always found by the 
court to violate the First Amendment.315  When Tinker was found to control, the student’s 
actions were found to be protected by the First Amendment so long as the actions “d[id] 
not materially infringe the rights of other students or disrupt school activities.”316 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 See generally Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 
310 See generally Holloman, 370 F.3d 1252. 
311 See Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
312 See Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 450 F.2d 1103 
(5th Cir. 1971). 
313 Id. 
314 Id.; Frain, 307 F. Supp. at 32. 
315 See Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004); Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 
834 (3d Cir. 1978); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973); Banks, 314 F. Supp. at 295-97; Sheldon 
v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774-65 (D. Ariz. 1963). 
316 Frain, 307 F. Supp. at 32.  See also id. at 31-33 (finding that Tinker was controlling and that the 
student’s decision to remain quietly in the classroom during the Pledge was protected by the First 
Amendment); Banks, 314 F. Supp. at 295-96 (holding that the student’s refusal to stand during the Pledge 
was protected under Tinker). 
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From this line of reasoning, it may be distilled that government compulsion of 
recitations is unconstitutional regardless of the state’s interest.  This position is supported 
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Barnette, where the Court noted that it could not think 
of any exceptions to the rule in that case.317  Furthermore, the government interest at 
stake in Barnette, promoting national unity,318 was the same interest that the Court 
characterized as “an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values” just three 
years earlier in Gobitis.319  Despite the importance of this government interest, the Court 
still found that the individual rights guarded by the First Amendment protection were 
stronger. Thus, while the government may seek to advance important interests through 
compelled recitations, it appears, at least under Barnette and the subsequent lower court 
opinions applying Barnette, that such government interests do not override a student’s 
First Amendment rights against compelled recitations. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  The Barnette Court explained: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there 
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us. 
Id. 
318 Id. at 640. 
319 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940). 
	  	  
 	  
CHAPTER III 
COMPELLED SPEECH FOR MANDATORY EDUCATION EFFORTS 
 Compelled speech for mandatory education efforts is speech that is compelled as 
part of in-class exercises or related homework assignments.  There have only been two 
cases that addressed the constitutionality of the government compulsion of speech as part 
of mandatory education efforts.  In both cases, the courts applied the Hazelwood 
standard, derived from a U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with the censorship of school-
sponsored student speech, to the compelled speech; the schools prevailed in both cases. 
Furthermore, the courts purported that the Hazelwood standard, which is extremely 
deferential to schools, should apply to all compelled speech that is school sponsored; 
school sponsored speech includes speech that occurs outside of the classroom or related 
homework assignments.  In contrast to the courts’ approach, student authors have argued 
that courts should not apply tests used to determine the constitutionality of the censorship 
of speech to the compulsion of speech.   
First, this chapter defines what types of compelled speech fit into this category by 
discussing the relevant literature and illustrative cases.  Second, this chapter discusses the 
two cases that have addressed the constitutionality of compelled student speech for 
mandatory education efforts.  Finally, this chapter concludes by summarizing the findings 
and highlighting the differences between the approach adopted by the courts and those 
proposed by student authors.  
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Definition of Compelled Speech for Mandatory Education Efforts 
 This section seeks to define compelled speech for mandatory education efforts by 
examining the literature and cases. Scholars have argued that compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts is afforded less First Amendment protection than other types 
of speech because schools must be allowed to compel speech in some situations in order 
to teach students.  What distinguishes this category of compelled speech from others is 
the purpose of the compulsion and the context in which the compulsion arises.  The 
purpose of compelled speech for mandatory education efforts is to teach students how to 
think critically and arrive at their own conclusions about a particular issue.  The context 
in which compelled speech for mandatory education efforts arises is either curricular in-
class exercises or homework assigned as part of the curriculum.  The following section 
discusses the pertinent literature and cases that helped to develop this definition of 
compelled speech for mandatory education efforts. 
Compelled speech as part of mandatory education efforts is defined as 
compulsion of speech and expressive activities as part of “classroom exercises designed 
to teach” students.320  This type of compelled speech is different from compelled 
recitations because the compulsion as part of the educational process is intended to 
engage students’ minds and allow them to arrive at their own conclusions.321  Because of 
this respect for a student’s development of his or her own beliefs, Shiffrin concluded that 
it is “constitutionally permissible to require children to be schooled and to subject them to 
direct efforts to influence their mental content, even in light of their resistance and even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 Sullivan, supra note 13, at 559. 
321 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 882. 
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where mandatory education of adults would be constitutionally suspect.”322  Compelled 
speech for mandatory education efforts is considered a distinct category with lower First 
Amendment protection because schools must be given some leeway in order to fulfill 
their mission of educating young people.  
There are two factors that should be examined to identify compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts: the purpose behind the compulsion and context in which the 
speech is compelled.   Shiffrin and Blasi distinguished the purpose behind the compulsion 
of speech as part of mandatory education efforts from the compulsion of recitations as 
follows: 
[E]ducational efforts keyed to persuasion go further and show more 
nuanced attention to the beliefs of students.  A teacher who employs the 
pedagogy of persuasion engages with the questions and doubts of her 
students.  Such a teacher actively nurtures the evaluative and deliberative 
capacities of students to help them arrive at conclusions that are truly their 
own.  Such interactions show respect for the judgments and attitudes of 
students, in contrast to the indifference manifest in recitation 
requirements.323 
 
Compelled speech for mandatory education efforts, then, must be designed to engage the 
student in order to allow him or her to develop his or her own opinions about a specific 
topic.   
Consideration of the context in which the compulsion of speech arises is also 
relevant for determining whether the speech is part of a mandatory education effort.  
Compulsion of speech as part of a mandatory education effort is limited to speech that is 
compelled either as part of a classroom exercise or homework assignment.324  The U.S. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Id. 
323 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 458-59. 
324 The author of this thesis previously noted that compelled speech for mandatory education efforts 
includes speech during “classroom exercises.”  Sullivan, supra note 13, at 559.  The stricter definition 
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit offered two examples of this category of speech in 
dicta, “[A] college history teacher may demand a paper defending Prohibition, and a law-
school professor may assign students to write ‘opinions’ showing how Justices Ginsburg 
and Scalia would analyze a particular Fourth Amendment question.”325  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
offered here is based on the author’s research during the course of this thesis.  The decision to incorporate 
these limitations on the purpose and context of this category of compelled student speech is in response to 
the Tenth Circuit’s discussion in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2005), and is explained 
later in this chapter.  See infra pp. 78-81.  Compelled speech designed to educate and engage a student 
outside of a school setting is not included in this category.  For example, in Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 
(3d Cir. 2010), a district attorney sought to require high school students who were caught participating in 
“sexting” to attend an “educational program.”  Id. at 143-44.  The program involved five sessions: 
In the first session, students are assigned to write “a report explaining why you are here,” 
“[w]hat you did,” “[w]hy it was wrong,” “[d]id you create a victim? If so, who?,” and 
how their actions “affect[ed] the victim[,] [t]he school[, and] the community.” The first 
two sessions focus on sexual violence, and the third on sexual harassment. The fourth 
session is titled “Gender identity-Gender strengths,” and the fifth “Self Concept,” which 
includes a “Gender Advantages and Disadvantages” exercise. 
Id. at 144 (alterations in original).  This case falls outside the discussion of compelled speech for mandatory 
education efforts because the “educational program” was designed by the district attorney’s office in 
“consultation with the Victims Resource Center and the Juvenile Probation Department,” not the school, 
and was offered as part of a plea agreement in lieu of filing charges against the students.  Id. at 143-44.  
Thus, the case is discussed more fully in the following chapter on compelled speech as a form of 
punishment.  See discussion infra Chapter IV. 
325 Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2002).  Brown did not involve compelled speech, but rather 
dealt with the constitutionality of a public university’s refusal to approve a student’s thesis unless he 
removed the “acknowledgements” section of the thesis.  Id. at 941.  The relevant part of the thesis as 
described by the court follows: 
“I would like to offer special Fuck You’s to the following degenerates for being an ever-
present hindrance during my graduate career . . . .” It then identified the Dean and staff of 
the UCSB graduate school, the managers of Davidson Library, former California 
Governor Wilson, the Regents of the University of California, and “Science” as having 
been particularly obstructive to Plaintiff’s progress toward his graduate degree. 
Id. at 943 (quoting the “Disacknowledgements” section of Brown’s thesis).  Although this case dealt with 
the constitutionality of the censorship of this speech, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless touched on the ability 
of schools to compel speech for certain purposes.  Id. at 953. 
Other cases that have addressed the constitutionality of a teacher’s approval of assignment topics fall 
outside of compelled speech for mandatory education efforts because they deal with censorship rather than 
compulsion.  For instance, in Settle v. Dickson County School Board, 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995), one 
teacher refused to allow a student to write a research paper on Jesus Christ for several reasons, including 
the fact that the student already knew about the topic and, thus, would not have to conduct significant 
research in order to complete the assignment.  Id. at 154.  This case did not involve compelled speech, 
however, because each student was allowed to pick his or her topic as long as it was “‘interesting, 
researchable and decent.’”  Id. at 153 (quoting the teacher’s guidelines for approving a topic). 
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 The facts of Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,326 a recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit case, illustrate the category of compelled speech for mandatory education 
efforts.  In Axson-Flynn, a public university theater major “refused to say the word ‘fuck’ 
or take God’s name in vain during classroom exercises” because she believed that doing 
so conflicted with her religious beliefs as a member of the Church of Latter Day Saints.327  
During acting exercises, Axson-Flynn began changing scripts when performing them to 
remove the objectionable language and, after some resistance from her professor, was 
permitted to do so for her first semester of school.328  After her first semester, Axson-
Flynn was told by administrators of her program that she would have to either perform 
the scripts as written or resign from the program.329  The university argued that requiring 
students to perform the scripts verbatim was important because: 
(1) it teaches students how to step outside their own values and character 
by forcing them to assume a very foreign character and to recite offensive 
dialogue; (2) it teaches students to preserve the integrity of the author’s 
work; and (3) it measures true acting skills to be able convincingly to 
portray an offensive part.330 
 
The student chose to resign from the program and filed suit against the university, 
alleging that her First Amendment rights were violated.331  This case exemplifies 
scenarios in which speech is compelled as part of a mandatory education effort.  While 
scholars have argued that this type of compelled speech garners less First Amendment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). 
327 Id. at 1280. 
328 Id. at 1282. 
329 Id. 
330 Id. at 1291. 
331 Id. at 1282-83. 
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protection,332 courts have only rarely addressed the issue and have never addressed it in a 
high school setting. 
Courts’ Treatment of the Constitutionality of Compelled Speech for Mandatory 
Education Efforts 
 
 This section reviews the two court opinions that have addressed the 
constitutionality of compelled speech for mandatory educations efforts.  In both cases, the 
courts found that the compelled speech was school sponsored and, thus, the courts 
decided to apply the Hazelwood standard to determine whether the schools violated the 
First Amendment.  Applying the Hazelwood standard, which is extremely deferential to 
school officials, both courts found that the schools’ compulsion of speech did not violate 
the First Amendment.333  The courts’ determination that Hazelwood was controlling in 
these cases is interesting for three reasons.  First, neither court fully explained why it 
decided to apply a test developed by the Supreme Court in a student speech censorship 
case to a compelled speech case.  Second, the courts purported that the Hazelwood 
standard applies to all government compulsion of “school-sponsored speech” and that 
category includes far more speech than compelled speech for mandatory education efforts 
as defined earlier in this chapter.334  Finally, it should be noted that both of these cases 
deal with compelled speech in a university rather than high school setting.  The fact that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 See Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 882.  Cf. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 457-59, 461 (reviewing the 
Court’s decision in Barnette and contrasting the constitutional issues raised by the compelled recitation in 
that case with those raised by compelled speech for mandatory education efforts). 
333 See generally Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2005); Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State 
Univ., 315 F. App’x 7 (9th Cir. 2008).  One case, Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. A.1:95CV167-D-D, 1996 
WL 676410 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996), aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998), deals with compelled speech 
both as a mandatory education effort and a punishment.  This case is discussed in the next chapter.  See 
infra pp. 95-97. 
334 For a discussion of the broad range of speech that has been deemed “school-sponsored” by courts, see 
infra pp. 86-87. 
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courts have applied high school student speech precedents in a college setting has been 
criticized since it has generally been recognized that college students receive a higher 
level of First Amendment protection than high school students.335   While the debate over 
whether Hazelwood and other high school student speech precedents should apply to 
college students is outside the scope of this thesis, the two courts’ treatment of the 
compelled speech for mandatory education efforts in the college setting is still relevant 
since college students have at least the same, if not a higher, level of First Amendment 
protection as high school students.336  The following section discusses the approaches 
adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Axson-Flynn337 and the U.S. District Court for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (finding that college students, unlike high school 
students, are entitled to full First Amendment protection).  See generally, e.g., Edward L. Carter et al., 
Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum Doctrine and Government Speech in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV 157 (2006) (presenting a study of thirteen federal appellate court cases that 
applied the Hazelwood standard to college students and finding that there is much confusion about when 
and whether this standard should apply to higher education students); Michael O. Finnigan, Jr., Comment, 
Extra! Extra! Read All About It! Censorship at State Universities: Hosty v. Carter, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1477 
(2006) (criticizing a Seventh Circuit case where the court applied the Hazelwood standard to college 
students); Chris Sanders, Comment, Censorship 101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and Preservation of Free 
Speech at Colleges and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV 159 (2006) (noting that courts have applied 
Hazelwood to assess the constitutionality of censorship of college students’ speech and arguing that states 
should enact speech-protective statutes for college students); Jeff Sklar, Note, The Presses Won’t Stop Just 
Yet: Shaping Student Speech Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood’s Application to Colleges, 80 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 614 (2007) (arguing that the application of the Hazelwood standard to college students is acceptable, 
but asserting that courts should be more restrictive in determining what constitutes a “legitimate” 
pedagogical concern in a college setting rather than in a high school setting); Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, 
Demoted to High School: Are College Students’ Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High School 
Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173 (2003) (arguing that the Tinker “material disruption test” should apply in 
colleges but not the Hazelwood standard that recognizes limited First Amendment protection for school-
sponsored speech).  But see generally Christopher N. LaVigne, Note, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier and the 
University: Why the High School Standard is Here to Stay, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1191 (2008) (arguing 
that courts’ application of Hazelwood to college students is consistent with the trend of courts recognizing 
the power of college officials to regulate speech). 
336 See supra notes 62, 185, 335 and accompanying text.  The Tenth Circuit in Axson-Flynn noted that 
“[a]ge, maturity, and sophistication level of the students” was considered when applying the test in a 
university setting.  Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289. 
337 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 1277. 
	  	   78 
Northern District of California in Head v. Board of Trustees of California State 
University.338 
The Tenth Circuit in Axson-Flynn presented a detailed analysis of the compelled 
speech claim raised by the student who challenged the university’s requirement that she 
perform her assigned scripts verbatim.339  The court started its analysis by finding that 
Barnette and Tinker were relevant because they supported the notion that compelled 
student speech was protected against by the First Amendment.340  The Tenth Circuit, 
however, found that the Court’s holding in Hazelwood, a student speech censorship case, 
was controlling, because the compelled speech in Axson-Flynn was “school-sponsored” 
just like the censored speech in Hazelwood.341  The court found that compelling Axson-
Flynn to perform the scripts was school-sponsored speech because it was “speech that a 
school ‘affirmatively . . . promotes’ as opposed to speech that it ‘tolerates.’”342  The 
Tenth Circuit, quoting Hazelwood, defined school-sponsored speech as all “expressive 
activities” that are related to the school’s curriculum, including those activities that occur 
outside of the classroom, “‘so long as they are supervised by faculty members and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 No. C 05-05328 WHA, 2006 WL 2355209 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006), aff’d, 315 F. App’x 7 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
339 See generally Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1283-93. 
340 Id. at 1283-84. 
341 Id. at 1285.  The Tenth Circuit found that there were three types of school speech: (1) speech that 
“‘happens to occur on the school premises’” like in Tinker; (2) “government speech” that is delivered by a 
school official; and (3) “school-sponsored speech” like that in Hazelwood.  Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260, 270-71 (1980)). 
342 Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71) (alteration in original). 
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designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and 
audiences.’”343  
The Axson-Flynn court reasoned that the government has more latitude than it 
would with adults to limit students’ speech and “[n]owhere is this more true than in the 
context of a school’s right to determine what to teach and how to teach in its 
classrooms.”344  The court then determined that under Hazelwood, “school officials may 
place restrictions on school-sponsored speech ‘so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”345  The Tenth Circuit then reasoned that any 
compulsion of student speech that was “‘related to learning’” did not violate the First 
Amendment.346  
In its discussion of the compelled speech at issue in Axson-Flynn, the Tenth 
Circuit rejected the lower court’s finding that the First Amendment only protects against 
compulsion that requires the speaker to “‘espouse an ideological point of view on behalf 
of the State.’”347  The Tenth Circuit found that the First Amendment protects against 
government compulsion of all types of speech because the “constitutional harm,” forcing 
one to speak instead of allowing him or her to remain silent, is the same regardless of the 
content of the compelled speech.348  While the Tenth Circuit discussed the First 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Id. at 1286 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271). 
344 Id. at 1284 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (1980)). 
345 Id. at 1286 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273). 
346 Id.  (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
347 Id. at 1284 n.4 (quoting Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335 (D. Utah 2001), rev’d, 
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 1277). 
348 Id.  The Tenth Circuit also noted the difficulty in developing a standard to determine whether speech 
was ideological in nature.  Id.  
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Amendment protection against compelled speech, it failed to explain why it was proper to 
apply a test from a student speech censorship case to a student speech compulsion 
case.349  The only explanation was offered in a footnote, where the court simply noted, 
“For First Amendment purposes, it is irrelevant whether the speech at issue here was 
restricted or compelled.”350   
The Tenth Circuit moved forward with its analysis, finding that the speech 
compelled in Axson-Flynn was undeniably school-sponsored because it was speech 
required for an in-class exercise as part of the official school curriculum.351  The court 
then found that compulsion was “related to learning” because it was designed to train the 
students to become professional actors, which often would require performance of scripts 
as written.352  In its application of the Hazelwood standard, the Tenth Circuit was 
deferential to schools, noting that “[t]he school’s methodology may not be necessary to 
the achievement of its goals and it may not even be the most effective means of teaching, 
but it can still be ‘reasonably related’ to pedagogical concerns.”353   
The Axson-Flynn court did acknowledge that there was one important exception 
to its application of the Hazelwood standard to the censorship and compulsion of school-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 See id. at 1290 n.9. 
350 Id.  The court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 
781 (1988), to support this statement, but also noted in a parenthetical that the Riley Court explained that 
there are some differences between compelled speech and censorship.  Id. 
351 Id. at 1286.  The court cited opinions from other circuits, all dealing with the censorship of speech, to 
support this notion.  Id. at 1286-87 (citing Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Settle v. Dickson 
County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
352 Id. at 1291.  The court explained that “[r]equiring an acting student, in the context of a classroom 
exercise, to speak the words of a script as written is no different than requiring that a law or history student 
argue a position with which he disagrees.”  Id. at 1292-93. 
353 Id. at 1292.  The court noted that it was important to be deferential to school officials in cases involving 
school-sponsored speech, otherwise it would “subject[] the curricular decisions of teachers to the whims of 
what a particular student does or does not feel like learning on a given day.”  Id. 
	  	   81 
sponsored speech.  Axson-Flynn argued that the school only required her to perform the 
scripts verbatim as a veiled form of discrimination because she was Mormon.354  The 
Tenth Circuit found that while the Hazelwood standard requires courts to be deferential to 
schools, the court should also inquire whether the government’s interest in the 
compulsion or censorship is simply a pretext for discrimination and, thus, 
unconstitutional.355  The court explained, “Although we do not second-guess the 
pedagogical wisdom or efficacy of an educator’s goal, we would be abdicating our 
judicial duty if we failed to investigate whether the educational goal or pedagogical 
concern was pretextual.”356  Under the Tenth Circuit’s approach, courts should apply the 
Hazelwood standard only after they determine that the government’s stated goal for the 
compulsion or censorship is not a “sham pretext for an impermissible ulterior motive.”357  
The Axson-Flynn court then remanded the case so that the district court could determine 
whether the school’s stated purpose for compelling the student to perform the scripts as 
written was a legitimate pedagogical objective or a pretext for religious discrimination.358 
The Tenth Circuit’s approach to assessing the constitutionality of compelled 
student speech for mandatory education efforts was adopted by the U.S. District Court for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Id. at 1293.  Axson-Flynn pointed to several incidents where the school administrators and her professor 
discussed with her whether her faith precluded her for performing the scripts as they were written.  In 
particular, Axson-Flynn was told to “speak with other ‘good Mormon girls’” and was told that “she could 
‘still be a good Mormon’” if she complied with the school’s requirement.  Id. 
355 Id.  
356 Id. at 1292-93. 
357 Id. at 1293. 
358 Id. 
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the Northern District of California.  In Head,359 a student enrolled in a secondary 
education Teacher Credential Program brought a claim in federal court against the 
university.360  Head argued that the university violated his First Amendment rights 
against compelled speech by “requiring him to take a course on ‘multiculturalism’ where 
he was forced to adopt ‘predetermined radical leftist or otherwise socially controversial 
viewpoints’ that are counter to his conservative positions.”361   
The district court noted that no Ninth Circuit courts had addressed the 
constitutionality of compelled student speech in a university setting and then, citing 
Axson-Flynn, adopted the view that Hazelwood should apply.362  The district court found 
that the school’s compulsion of speech, namely the allegation that Head was forced “to 
espouse liberal views,”363 was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical concern 
and, thus, the court dismissed the case.364  The district court cited several reasons why it 
was important for universities to train secondary education teachers in the importance of 
diversity and multiculturalism, like preparing teachers to effectively communicate with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 No. C 05-05328 WHA, 2006 WL 2355209 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006), aff’d, 315 F. App’x 7 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
360 Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., No. C 05-05328 WHA, 2006 WL 2355209 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 
2006), aff’d, 315 F. App’x 7 (9th Cir. 2008). 
361 Head, 315 F. App’x at 8. 
362 Head, 2006 WL 2355209, at *6.  The district court explained: 
Although our own circuit has not spoken with one voice on this issue, the Tenth Circuit’s 
formulation seems entirely correct to this Court. For example, if a student takes an 
algebra course, the student cannot ace a quiz by offering biblical quotes. Conversely, if 
he takes a course on the Bible, he cannot answer exam questions by reference to 
mathematics. The student must learn the premises of the course and how to apply them.  
Id. 
363 Id. at *1.  Head pointed to the course’s syllabus that stated students would learn reasons why it was 
important to “‘express sensitivity to . . . diversity.’”  Id. (quoting the course syllabus). 
364 Id. at *7. 
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children from a variety of backgrounds.365 Finally, the district court found that Head was 
not really compelled to say anything, since it appeared that Head’s primary objection was 
to the fact that his teacher reacted negatively to his comments.366 
The Ninth Circuit heard the appeal in Head and affirmed the district court’s 
opinion, but never expressly accepted or rejected the application of the Hazelwood 
standard in that case.367  Instead, the Ninth Circuit simply quoted the district court 
opinion and agreed that a “‘student must learn the premises of the course and how to 
apply them.  Learning the course material in no way comprises one’s personal right to 
believe as he wishes.’”368  The Ninth Circuit also ruled that Head could not amend his 
complaint because there was no way that he could state a “colorable claim” against the 
university.369 
Conclusions on the Constitutionality of Compelled Speech for Mandatory Education 
Efforts 
 
The category of compelled speech for mandatory education efforts consists of 
speech compelled as part of curricular in-class exercises or homework assignments.  An 
analysis of the two cases addressing the constitutionality of compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts shows that both federal courts found Hazelwood controlling.  
Two student authors have asserted that the Hazelwood standard should not apply to cases 
dealing with the school compulsion of speech because compulsion is different from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 Id. 
366 Id. 
367 See generally Head, 315 F. App’x 7 (9th Cir. 2008). 
368 Id. at 8 (quoting Head, 2006 WL 2355209, at *6). 
369 Id.  
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censorship and raises different First Amendment concerns.  The courts’ application of the 
Hazelwood standard, which is extremely deferential to schools, may also be inappropriate 
because school-sponsored compelled speech includes expressive activities far outside of 
what is considered compelled speech for mandatory education efforts.   
Axson-Flynn and Head are the only cases where courts have addressed the 
constitutionality of compelled speech for mandatory education efforts.  The Tenth Circuit 
and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California accepted, without much 
explanation, that the Hazelwood standard, developed by the Supreme Court in a case 
involving the censorship of student speech, should apply.370  Two student authors, 
including the author of this thesis, have questioned the prudence of the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision to apply the Hazelwood standard in compelled student speech cases.371  Brandon 
Pond argued that the broad deference granted to school officials through the Hazelwood 
standard is inappropriate in a compelled speech case.372  He found that the motivations 
for government compulsion of speech could be more offensive than the motivations for 
government censorship of speech from a First Amendment perspective and, thus, should 
be afforded different tests.373  Pond noted one such motivation was a school “attempting 
to actually mandate compliance with a particular viewpoint” through compelled 
speech.374  Pond also noted that if the Hazelwood standard was applied to the facts of 
Barnette, the Court likely would have concluded that school officials could compel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2005); Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State 
Univ., No. C 05-05328 WHA, 2006 WL 2355209, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006). 
371 See generally Pond, supra note 64, at 155-59; Sullivan, supra note 13, at 555-65. 
372 Pond, supra note 64, at 157-59. 
373 Id. at 156-57. 
374 Id. at 156. 
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students to recite the Pledge.375  He also argued that the Hazelwood standard, at least as it 
was interpreted by the Axson-Flynn court, allows a school to compel any type of school-
sponsored speech, as long as the compulsion is not completely arbitrary or a pretext for 
discrimination.376   
The author of this thesis argued that instead of applying the Hazelwood standard 
to cases that involve compelled student speech for mandatory education efforts, like in 
Axson-Flynn and Head, courts should find the government compulsion of speech in those 
cases constitutional in light of the “special characteristics of the school environment.”377  
This argument was supported by the fact that the Court has recognized a lower level First 
Amendment protection for high school student speakers than for other types of speakers, 
the notion that schools must be granted some deference to carry out their educational 
mission, and the idea that compulsion of speech for this purpose is designed to engage the 
students and help them develop critical thinking skills.378    
 In addition to student authors’ questioning of the deference granted to school 
officials through the Tenth Circuits application of Hazelwood, application of that 
standard in compelled student speech cases is troubling for another reason.  It appears 
that the Tenth Circuit’s definition of what compelled speech is “school-sponsored” and, 
thus, governed by Hazelwood, is broader than the definition in this thesis of compelled 
speech for mandatory education efforts.  The Tenth Circuit, borrowing language from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Id. 
376 Id. at 157. 
377 Sullivan, supra note 13, at 566, 569 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969)). 
378 Id. at 568. 
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Hazelwood, noted that “school-sponsored speech” includes any speech or expressive 
activity that “‘may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not 
they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty 
members and designed to impart knowledge or skills to student participants and 
audiences.’”379   
Scholars have found that lower courts since Hazelwood have found a broad range 
of activities to be school-sponsored.  Emily Gold Waldman explained that “Hazelwood 
itself made clear that [the] category [of school-sponsored speech] should be construed 
broadly, encompassing not only classroom activities and official school-sponsored 
publications and productions but also any ‘other expressive activities that students, 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of 
the school . . . .’”380 
Indeed, it appears that courts quickly accepted that school-sponsored speech 
comes in many different forms.  Rosemary Salomone, in 1992, just four years after 
Hazelwood was decided, found: 
Just about any aspect of school sponsored activity (newspapers, career 
days, elective courses) conducted anywhere in the school (classrooms, 
hallways) is considered to be . . . subject to the reasonableness standard of 
Hazelwood. Even extracurricular activities that appear to be associated 
with the school may fall under the rubric of “sponsorship,” broadly 
defined.  Schools teach the “lessons of civility” and school officials may 
impose sanctions for discourteous, rude, controversial, even politically 
sensitive and religious speech that appears to carry the imprimatur of the 
school.381 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)). 
380 Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-
Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 73 (2008). 
381 Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. 
REV. 253, 316 (1992). 
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Waldman studied the lower court cases that applied Hazelwood in the nineteen years after 
the opinion was handed down and also found that the courts deemed a broad range of 
speech to be school sponsored.382  Waldman noted several examples of school-sponsored 
speech that occurred outside of classroom exercises and homework assignments, 
including: an elementary school student who was not allowed “to distribute, during a 
classroom holiday party, candy canes with religious messages”; and, “[s]everal 
Columbine High School students . . . [who were not allowed to hang] tiles that they had 
created as part of a tile painting project to commemorate the April 1999 Columbine 
massacre.”383   
 Applying the far-reaching Hazelwood standard for “school-sponsored speech” to 
compelled speech cases and then using that standard to justify applying a more 
deferential standard is troubling because of the wide scope of cases it encompasses.  A 
review of the tests used to determine compelled speech for mandatory education efforts 
and school-sponsored speech illustrates the difference.  As previously noted, the proper 
inquiry for determining whether compelled speech fits into the mandatory education 
efforts category focuses on the purpose behind the compulsion and context in which the 
speech is compelled.  Blasi and Shiffrin found that compelled speech for mandatory 
education efforts was less constitutionally troubling because in those situations “a teacher 
actively nurtures the evaluative and deliberative capacities of students to help them arrive 
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383 Id. at 74.  Waldman noted that the trend of courts broadly applying Hazelwood has expanded in recent 
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sponsored’ – student speech, teachers’ classroom speech, outside-entity speech, and speech that reflects 
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at conclusions that are truly their own.”384  Based on this finding, compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts comprises only speech that was compelled in order to teach 
students through critical thinking.  Furthermore, this category of compelled speech 
embodies only speech that was compelled during a classroom exercise or as part of a 
student’s homework assignment.  The category of school-sponsored speech, on the other 
hand, comprised anything that “students, parents, and members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,” regardless of the purpose or 
context of the speech.385   
 While both Axson-Flynn and Head dealt with in-class exercises that fit into both 
definitions, cases exist where a court may deem compelled speech to be school-
sponsored, but the speech would not fit into the category of compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts.  For example, in Corder v. Lewis Palmer School District,386 
another Tenth Circuit case discussed in the next chapter, a school compelled a high 
school student to issue an apology for mentioning Jesus Christ during her graduation 
speech.387  The Corder court found that the apology was “school-sponsored” because the 
apology was related to the student’s graduation speech, which was also school-sponsored, 
and the apology was sent out by the principal’s office.388  The court then applied the 
Hazelwood standard to determine the constitutionality of the government compulsion of 
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386 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009). 
387 Id. at 1222-23. 
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the speech.389  Under the definition presented in this chapter, the apology would not 
constitute compelled speech for mandatory education efforts because the apology was not 
required as part of a curricular, in-class exercise nor was it part of a homework 
assignment.  Thus, the framework presented by the Tenth Circuit in Axson-Flynn and 
adopted by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in Head, would 
allow the deferential Hazelwood standard to apply to a broad spectrum of situations 
where the government compels student speech. 
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CHAPTER IV  
COMPELLED SPEECH AS A FORM OF PUNISHMENT 
 Compelled speech as a form of punishment is speech that is compelled in order to 
discipline a student, including compelled apologies.  A study of the relevant cases and 
literature reveals that there are currently three approaches to assessing the 
constitutionality of compelled speech as a form of punishment.  In the first approach, 
compelled speech precedents, such as those from West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette390 and Wooley v. Maynard,391 are applied; this approach is the most protective 
against compelled student speech.  In the second approach, student speech censorship 
precedents, such as those from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District392 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,393 are applied; this approach is 
deferential to school officials.  In the third approach, courts do not inquire into the 
constitutionality of the compelled student speech, appearing to accept that the compulsion 
is permissible; this approach is the most deferential to school officials because the court 
does not conduct an independent inquiry into the school’s actions.  This study also 
revealed that there is a fourth category of compelled student speech.  In some cases, 
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speech is compelled as a form of punishment and also as a part of mandatory education 
efforts. 
First, this chapter defines what types of speech fit into the category of compelled 
speech as a form of punishment by discussing the relevant literature and illustrative cases.  
This section of the chapter also discusses the two cases that deal with the fourth, hybrid 
category of compelled student speech, meaning speech that was compelled in order to 
punish and educate.  Second, this chapter discusses the seven cases that have addressed 
the issue of student speech compelled only as a form of punishment.  Finally, this chapter 
concludes by summarizing the findings and highlighting the differences between the 
three approaches.   
Definition of Compelled Speech as a Form of Punishment 
 Schools have used compelled speech as a means of disciplining students.  For 
example, one school compelled an apology from a student who got into an altercation 
with a classmate and then talked back to her teacher.394  In another case, a school required 
a student to issue an apology after the student posted comments on her blog about her 
school’s principal.395   
This section presents a complete definition of compelled speech as a form of 
punishment.  This section then discusses two cases that demonstrate a fourth, hybrid 
category of compelled student speech.  In this category, speech is compelled as a form of 
punishment and also as part of mandatory education efforts.  Next, this section reviews an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 See generally Kicklighter v. Evans County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 
1043 (11th Cir. 1998). 
395 See generally Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007) aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
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argument presented by the author of this thesis that the constitutionality of compelled 
speech as a form of punishment should be assessed based on the standard used by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Wooley.396  Finally, this section discusses the possible issues with 
the after-the-fact punishment of speech.  This discussion is relevant because several of 
the cases analyzed later in this chapter address the constitutionality of government-
compelled apologies for prior speech. 
Speech that a student is required to deliver as a consequence for his or her prior 
actions or speech is categorized as compelled speech as a form of punishment.  The 
impetus for the school compelling speech in these situations is always the student doing 
something wrong.  The most common example is when a student is forced to issue an 
apology for violating a school policy or otherwise behaving badly.  There also is always a 
consequence for refusing to deliver the compelled speech, such as suspension, expulsion, 
or the school’s refusal to award the student a diploma.  Schools have asserted 
discipline397 and the desire to teach students about socially acceptable behavior398 as 
justifications for compelling speech as a form of punishment. 
Several cases have dealt with the constitutionality of compelled apologies.  For 
example, in Corder v. Lewis Palmer High School, a high school valedictorian delivered a 
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graduation speech where she urged the audience to get to know Jesus.399  As part of her 
punishment for deviating from the version of her speech that had been previously 
approved by the high school’s principal, the school refused to award Corder a diploma 
until she composed an e-mail apology to members of the school community.400  In 
another case, Wildman v. Marshalltown School District, a school refused to let a high 
school athlete rejoin the basketball team unless she apologized to her teammate for 
sending them a letter in which she criticized the team’s coach.401   
 Two cases demonstrate the fourth, hybrid category of compelled speech.  In these 
cases, two courts addressed the constitutionality of compelled speech as a form of 
punishment; in both of these cases, however, the compelled speech did not take the form 
of a compelled apology, but rather the compelled speech was designed to educate the 
students.  In Miller v. Mitchell,402 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
addressed a compelled speech claim outside of a school setting.  The case is still relevant, 
however, as an example of this fourth category of compelled student speech.  In Miller, a 
district attorney designed a plea bargain for a group of high school students who were 
caught “sexting.”403  In exchange for not charging the students with “possession and 
distribution of child pornography,” the district attorney notified parents that their children 
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400 Id. at 1222-23. 
401 Wildman, 249 F.3d at 769-70. 
402 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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could complete an education program.404  A letter to parents of the described the program 
for the females as follows: 
In the first session, students are assigned to write “a report explaining why 
you are here,” “[w]hat you did,” “[w]hy it was wrong,” “[d]id you create a 
victim? If so, who?,” and how their actions “affect[ed] the victim[,] [t]he 
school[, and] the community.” The first two sessions focus on sexual 
violence, and the third on sexual harassment. The fourth session is titled 
“Gender identity-Gender strengths,” and the fifth “Self Concept,” which 
includes a “Gender Advantages and Disadvantages” exercise.405 
 
The children’s parents objected to the district attorney’s proposal, claiming that 
requiring the students to write about “how [their] actions were wrong” violated the 
students’ First Amendment right against compelled speech.406  The Third Circuit agreed 
that the students had a colorable compelled speech claim.  After citing Barnette, the court 
explained that “[t]he compulsion here takes the form of the District Attorney’s promise to 
prosecute [the student] if she does not satisfactorily complete the education program.”407  
The court seemed persuaded by the fact that it was not proper for the juvenile criminal 
justice system to educate students about their proper place in society.408  Noting the 
importance of the age of the plaintiffs, the court explained: “Minors are often more 
susceptible to external influences, and while this susceptibility may weigh in favor of 
certain educational or rehabilitative programs, it also cautions against allowing actors in 
the juvenile and criminal justice systems to venture outside the realm of their elected 
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authority.”409  The Third Circuit did not cite to any student speech cases other than 
Barnette, probably because this instance of compelled speech occurred outside of school.  
The facts of the case are still important because they demonstrate a different type of 
compelled speech as form of punishment, namely an education program. 
In Marinello v. Bushby,410 the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of 
Mississippi addressed the constitutionality of a punishment that also appeared designed to 
educate a student.  In Marinello, a college student, pursuing the degree of Doctor of 
Veterinary Medicine, wrote a letter to appeal his grade in a course.411  As part of the 
letter, the student noted that “‘it has become quite clear to me that politics, cowardice, 
and corruptness have transcended the obligation of certain Food Animal faculty members 
to impartially educate those students involved in their rotation . . . .’”412  The university’s 
Academic Review and Professional Standards Select Committee investigated the 
student’s conduct, citing the professional ethical code for veterinarians that provided “no 
one should ‘belittle or injure the professional standing of another member of the 
profession or unnecessarily condemn the character of that person’s professional act in 
such a manner as to be false or misleading.’”413  The committee found that the student 
violated the ethical code, and the school ordered him to present a “written synopsis 
clearly indicating [his] understanding of these principles and how they apply to [his] 
conduct during the grade appeal process” before he would be promoted to the next step in 	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410 No. CIV. A.1:95CV167-D-D, 1996 WL 671410 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996) aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th 
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411 Id. at *1-*2. 
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his program.414  The student refused to complete the writing requirement and challenged 
the constitutionality of the requirement, claiming that it violated his First Amendment 
protection against compelled speech.415   
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in Marinello held 
that the school did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights, relying at least in 
part on the fact that he was a student enrolled in a professional degree program.416  The 
court first found that the school’s compulsion of the synopsis was outside the scope of 
compelled speech protected against in Barnette because the student was not required to 
“disseminate a particular political or ideological message.”417  The court also noted the 
importance of the fact that the compelled synopsis was not just a form of punishment but 
was also designed to educate the student.418  The court found that because it was  
part of the educational mission of the [school] to instruct veterinary 
students as to the ethical standards governing the profession, the Dean’s 
requirement in this case is more similar to an academic assignment. In 
such contexts, First Amendment rights yield more readily because of the 
First Amendment academic freedoms possessed by school officials 
themselves.419 
 
The Marinello court further noted that schools must be allowed to compel speech in some 
situations so that they can assess whether the student has learned the information 
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necessary for his or her academic program.420  In this situation, the court found that the 
school’s need to accomplish its educational mission trumped the student’s First 
Amendment protection against compelled speech.421  Even though Marinello deals with 
the constitutional rights of college students, it is still related to this discussion of 
compelled student speech because it demonstrates a situation where a school’s mandate 
constitutes both compelled speech as a form of punishment and compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts.   
The author of this thesis argued in a 2010 law review note that compelled student 
speech as a form of punishment was distinct from compelled recitations and compelled 
speech for mandatory education efforts.422  However, this author also found that 
compelled speech as a form of punishment is similar to compelled recitations in that both 
categories of compelled student speech fail to engage the student and allow him or her to 
arrive at his or her own conclusions.423  This author argued that courts should adopt a 
balancing test to assess the constitutionality of compelled speech as a form of punishment 
based on the test for compelled speech proposed by the Supreme Court in Wooley.424  
Under the proposed test, “[t]he court must determine whether the compelled speech [as a 
form of punishment] raises First Amendment concerns, and then the court must balance 
those concerns, if any, against the government's interest. In order to pass constitutional 
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muster, the government’s interest must be ‘sufficiently compelling’ to outweigh any First 
Amendment concerns.”425  
Emily Gold Waldman argued that the First Amendment should strongly guard 
against all after-the-fact punishments of student speech, whether or not the punishment 
includes a compelled apology.426  Waldman noted that while schools may constitutionally 
censor student speech in ways that adult speech cannot be restricted, the justifications for 
allowing censorship in a school setting do not extend to justifying the punishment of 
speech that could have been censored.427    
Waldman found two justifications for recognizing limited First Amendment 
protections against the censorship of student speech in public high schools.  First, she 
found that the First Amendment is less speech protective in schools because of the need 
to stop speech that “threaten[s] other students’ rights or the functioning of the learning 
environment.”428  Second, Waldman found that censorship of student speech also was 
permitted in order to teach students lessons that “relate either to general civility or to 
specific coursework.”429  She found that neither of these reasons for permitting more 
censorship in schools logically applied to punishing speech.430  Punishing speech after the 
fact, when the student is not given prior notice that his or her speech would be considered 
impermissible, does not protect other students or the learning environment because the 
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speech has already been delivered and the damage has been done.431  Furthermore, 
Waldman asserted that lessons in civility are best taught through censorship of the 
objectionable speech followed up by an explanation of why the speech is problematic, 
rather than through after-the-fact punishment.432  Waldman, however, did feel that it was 
acceptable for schools to impose after-the-fact punishments on a student who ignored a 
school’s attempt to censor their speech.433  Waldman’s analysis is useful when 
considering the following cases in which schools sought to punish students through the 
compulsion of speech. 
Courts’ Treatment of the Constitutionality of Compelled Speech as a Form of 
Punishment 
 
 This section analyzes seven cases that address the issue of compelled speech as a 
form of punishment.  The cases have been divided into three categories based on their 
treatment of the compelled speech issue.  The first case does not directly deal with 
compelled speech as a form of punishment, but does provide a useful discussion, in dicta, 
of the difference between the application of Barnette434 and the application of the student 
speech censorship precedents, like Hazelwood,435 to this category of compelled speech.   
This approach of applying compelled speech precedents is the most protective of 
students’ speech rights.  The second set of cases involves situations where a student was 
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compelled to issue an apology and the courts analyzed the compelled speech issue based 
on the student speech censorship precedents.  The approach of applying student speech 
censorship precedents is deferential to school officials.  The third set of cases all involve 
situations where a student was compelled to speak as a form of punishment, but the 
courts never addressed the constitutionality of the government compulsion of speech.  
The approach of not conducting a separate inquiry into the constitutionality of the 
compelled student speech is the most deferential to school officials. 
 In the first case, Poling v. Murphy,436 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit discussed the difference between situations in which Barnette should apply and 
situations in which Hazelwood should apply.  While not directly on point, Poling is 
relevant for two reasons.  The first is that the Sixth Circuit appeared to accept Barnette as 
recognizing that First Amendment protections against compulsion are stronger than First 
Amendment protections against censorship of student speech.  The second is that the 
Sixth Circuit appeared to find that Hazelwood and not Barnette was controlling because 
the case was dealing with the constitutionality of the censorship rather than the 
compulsion of student speech.  In Poling, a high school student was disqualified from 
running for student council president because he delivered a speech that made fun of the 
school’s assistant principal.437  The punishment of the student in that case did not involve 
the government compulsion of speech, but rather involved the student’s exclusion from 
running for student council. The student challenged the punishment, claiming that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989).  While this case does not actually involve compelled speech as a form of 
punishment, it was included in this chapter because the court was addressing the constitutionality of the 
punishment of student speech.  See id. at 761-64.  
437 Id. at 759-60. 
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school could not punish him for his speech under the First Amendment.438  The Sixth 
Circuit, however, did find it pertinent to discuss the importance of the fact that the school 
did not attempt to compel the student to speak as part of his punishment.439  The court 
distinguished the facts of Poling from Barnette, noting that Poling was different because 
the court was not assessing the constitutionality of compelled speech.  The Sixth Circuit, 
citing Barnette, explained: “The compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance 
‘require[d] affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind,’ and it seemed to Mr. Justice 
Jackson in Barnette, as it seems to us here, that ‘involuntary affirmation could be 
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.’”440  The 
Sixth Circuit ultimately found that the student’s speech was school sponsored and, thus, 
applied Hazelwood to assess the constitutionality of the censorship and subsequent 
punishment.441  This Sixth Circuit approach of applying different standards to censorship 
and compulsion cases was not adopted by other courts. 
 The second set of cases all address the constitutionality of compelled apologies.  
In each case, the court applied a test derived from the cases dealing with the censorship 
of student speech to assess the constitutionality of the government compulsion of the 
apology.  Two cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit fall into this 
set.  In the first, Seamons v. Snow,442 the Tenth Circuit assessed the constitutionality of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Id. at 761. 
439 Id. at 763.  The court noted, “It is important to bear in mind, we think, that the school officials made no 
attempt to compel Dean Poling to say anything he did not want to say.”  Id. 
440 Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). 
441 Id. at 762-63. 
442 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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school’s compulsion of an apology from a high school football player.443  The football 
player claimed that when he refused apologize to his teammates after he reported a locker 
room assault to police, he was told that he could not rejoin the team.444  The Tenth 
Circuit, before remanding the case for trial, summarized the relevant law that should 
apply in the case as follows: “extensive case law . . . support[s] the proposition that 
school authorities may not penalize students for their speech when that speech is non-
disruptive, non-obscene, and not school-sponsored.”445 The Seamons court never 
discussed Barnette and instead indicated that the proper analysis in this case was based 
on the student speech censorship cases. 
In Corder, where the valedictorian was required to issue an e-mail apology for her 
graduation speech, the Tenth Circuit applied the Hazelwood standard to determine the 
constitutionality of the school’s compulsion of Corder’s apology.446  The Tenth Circuit 
first found that Corder’s graduation speech was school sponsored within the meaning of 
Hazelwood and, applying that standard, found that the school had the power to censor the 
content of her speech.447  The court then turned to the constitutionality of the school’s 
compulsion of Corder’s apology.  The Corder court found that the apology, like the 
graduation speech, was school sponsored because it was disseminated by the principal’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 See id. 
444 Id. at 1024.  The Tenth Circuit heard the appeal in this case after the district court granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Id.  As part of its holding, the Tenth Circuit found that there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the student was actually asked to apologize because he 
reported the incident to police or whether the coach simply made a general “request for a mutual 
reconciliation” between the student and his teammates.  Id. at 1027. 
445 Id. at 1030 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 
(1969)). 
446 Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1231 (10th Cir. 2009). 
447 Id. at 1229. 
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office shortly after graduation and, thus, was properly assessed under the Hazelwood 
standard.  The Tenth Circuit reasoned, “[I]f the School District may censor Corder 
because her speech is school-sponsored rather than private, then so may the School 
District tell her what to say when she disregards the School District’s policy regarding the 
school-sponsored speech, as long as the compulsion is related to a legitimate pedagogical 
purpose.”448  The Tenth Circuit justified its application of a censorship standard to 
compelled speech by noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that, for the 
purposes of the First Amendment, forced speech is no different than censored speech.”449  
The Corder court then found that the school did not violate the First Amendment by 
compelling the student’s apology because the school’s compulsion of the apology was 
reasonably related to student discipline, a legitimate pedagogical concern.450   
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit, looked to 
student censorship cases when determining whether a school district’s compulsion of a 
student’s apology violated the First Amendment.  In Wildman, a high school athlete who 
was upset that she was not called up to play on the varsity basketball team issued a letter 
to her teammates.  In the letter, Wildman urged her teammates to “‘give [the coach] back 
some of the bullshit that he has given us.’”451  The coach, with the support of the school’s 
athletic director and principal, required Wildman to apologize to her teammates within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Id. at 1231. 
449 Id.  The Corder court cited the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miami Herald Publishing Company v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), and Riley v. National Federation of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), to support 
this statement.  Id.  The author of this thesis argued that the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on these Supreme 
Court precedents to support the view that the constitutionality of censorship and compulsion could be 
assessed under the same standards was misplaced.  See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 544-49. 
450 Corder, 566 F.3d at 1231-32. 
451 Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting the letter Wildman sent 
her to her teammates). 
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twenty-four hours or else she would not be permitted to rejoin the team.452  Wildman 
refused to issue an apology and was no longer allowed to play on the team.453  The Eighth 
Circuit, recognizing limited First Amendment protection for high school students based 
on the student speech censorship cases, found that school’s actions did not violate 
Wildman’s First Amendment rights.454  Citing Fraser, Eighth Circuit found that it was 
“well within the parameters of school officials’ authority to prohibit the public expression 
of vulgar and offensive comments and to teach civility and sensitivity in the expression of 
opinions.”455   
The Wildman court found that because the apology was related to disciplining the 
student for her unprotected speech in the letter, the compulsion of the apology passed 
constitutional muster.456  The Eighth Circuit found that “the actions taken by the coaches 
in response were reasonable,” even though there was probably a better way for the school 
to handle the situation.457  The Wildman court, however, did seem to indicate that the 
reach of its opinion may be limited to situations where students are precluded from 
extracurricular activities.  The Eighth Circuit stated, “A difference exists between being 
in a classroom which was not affected here, and playing on an athletic team when the 
requirement is that the player only apologize to her teammates and her coach for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 Id.  
453 Id. 
454 Id. at 771-72. 
455 Id. at 771. 
456 See id. at 771-72.   
457 Id. at 772.  The Wildman court noted, “The parties perhaps could have achieved with minimal creativity 
and flexibility a solution more amicable or less humiliating to the student.  However, the school sanction 
only required an apology.”  Id. 
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circulating an insubordinate letter.”458  In summary, the Eighth Circuit appeared to find 
that because the student’s initial letter was not protected under the First Amendment, the 
school could permissibly compel an apology, at least when the alternative to the student 
apologizing was her exclusion from an extracurricular activity.   
 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia also accepted that 
student speech censorship cases were applicable to determining the constitutionality of a 
compelled apology.  In Kicklighter v. Evans County School District,459 a high school 
student was ordered to serve a five-day suspension and apologize to her class after she 
engaged in a verbal altercation with another student and her teacher.460  After serving the 
detention, the student refused to issue the apology and, as a result, sat out of school for 
the remainder of the school year.461  The student argued that the school violated her First 
Amendment rights, as recognized in Barnette, when it sought to compel her to issue an 
apology.462  The district court found that the student’s claim was limited by the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Tinker and Fraser, noting that Eleventh Circuit recently had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 Id. 
459 968 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1998). 
460 Id. at 714.  The court described the incident as follows: 
Kicklighter got into an inappropriate “exchange of words” with another student before 
her English class had been called to order.  Overhearing the discussion, the teacher, 
Louise Jones, informed Kicklighter that she would not abide any off-color remarks in the 
classroom.  Plaintiff’s retort included an invitation to “check the Declaration of 
Independence” with respect to free speech rights.  Jones then asked Kicklighter to find a 
seat, but when Plaintiff could not locate one, the teacher sent her to see Defendant Dewey 
Hulsey, the principal. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting court documents from the case). 
461 Id. at 714-715.  The student returned to school immediately after serving the suspension, but when she 
went straight to class and refused to apologize she was escorted out of school by police officers.  Id. at 715.  
Kicklighter was allowed to return to school without apologizing the following year but then she dropped 
out altogether.  Id. 
462 Id. at 719. 
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recognized “‘exceedingly limited rights of public school students facing school 
discipline.’”463  The Kicklighter court found that schools were free to “require a simple 
apology for truculent and disruptive in-school behavior” under Tinker and Fraser 
because such discipline “falls well within the ambit of an institution’s balanced 
‘comprehensive authority.’”464  The court found that the apologies are “lessons [in] the 
form of disciplinary measures . . . [with an] educational purpose.”465  The U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Georgia, then, found that the student speech censorship 
precedents like Tinker and Fraser gave schools wide latitude to punish student speech, 
even through the compulsion of more speech.  Under the approach adopted by the courts 
in this set of cases, compelled speech should be analyzed under the student speech 
censorship precedents, which are often deferential to school officials. 
The third set of cases is distinct because the courts never addressed the 
constitutionality of the government compulsion of speech as a form of punishment.  The 
courts in these cases, however, never addressed the constitutionality of the government 
compulsion of speech for a variety of different reasons.  These cases are still important to 
this discussion of compelled speech as a form of punishment because they demonstrate 
that some courts may presume the constitutionality of these compulsions.  In Rogers v. 
Cook,466 for example, a high school student was in a school hallway when a fight broke 
out.  As a result, he was suspended from school for five days.467  When the student 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 Id. (quoting C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383 (11th Cir. 1996)).    
464 Id. 
465 Id.  
466 Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cook, No. 08 C 2270, 2008 WL 5387642 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2008). 
467 Id. at *1. 
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returned from his suspension, he was required to sign a “behavior contract.”468  While the 
specifics of the contract were not discussed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois’s opinion, it is unclear if the student raised any First Amendment 
claims,469 and the court failed to address First Amendment concerns related to the 
compulsion, the case still demonstrates different types of compelled speech used as form 
of punishment. 
Similar to Rogers, in Doninger v. Niehoff,470 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit dealt with a case where a student was compelled to speak as a form of 
punishment.  In Doninger, a member of the student council sent out an e-mail to 
members of the school community urging them to call the superintendent to object to the 
school’s decision to change the date of a battle-of-the-bands contest.471  After calls 
flooded the superintendent’s and the principal’s offices, the principal informed the 
student that she planned to cancel the battle-of-the-bands contest.472  In response to the 
student’s conversation with the school’s principal, the student posted on her blog.  In the 
blog post, the student told people that the battle-of-the-bands had been canceled by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 Id. 
469 See id. The case against the school administrators eventually was voluntarily dismissed by the student.  
See Stipulation of Dismissal for Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cook, No. 108CV02270 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2009), 
available at 2009 WL 4683055.   
In at least one instance, a parent, rather than a child, objected to being forced to sign an agreement.  In 
Doe v. Banos, No. 10-2164, 2010 WL 4846055 (3d Cir. 2010), a parent challenged the requirement that he 
sign a permission slip in order for his daughter to play on the high school lacrosse team.  Id. at *1.  The 
parent specifically objected to the provision in the permission slip that required the parent to acknowledge 
that the student may be punished under the school’s 24/7 drug and alcohol policy.  Id.  The Third Circuit 
found that this case did not involve government compulsion of speech because “the First Amendment does 
not protect a parent’s right to sign a school permission form ‘under duress’ while still mandating that the 
school allow his or her child to participate in the underlying activity.”  Id. at *3. 
470 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
471 Id. at 44. 
472 Id. at 44-45. 
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“‘douchebags in the central office’” and asked people to “‘write something or call [the 
principal] to piss her off more.’”473  The school officials ultimately chose to allow the 
event to go forward, but when they discovered the student’s blog, they sought to punish 
her.  The principal required that the student submit a written apology to the 
superintendent, show her mother the blog post, and withdraw her candidacy for senior 
class secretary.474  The Second Circuit analyzed the student’s First Amendment claim, 
which focused on the argument that the school could not punish her for the blog post.475  
The court never addressed the constitutionality of the compelled apology, perhaps 
because the student did not raise the issue as part of her First Amendment claim.  Despite 
the fact that the Doninger court did not tackle the constitutionality of the compelled 
apology, the case is still worth noting.  Doninger demonstrates that some student 
plaintiffs do not raise a claim even when it is clear that the government has compelled 
their speech and shows that some courts do not raise any concerns about the potential 
First Amendment issues with the government’s compulsion of apologies.476 
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473 Id. at 45 (quoting the student’s “publicly accessible blog, which was hosted by livejournal.com”). 
474 Id. at 46. 
475 See id. 47-53 (discussing Doninger’s claim that the school impermissibly punished her for the blog post 
that she created outside of school and ultimately finding that the school could punish her because the post 
was likely to cause a substantial disruption at school). 
476 Another case where the court did not address the constitutionality of compelled speech as a form of 
punishment was not included in this discussion because the case involved college students.  See Hysaw v. 
Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 941 (D. Kan. 1987).  In that case, college football players were 
told that they would have to issue an apology through the media to the university as well in person to their 
teammates if they wanted to rejoin the team.  Id. at 943.  The apologies were required after some players 
boycotted practice to protest what they believed were racially discriminatory practices by the university.  
Id. at 942-43. 
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Conclusions on the Constitutionality of Compelled Speech as a Form of Punishment  	  
The category of compelled speech as a form of punishment consists of compelled 
apologies and other types of compelled speech designed to allow a student to demonstrate 
his or her understanding that his or her conduct was wrong.  The author of this thesis has 
previously researched this category of compelled speech and argued that the standard 
presented in the compelled speech case of Wooley v. Maynard should be applied in these 
cases.  However, a review of the nine cases relevant to a discussion of compelled speech 
as a form of punishment demonstrates that no court has adopted this approach.  One 
court, however, did accept that there is a distinction between the compulsion and 
censorship of student speech and that courts should apply different precedents based on 
that distinction. 
Two cases revealed that there is a fourth, hybrid category of compelled student 
speech.  In those cases, the government compulsion of speech was a form of punishment 
and also part of education efforts.  This type of compelled speech, because it has many of 
the qualities of compelled speech for mandatory education efforts may be less offensive 
from of a First Amendment perspective.  In Miller, a district attorney sought to compel 
students to complete an education class as part of a plea agreement.477  While the court 
recognized that the lessons in the proposed education class were important, the court was 
troubled by the fact that the juvenile criminal justice system was attempting to teach the 
students these lessons.478   The Miller court’s analysis seems limited to programs imposed 
by the prosecutors and, thus, it appears that an education program imposed by a school as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2010).   
478 Id. at 152. 
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a punishment for some type of misbehavior may pass constitutional muster.  The 
Marinello court, on the other hand, found that a university could compel a student to 
write about how his actions violated the code of ethics for his future profession.479  In 
Marinello, the court even characterized the compelled written synopsis as “similar to an 
academic assignment.”480  The written synopsis in Marinello seems similar to compelled 
speech for mandatory education efforts because it was part of the school’s mission to 
teach students professional standards for their future careers481 and the assignment was 
designed to “actively nurture[] the evaluative and deliberative capacities of [the] 
student”482 by requiring him to write about his behavior in relation to the ethical code 
provisions.   
The seven remaining cases dealing with pure compelled speech as a form of 
punishment were divided into three categories: (1) a case that provides useful discussion 
in dicta about the difference between situations when Barnette and Hazelwood should 
apply to this category of compelled speech; (2) four cases where the court applied student 
speech censorship precedents to the assess the constitutionality of the government 
compulsion of speech; and (3) two cases where the court never addressed the presence 
and/or constitutionality of the compelled apologies present in the fact patterns.  The 
conclusions that can be drawn from each set of cases will be discussed in the following 
section. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. A.1:95CV167-D-D, 1996 WL 671410, at *12-*15 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 
1996), aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998). 
480 Id. at *14. 
481 Id. at *9 (noting that the “students should expect nothing less from an institution charged with the task 
of preparing them for professional life”). 
482 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 458.  
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 The first category consisted of only one case that provided a discussion of the 
distinction between Barnette and Hazelwood.  In Poling, the Sixth Circuit did not directly 
address the constitutionality of compelled speech as a form of punishment.  The court’s 
analysis was useful, however, because it pointed to the idea that Barnette requires a 
greater level of First Amendment protection against the compulsion of speech than the 
level of First Amendment protection provided against the censorship of student speech.483  
Poling was also relevant because it demonstrated the Sixth Circuit’s finding that Barnette 
is controlling in cases dealing with the compulsion of speech and that student speech 
censorship cases are controlling in cases dealing with the censorship of student speech.484  
This approach differs from the approaches adopted by courts in the next set of cases. 
 In the second set of cases, courts looked to the cases dealing with the censorship 
of student speech to analyze the constitutionality of compelled apologies.485  This 
approach appears to be less protective against compelled speech than the approach 
represented in Poling.  In Seamons, the Tenth Circuit cited three student speech 
censorship cases when it determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the compelled apology violated the high school football player’s First 
Amendment rights.486  The Tenth Circuit in Corder further explained that schools could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 See Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 1989) (approving of the portion of Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 633 (1943), where the Court explained that “‘involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on 
even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence’”). 
484 See id. (distinguishing Poling from Barnette because the “school officials made no attempt to compel 
Dean Poling to say anything he did not want to say”). 
485 See generally Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009); Wildman v. 
Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001); Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000); 
Kicklighter v. Evans County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
486 Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1028, 1030. 
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compel a student to apologize for speech that the school had the ability to censor.487  The 
Corder court found that the Hazelwood test was appropriate to assess the constitutionality 
of the government compulsion of speech that was school sponsored and, that under 
Hazelwood, discipline was a legitimate pedagogical concern.488  In summary, under the 
Tenth Circuit’s approach, any compelled speech as a form of punishment that could be 
considered school sponsored would pass constitutional muster so long as the speech was 
reasonably related to disciplining the student.  As previously mentioned in Chapter III, 
the Hazelwood standard for determining what speech is school sponsored is broad489 and, 
in practice, the Hazelwood standard is extremely deferential to schools.490  For this 
reason, the Corder court approach would permit schools to compel apologies in almost 
any situation except, perhaps, in a case like Seamons where it may have been 
unconstitutional to discipline the student in the first place.491  The Eighth Circuit in 
Wildman and the U.S. District for the Southern District of Georgia in Kicklighter also lent 
support to the Tenth Circuit’s approach of recognizing limited First Amendment 
protections against compulsion of speech as well censorship of speech through the 
Supreme Court’s student speech censorship cases.492 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Corder, 566 F.3d at 1231. 
488 Id. at 1231-32. 
489 See supra pp. 86-87 (discussing the broad range of speech that is considered “school-sponsored” within 
the meaning of Hazelwood). 
490 See supra pp. 84-85 (noting the fact that when the Hazelwood standard is applied, the school officials 
almost always prevail). 
491 Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1023-24 (discussing the facts of a case where it was possible that the school 
compelled a student athlete to apologize for reporting a locker room assault to the police). 
492 See Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771-72 (8th Cir. 2001); Kicklighter v. Evans 
County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 718-20 (S.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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 The third set of cases represent the approach that is the most permissive of the 
government compulsion of speech.  In these cases, the courts did not separately analyze 
the constitutionality of the compelled speech.  In Rogers, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois did not discuss the constitutionality of requiring a student to 
sign a behavior contract before he could return to school.493  In Doninger, the Second 
Circuit declined to discuss the constitutionality of a school’s compulsion of an apology 
from a student who posted comments about her school’s principal on her blog.494  While 
these courts may have failed to assess the First Amendment protection against compelled 
speech as a form of punishment, the cases are still pertinent to this study because they 
demonstrate that compelled speech claims are not always addressed by courts when they 
arise and that some courts decline to note that there might be a separate constitutional 
issue raised by the compulsion of speech as a form of punishment. 
 This study of compelled speech as a form of punishment reveals three different 
approaches as well as an overlap between two categories of compelled student speech.  
The first approach to assessing the constitutionality of compelled student speech is to 
apply the compelled speech precedents.  This approach was advocated by the author of 
this thesis in a law review note and also seemed to be adopted by the Sixth Circuit in 
Poling.   This approach is the most protective against compelled speech because Barnette 
and other compelled speech precedents are less deferential to the government than the 
student speech censorship precedents.  The second approach to assessing the 
constitutionality of compelled speech as a form of punishment is to apply student speech 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 See Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cook, No. 08 C 2270, 2008 WL 5387642, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2008). 
494 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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censorship precedents.  This approach, adopted by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, is less protective against 
compelled speech than the previous approach.  It is less protective because the student 
speech censorship precedents recognize a lower level of First Amendment protection for 
students in public schools and, in some instances, the tests derived from those cases are 
extremely deferential to school officials.  The third approach, reflected by the decisions 
from the Second Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
were the least protective against compelled speech as a form of punishment.  In those 
cases, the court did not analyze the compelled speech as raising separate First 
Amendment concerns. 
	  	  
 
 
CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING  
COMPELLED SPEECH IN PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS 	  
 This review of the nineteen cases addressing the constitutionality of compelled 
speech in public high schools495 demonstrates that there are four categories of compelled 
student speech: (1) compelled recitations;496 (2) compelled speech for mandatory 
education efforts;497 (3) compelled speech as a form of punishment;498 and (4) compelled 
speech that is both a form of punishment and part of mandatory education efforts.499  This 
study confirmed and examined more fully the first three categories of compelled student 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 One case in which a compelled speech claim was raised, but the court ultimately found that speech was 
not actually compelled, was not included in this sample.  See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 
159, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that students who completed a survey on attitudes regarding topics like 
sex and alcohol use were not compelled to speak because there was no consequence for refusing to fill out 
the survey and the students were not required to select specific answers if they did complete the survey). 
496 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586 (1940); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004); Lipp v. Morris, 579 
F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973); Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 
314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 
27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).   
497 See Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 315 F. App’x 7 (9th Cir. 2008); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 
356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2005). 
498 See Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009); Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. 
Dist., 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001); Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000); Poling v. Murphy, 
872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989); Kicklighter v. Evans County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1997), 
aff’d, 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1998); Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 
527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cook, No. 08 C 2270, 2008 WL 5387642 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 23, 2008). 
499 See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. A.1:95CV167-D-D, 
1996 WL 671410 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996), aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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speech, each of which had been previously recognized in the literature.500  A new 
category of compelled student speech, speech that is compelled to punish and educate, 
was recognized through this study. 
An analysis of the court opinions addressing each category of compelled speech 
revealed that the students always prevailed in the compelled recitation cases.  In contrast, 
the school officials always prevailed when speech was compelled for mandatory 
education efforts.  Courts assessing the constitutionality of compelled speech as a form of 
punishment adopted different approaches with different outcomes.  In some cases, courts 
declined to assess the constitutionality of the government compulsion of student speech; 
this approach was the most deferential to school officials.  In other cases, courts applied 
First Amendment tests derived from student speech censorship cases to compelled 
speech; this approach was still deferential to school officials, but not as deferential to 
school officials as the previous approach.   In the last set of cases addressing compelled 
speech as a form of punishment, courts applied First Amendment tests derived from 
Supreme Court compelled speech cases; this approach was the most protective of student 
speech rights.   
 This chapter discusses the major findings from this study and then proposes a 
framework for how courts should assess the constitutionality of compelled speech in 
public high schools.  First, this chapter defines the four categories of compelled student 
speech.  Second, this chapter summarizes the courts’ treatment of the constitutionality of 
compelled speech for each one of these categories.  Finally, this chapter discusses what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Compelled recitations and compelled speech for mandatory education efforts were first recognized by 
Vincent Blasi and Seana Shiffrin.  See generally Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92. Compelled speech as a 
form of punishment was first recognized by the author of this thesis in a 2010 law review note.  See 
generally Sullivan, supra note 13, at 569-70. 
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should be the proper level of First Amendment protection against each category of 
compelled student speech and, based on this discussion, presents a framework that courts 
can apply in future cases dealing with the constitutionality of the compulsion of speech in 
public high schools.  The proposed framework provides courts with a more consistent and 
speech protective approach than the one currently used. 
Types of Compelled Speech in Public High Schools 
 Four categories of compelled student speech, compelled recitations, compelled 
speech for mandatory education efforts, compelled speech as a form of punishment, and 
compelled speech that is both a form of punishment and part of mandatory education 
efforts, were discussed in this study.   This section defines each category of speech based 
on the case law and scholarly literature.   
 Compelled recitations are government-mandated reiterations of specific words 
and government-mandated participation in activities that amount to implicit expression.  
Requiring a student to recite the Pledge of Allegiance is an example of a compelled 
recitation.501  Compelled recitations also occur when students are commanded to 
participate in activities that communicate implicit expression.  Examples of this type of 
compelled recitations include requiring students to stand at attention during the Pledge502 
and forcing students to choose between standing or leaving the room during the 
Pledge.503   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501 See Barnette, 319 U.S. 624; Holloman, 370 F.3d 1252. 
502 See Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834, 835 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-3); Banks v. 
Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 303 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 
1971). 
503 See Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 636 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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 Compelled speech for mandatory education efforts is government-forced speech 
and expressive activities as part of in-class exercises and related homework assignments.  
Compelled speech for mandatory education efforts always is designed to “actively 
nurture[] the evaluative and deliberative capacities of students to help them arrive at  
conclusions that are truly their own.”504  Requiring a theater student to perform scripts 
verbatim505 and requiring an education major to take a class stressing the importance of 
multiculturalism506 are both examples of compelled speech for mandatory education 
efforts. 
 Compelled speech as a form of punishment is speech that a student is required to 
declare as a consequence for his or her prior actions or speech.  Students who refuse to 
deliver the compelled speech as required face additional and usually more severe 
punishments, such as being held back from advancing in school, suspension, or 
expulsion.  A common example of compelled speech as a form of punishment occurs 
when school officials, perceiving that student has done something wrong, compel the 
student to apologize.507  In other situations, this category of compelled speech may take 
on other forms, like requiring a student to sign a “behavior contract.”508 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 458-59. 
505 See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2004). 
506 See Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 315 F. App’x 7, 8 (9th Cir. 2008). 
507 See, e.g., Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2009); Wildman v. 
Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 769-70 (8th Cir. 2001). 
508 See Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cook, No. 08 C 2270, 2008 WL 5387642, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2008). 
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 Compelled speech that is both a form of punishment and part of mandatory 
education efforts is the final category of compelled student speech.509  This type of 
compelled speech, thus, is required in order to discipline the student and also designed to 
teach the student how his or her actions were wrong.  Compelling a student to produce a 
writing assignment discussing how his or her behavior violated the ethical rules of his or 
her future profession is one example of this hybrid category of compelled speech.510 
Courts and scholars have not advanced a uniform approach for assessing the 
constitutionality of these different types of compelled student speech.  The next section 
will address the various First Amendment concerns raised by each type of compelled 
speech and the various tests applied by courts. 
First Amendment Standards for Compelled Speech in Public High Schools 
 Courts addressing the constitutionality of compelled student speech have not 
parsed cases based on the categories of speech described in this thesis.  These categories, 
however, are useful because different categories of compelled student speech raise 
different First Amendment concerns.  An analysis of these cases using the lens of the four 
categories demonstrates not only what courts are doing, but also provides insight into 
what standards courts should apply in order to protect students’ First Amendment rights 
against compelled speech.  This section will summarize the different First Amendment 
standards applied by courts and advocated by scholars for each category of compelled 
student speech.  This section will first address the category of compelled recitations, then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. A.1:95CV167-D-D, 
1996 WL 671410 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996), aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998). 
510 See Marinello, 1996 WL 671410, at *5. 
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compelled speech for mandatory education efforts, then compelled speech as a form of 
punishment, and finally compelled speech that is designed both to punish and educate.  
 Compelled recitations were first recognized as a distinct category of compelled 
student speech, deserving of special First Amendment protections, by Vincent Blasi and 
Seana Shiffrin.511  Blasi and Shiffrin argued that compelled recitations are particularly 
offensive under the First Amendment because they leave the student who does not agree 
with the message of the compelled speech with two troubling options: deliver the speech 
as mandated by the government even though it does not reflect his or her true beliefs or 
refuse to deliver the compelled speech and, thus, be forced to expose his or her true 
beliefs.512  Shiffrin also found that compelled recitations raised unique First Amendment 
concerns because recitations do not “show respect for the judgments and attitudes of 
students” nor do they engage the student speakers in order to allow them to reach their 
own conclusions about a particular matter.513  Shiffrin argued that the Court found in 
favor of the students in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette514 because that case 
involved a compelled recitation rather than some other category of compelled speech.515 
 No court has expressly adopted Blasi and Shiffrin’s view that compelled 
recitations is a distinct category of compelled speech, the compulsion of which always 
violates the First Amendment.  While no court has clearly stated that it distinguishes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 See generally Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92. 
512 Id. at 456. 
513 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 884. 
514 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
515 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 884.  Shiffrin specifically distinguished compelled recitations from compelled 
speech for mandatory education efforts.  She argued that the Court’s holding in Barnette was based on the 
fact that compelled recitations, unlike compelled speech designed to educate, do not respect the individual 
thought processes and judgments of the student speaker.  Id. 
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between compelled recitations and other types of compelled speech, courts did address 
the constitutionality of compelled recitations six times since Barnette, and each time the 
student speakers prevailed.516   
Three key points, each pointing to robust First Amendment protection against 
compelled recitations, were distilled from a review of the cases dealing with the 
constitutionality of compelled recitations.517  The first is that there are numerous 
justifications in addition to those presented by Blasi and Shiffrin for recognizing strong 
First Amendment protections against compelled recitations in public high schools.  
Several courts found that compelling recitations interferes with the student speaker’s 
right to express him or herself.518  One lower court also found that the compelled 
recitations and the resulting punishments imposed on students who refused to participate 
in the recitations has a potential chilling effect on the speech of other students in the 
audience.519  The second key point from the cases is that First Amendment protection 
against compelled recitations should be extremely strong in a school setting.  For 
example, the Supreme Court noted that compelling speech that is not designed to engage 
and teach students runs counter to the schools’ purpose in society, educating children and 
creating an informed citizenry.520  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
found that protection against government compulsion of speech may need to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516 See supra pp. 55-65 (discussing the six lower court, compelled recitation cases). 
517 Another key point was identified in Chapter II; that key point was the fact that compelled recitations 
include situations beyond those where students are required to actually speak.  That key point is not 
discussed in this section because it was addressed earlier in the discussion of the definition of compelled 
recitation.  See supra pp. 43-44, 67. 
518 See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
519 Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004). 
520 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1269. 
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particularly strong in a school setting because of the inherent power imbalance between 
students and teachers.521  The third key point, which is applicable to all the categories of 
compelled speech, is the distinction made by some courts between situations where 
Barnette controls and situations where Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District,522 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,523 and other student speech 
censorship precedents should apply.  Courts found that Barnette applies when 
determining the constitutionality of the compelled recitation whereas Tinker applies when 
determining whether the action that the student undertook instead of participating in the 
compelled recitation was protected by the First Amendment.524  The courts applying 
Barnette to compelled recitations did not distill a specific test from that case, but each 
court that relied on Barnette found that the compelled recitation violated the First 
Amendment.525  Each of the key points identified in the compelled recitation cases 
supports the notion that First Amendment protection against the government compulsion 
of high school student speech should be strong. 
 Blasi and Shiffrin were also the first scholars to recognize compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts as a distinct category of compelled speech.  The scholars 
argued that compelled speech for mandatory education efforts was not troubling from a 
First Amendment perspective because this type of compelled speech shows respect for a 
student’s individual beliefs and, in fact, encourages a student to use critical thinking to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521 Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1269. 
522 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
523 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
524 Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th 
Cir. 1971); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
525 See supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
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develop his or her own beliefs.526  Furthermore, Shiffrin found that schools utilizing 
compelled speech for mandatory education efforts do not violate the First Amendment 
because this type of compelled speech is a necessary tool that teachers need in order to 
educate students.527  Courts have not expressly adopted Blasi and Shiffrin’s view that 
compelled speech for mandatory education efforts should be treated as a special category 
of compelled speech, but the courts appear to accept the notion that this type of 
compelled speech does not violate the First Amendment.  
 The two courts assessing the constitutionality of compelled speech for mandatory 
education efforts have found in favor of the schools officials.  In both cases the court 
applied the Hazelwood standard to determine if the government compulsion of speech 
violated the First Amendment.528  The Hazelwood standard, derived from a student 
speech censorship case, is extremely deferential to school officials.529  Under the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s articulation of how the Hazelwood standard 
applies to compelled speech, schools are free to compel any speech that is school 
sponsored so long as the compulsion is “reasonably related” to learning and not a pretext 
for discrimination.530  The courts’ acceptance that the Hazelwood standard should apply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 458-59. 
527 Shiffrin, supra note 63, at 882. 
528 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2005); Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 
No. C 05-05328 WHA, 2006 WL 2355209, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006), aff’d, 315 F. App’x 7 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
529 See, e.g., Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1292-93 (discussing the court’s refusal to “second-guess” the 
educators’ mission in compelling the speech).  See also Pond, supra note 64, at 157 (“Perhaps the greatest 
danger that Hazelwood presents to compelled speech claims is its ‘substantial deference’ to the 
administrative decisions of educators.”). 
530 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1292-93. 
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to any compelled speech that is considered school sponsored is troubling because of the 
broad range of speech that encompasses.531  As one scholar explained: 
Just about any aspect of school sponsored activity (newspapers, career 
days, elective courses) conducted anywhere in the school (classrooms, 
hallways) is considered to be . . . subject to the reasonableness standard of 
Hazelwood. Even extracurricular activities that appear to be associated 
with the school may fall under the rubric of “sponsorship,” broadly 
defined.532 
 
A standard that is deferential to school officials may be appropriate when student speech 
is compelled in order to fulfill the schools’ mission of educating young people.  A 
standard that is deferential to school officials, however, is not appropriate for all the 
speech that is considered school sponsored.533  Rather, the category of compelled speech 
for mandatory education efforts as defined in this thesis accurately outlines the limited 
situations where First Amendment protections should be relaxed in public schools in 
order to allow teachers and school officials to compel student speech as part of the 
educational process. 
 The notion that compelled speech as a form of punishment should be recognized 
as a distinct category of compelled student speech was first advocated by the author of 
this thesis in a 2010 law review note.534  The author of this thesis argued that all 
compelled student speech except compelled recitations and compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts should be assessed using the First Amendment standard 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 See supra pp. 86-88 and accompanying text. 
532 Salomone, supra note 381, at 316. 
533 For example, the author of this thesis argued that the Tenth Circuit inappropriately applied the 
Hazelwood standard to a compelled apology in Corder v. Lewis Palmer School District, 566 F.3d 1219 
(10th Cir. 2009).  See generally Sullivan, supra note 13.  The Corder court applied this standard because 
the court found that the apology was related to the content of a student’s graduation speech and, thus, was 
school sponsored.  Corder, 566 F.3d at 1231.  
534 See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 561-65. 
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from Wooley v. Maynard.535  The Wooley standard requires courts to determine whether 
the government’s interest in compelling the speech is “sufficiently compelling” to 
overcome the student’s First Amendment interest in being free from government 
compulsion of speech.536  The Wooley Court noted that even if the government has a 
“legitimate and substantial” interest in compelling speech,  “‘that purpose cannot be 
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the 
light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.’”537  The Wooley 
standard, thus, is less deferential to school officials than the student speech censorship 
precedents.538  The Wooley standard requires a tighter fit between the means and the ends 
– between the government’s means of compelling student speech and the government’s 
ultimate goal in compelling the speech.539  It appears that government compulsion of 
student speech as a form of punishment is more difficult to justify under Wooley than 
under the student speech precedents because school officials may impose many 
alternative forms of punishment that do not raise First Amendment concerns.540 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 Id. at 567-70. 
536 Id. at 568-69 (discussing the application of the Wooley standard in compelled student speech cases). 
537 Wooley v. Maynard, 410 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 
(1960)). 
538 See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 565-70 (contrasting the Wooley standard with the student speech 
censorship precedents and discussing that Wooley requires a more searching analysis of the government’s 
interests).  
539 Id. at 570 (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716). 
540 Id. at 556-58 (noting that schools could avoid the compulsion of student speech by making “a notation 
in [a student’s] permanent record or require[ing] [a student] to complete detention for violating a school 
policy”). 
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A study of the cases addressing compelled speech as a form of punishment 
reveals that courts have adopted one of three approaches when assessing the 
constitutionality of that speech.  In the first approach, one court found that Barnette 
should control when determining the constitutionality of compelled speech and 
Hazelwood should control when determining the constitutionality of the censorship of 
student speech.541  The approach adopted by this court recognized the strongest First 
Amendment protection against compelled student speech.  In the second approach, courts 
applied tests derived from the student speech censorship cases, like Hazelwood, to 
determine if the government compulsion of speech violated the First Amendment.542  
This approach is more deferential to school officials than the approach of applying 
compelled speech precedents because the Supreme Court has recognized limited First 
Amendment protections against censorship for public high schools students.543  In the 
third approach, courts discussed the compulsion of speech as a form of punishment in the 
fact patterns but never analyzed the constitutionality of compelling student speech.544  
This approach is obviously the most deferential to school officials because the courts did 
not undertake an independent review of schools’ actions.  This review of the cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 See Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 1989). 
542 See generally Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009); Wildman v. 
Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001); Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000); 
Kicklighter v. Evans County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
543 See supra pp. 7-9, 27-30 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holdings in the student speech censorship 
cases and the Court’s increasing willingness to limit the First Amendment protections against censorship of 
student speech). 
544 See generally Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008); Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cook, No. 
08 C 2270, 2008 WL 5387642 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2008). 
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discussing compelled speech as a form of punishment demonstrates the need to have a 
more uniform approach to assessing the constitutionality of compelled student speech.   
Finally, a review of the compelled student speech cases reveals a fourth, hybrid 
category of compelled student speech.  The cases in this category dealt with the 
constitutionality of the government compelling speech that was both a form of 
punishment but also part of a mandatory education effort.545  The courts in these cases did 
not announce a specific First Amendment standard that should apply to this type of 
compelled speech, but one court found this type of speech to be outside the scope of that 
protected in Barnette.546  This court instead reasoned that because the compulsion of 
speech was related to the school’s educational mission, the school did not violate the 
student’s First Amendment rights.547 Although the courts did not expressly state this, it 
appears that compelling speech that falls into this hybrid category is unlikely to violate 
the First Amendment for the same reasons that compelling speech for mandatory 
education efforts is permissible.  A clearer standard, however, would help future courts 
assess the constitutionality of this category of compelled student speech. 
Proposed Framework for Courts Addressing Compelled Speech in Public High 
Schools  
 
 This study shows that courts have not expressly adopted a comprehensive 
framework for addressing the constitutionality of the government compulsion of student 
speech in public high schools.  While no court has expressly adopted the view that each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
545 See generally Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. 
A.1:95CV167-D-D, 1996 WL 671410 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996), aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998). 
546 See Marinello, 1996 WL 671410, at *13. 
547 Id. at *14. 
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of the four categories of compelled student speech discussed in this thesis requires the 
application of a different First Amendment standard, it appears that courts’ opinions do 
reflect some recognition of the differences between the types of compelled speech.  For 
instance, in all the cases dealing with the constitutionality of compelled recitations, the 
students prevailed; in all cases dealing with the constitutionality of compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts, the schools prevailed.  In cases dealing with compelled 
speech as a form of punishment, however, courts adopted three different approaches, 
each granting a different degree of deference to school officials.  Neither court addressing 
the constitutionality of speech that was compelled both as a form of punishment and as 
part of a mandatory education effort announced a clear approach. 
This section will present a framework, utilizing the four categories of compelled 
student speech, that affords what the author of this thesis believes to be the appropriate 
level of First Amendment protection against compelled student speech.  First, this section 
discusses the need for strong First Amendment protection against compelled recitations, 
like that found in Supreme Court’s decision in Barnette.  Second, this section presents a 
test for compelled speech as part of mandatory education efforts that is deferential to 
school officials, but that includes an exception for compulsion that is a pretext for 
discrimination.548  Third, this section argues that the Wooley standard is appropriate for 
assessing the constitutionality of compelled speech as a form of punishment.  Fourth, this 
section argues that the Wooley standard also should apply to compelled speech that is 
both a form of punishment and part of mandatory education efforts.  Finally, this section 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548 This exception is derived from the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson.  See 356 F.3d 
1277, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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presents a summary of the framework that courts should use in future compelled student 
speech cases.  
The first category of compelled student speech, compelled recitations, should be 
assessed under Barnette.  There are several inherent problems with compelled recitations 
that support applying Barnette, including the fact that compelled recitations: fail to 
engage the student in order to develop his or her critical thinking skills, disregard the true 
beliefs of the speaker, force students who disagree with the recitation to participate or 
expose their real thoughts, and may have a chilling effect on the speech of other 
students.549  Furthermore, compelled recitations are particularly problematic in a school 
setting because of the schools’ important societal role of educating young people and 
preparing an informed electorate.  The courts appear to agree that there is strong First 
Amendment protection against compelled recitations, but these courts have failed to 
articulate a clear standard for assessing the constitutionality of this type of compelled 
speech.   
Courts should explicitly find that Barnette controls when assessing the 
constitutionality of the government compulsion of recitations, both in the form of actual 
speech and actions that constitute “implicit expression,” in public high schools.  It 
appears that all compelled recitations in a school setting are unconstitutional under 
Barnette.  The Barnette Court itself could not name any exceptions to its rule,550 and no 
court since has recognized one.551  If any limit exists, it must satisfy the Barnette Court’s 
qualification that the government may not “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549 See discussion supra pp. 66-67. 
550 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
551 See supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
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nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein.”552  Under this language, perhaps the government may 
constitutionally compel speech or implicit expression that does not deal with “politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,” although the last catchall phrase 
makes it difficult to determine what would fall outside of this description.  Regardless of 
this speculative exception, it appears clear that the First Amendment strongly protects 
against government compulsion of recitations in public schools, as recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Barnette and lower courts in six subsequent opinions.  Future courts 
should continue this trend, but should be explicit about how they reach their decision by 
parsing the different categories of compelled student speech and clearly discussing the 
standard that they are applying. 
The compulsion of the second category of speech, compelled speech for 
mandatory education efforts, does not violate the First Amendment unless the 
government is compelling the speech as a method of discriminating against the speaker. 
There are a number of reasons why school officials should be granted deference to 
compel speech that helps them fulfill their educational mission.  For example, a school 
may need to compel students to speak in order to ensure that students have learned what 
they are required to know before advancing them to the next grade.553  Schools may also 
compel students to adopt a particular viewpoint in order to develop critical thinking 
skills.554   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
552 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).   
553 Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. A.1:95CV167-D-D, 1996 WL 671410, at *14 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996) 
aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998). 
554 See discussion supra pp. 72-74. 
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Courts addressing the constitutionality of compelled speech for mandatory 
education efforts have correctly ruled in favor of the schools, but they erroneously have 
applied the Hazelwood standard, a student speech censorship test, to reach their 
conclusions.555  There are four major problems with applying student speech censorship 
tests to compelled speech.  First, compelled speech raises unique speaker-, listener-, and 
society-based harms that censored speech does not raise.556   Second, compulsion of 
speech provides the speaker with fewer reasonable alternatives than the censorship of 
speech does.557  Third, the language in Barnette indicates that the Supreme Court found 
that speech could be compelled in more limited situations than speech could be 
censored.558  Fourth, the student speech cases define categories of speech, such as 
“school-sponsored” speech from Hazelwood, and use those categories to determine the 
proper level of First Amendment protection.  The problem is that the categories of 
student speech for censorship purposes do not translate correctly when applied to 
compelled speech.  For example, under Hazelwood, school-sponsored speech is any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 Some courts reviewing other categories of compelled student speech have accepted that the student 
speech censorship cases control when censorship is the issue and Barnette and other compelled speech 
precedents control when compulsion is the issue.  See generally Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762-63 
(6th Cir. 1989); Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 295-96 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d mem., 
450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
556 For a review of the literature discussing the unique harms caused by the government compulsion of 
speech, see supra pp. 22-26. 
557 See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 556. “A censored party has the option to remain silent or reframe his or 
her point to comply with the censorship restrictions; a compelled party is required to make statements that 
reflect the beliefs or opinions of another party and has no alternative.”  Id. 
558 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).  The Court explained: 
It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is 
tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present 
danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. It would seem 
that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and 
urgent grounds than silence. 
Id. 
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speech that “students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to 
bear the imprimatur of the school.”559  Courts have found that a wide range of speech, 
including speech outside of regular classroom exercises and homework assignments, is 
school sponsored and, thus, subject to the Hazelwood standard, a test that is extremely 
deferential school officials.560  Applying a standard that is deferential to school officials 
to all compelled speech that is considered school sponsored fails to take into account the 
strong First Amendment protections against compelled speech.  While it is true that 
schools need some leeway in order to carry out their mission, compulsion of speech 
should be permitted in more limited situations than the Hazelwood standards allows. 
Courts should consider whether compelled speech is part of a mandatory 
education effort instead of whether the speech is school sponsored.  Compelled speech 
for mandatory education efforts is limited to speech that is compelled as part of an in-
class exercise or related homework assignment and is designed to “actively nurture[] the 
evaluative and deliberative capacities of students to help them arrive at conclusions that 
are truly their own.”561  Compelled speech for mandatory education efforts, unless 
imposed for a discriminatory purpose, does not violate the First Amendment. Under a 
proper analysis, once a court has determined that the government-compelled speech is 
part of a mandatory education effort, the court should “investigate whether the 
educational goal or pedagogical concern was pretextual.”562  If the government’s goal is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
560 See discussion supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
561 Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 92, at 458-59. 
562 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted). 
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not a “sham pretext for an impermissible ulterior motive,”563 the court should find that 
the school officials did not violate the First Amendment. 
 The third category of compelled speech, compelled speech as a form of 
punishment, should be evaluated under the Wooley standard.  The government may 
compel student speech as a form of punishment in some situations without violating the 
First Amendment, but courts should not afford broad deference to schools in such 
situations.  Schools may punish students in a number ways without compelling speech, 
such as through detention and expulsion.564  These available alternatives support the 
notion that a test that is extremely deferential to school officials is inappropriate when 
assessing compelled speech as a form of punishment.  Unlike situations where schools 
must be permitted to compel speech as part of mandatory education efforts, schools can 
obtain their goal of disciplining students without compelling speech and should strive to 
do so. 
No court, however, has applied the Wooley standard when addressing the 
constitutionality of compelled speech as a form of punishment; instead courts have 
adopted one of three approaches: (1) finding that compelled speech precedents like 
Barnette, and not student speech censorship precedents, apply; (2) applying student 
speech censorship precedents; or (3) never evaluating the constitutionality of the 
compelled speech in the case.   
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564 See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 556-58 (discussing the importance of the available alternatives when 
determining the appropriate standard for First Amendment protection). 
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While one court, in dicta, advocated the application of Barnette to compelled 
speech as a form of punishment,565 Barnette is not the appropriate standard.  As 
previously discussed, the Barnette standard is extremely protective of student speech 
rights.566  In some situations, however, it may be constitutionally permissible for a school 
to compel speech as a form of punishment in light of the Supreme Court’s consistent 
recognition that schools must be able to discipline students as a means of controlling the 
school environment.567  While compelling speech may not be the best way to punish a 
student in most situations, it is conceivable that there are situations when it would be 
necessary for a school compel student speech as a form of punishment in order to avoid 
some serious consequence; for example, a school may require a student to apologize for 
something he or she said in order to calm down a riotous crowd.  While the First 
Amendment protection against compelled speech as a form of punishment should be 
strong, Barnette is not the proper standard because it fails to account for the fact that the 
compulsion of speech may be necessary in some limited situations. 
The second approach adopted by courts addressing the constitutionality of 
compelled speech as a form of punishment, applying the student speech censorship 
precedents to the compulsion, also is not the appropriate standard because it is too 
deferential to school officials.  As previously mentioned, there are four major problems 
with applying student speech censorship standards, like the one derived from Hazelwood, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565 See Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 1989). 
566 See supra notes 228-44 and accompanying text; supra pp.129-30. 
567 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (“[T]he Court has 
repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school 
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the 
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to compelled speech.568  The discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Corder v. Lewis 
Palmer School District demonstrates the problem with applying the Hazelwood standard 
to compelled student speech.  In Corder, the court found that it was appropriate to apply 
Hazelwood because the compelled apology, a consequence for the student mentioning 
Jesus in her graduation speech, was school sponsored.569  Essentially, the court found that 
if a school can censor a student’s speech, then the school can also require that a student 
issue an apology.570  This approach fails to recognize the differences between the First 
Amendment concerns raised by compelled speech and those raised by censored speech.  
Schools can discipline students without compelling speech and, if possible, should strive 
to do so.  If they do choose to punish a student through the compulsion of speech, then 
the constitutionality of that compelled speech should be assessed under a standard that is 
less deferential to school officials. 
The final approach adopted by courts was to avoid assessing the constitutionality 
of the compelled speech as a form of punishment.  This approach, which basically grants 
school officials free reign to compel speech, is inappropriate because it does not take into 
account that the government compulsion of speech raises First Amendment concerns.  
This approach fails to recognize that the Supreme Court has found that the First 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to decide “both what to say and what not to 
say.”571   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 See supra pp. 131-32. 
569 Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2009). 
570 Id. at 1231. 
571 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
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The Wooley standard is the proper analysis for assessing the constitutionality of 
compelled speech as a form of punishment because it strikes the appropriate balance 
between protecting the First Amendment rights of students and ensuring that schools are 
able to carry out their educational mission.  Under the Wooley standard, a court must 
determine “whether the State’s countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to 
justify”572 compulsion of the student’s speech as a form of punishment.  This standard 
should apply in all cases addressing the constitutionality of compelled speech as a form 
of punishment. 
The Wooley standard also is appropriate in cases dealing with the fourth category 
of compelled student speech, speech that is compelled as a form of punishment and as 
part of mandatory education efforts.  This category of compelled student speech will 
usually pass constitutional muster under the Wooley standard because the government’s 
interest in educating young people is likely to be “sufficiently compelling” to justify the 
compulsion of speech.   The deferential standard that is appropriate in pure compelled 
speech for mandatory education efforts cases, however, is not appropriate for the cases in 
this category because there are alternative ways to punish students that do not raise First 
Amendment concerns.  The existence of these available alternatives always supports 
courts engaging in a more active assessment of the government’s interest in cases dealing 
with compelled speech as a form of punishment.   
The need for a clearer standard in cases where speech is compelled as a form of 
punishment and also as part of mandatory education efforts is exemplified in Marinello v. 
Bushby.  In Marinello, a school compelled a student to provide a written synopsis 	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explaining how his actions violated the ethical rules for his future profession.573  In this 
case, the school sought to punish the student for his behavior, but chose to do so in a way 
that also taught the student an important lesson, how his actions were unprofessional.  In 
Marinello, the student objected to the writing requirement, claiming the First Amendment 
protected him against being compelled to declare that he violated the ethical rules.574  The 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi correctly found that the school 
in Marinello should be permitted to compel the student to provide a written synopsis 
because teaching students about the professional ethical code was part of the school’s 
mission.575  If the court had applied the Wooley standard, it would have yielded the same 
result, but it would have been more clear how the court reached its conclusion.  The 
Marinello court explained, “this court finds that while [the student] does possess a First 
Amendment right ‘not to speak,’ the right of school officials to fulfill the educational 
mission of the [school] justifies the imposed restrictions upon that right in this case.”576  
While it appears that the court did balance the student’s First Amendment rights against 
the school’s interest in compelling the speech, applying the Wooley standard would have 
clarified how strong the school’s interest needs to be in order to override the student’s 
rights.  Courts should apply the Wooley standard to the compulsion of speech that is both 
a form of punishment and part of mandatory education efforts in order to make it more 
clear how much weight is given to the student’s rights and the school’s interests.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
573 See Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. A.1:95CV167-D-D, 1996 WL 671410, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 
1996), aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998). 
574 Id. at *12-*13 
575 Id. at *14.  The Marinello court, however, never explicitly stated which First Amendment standard it did 
apply to the facts in that case. 
576 Id. at *15. 
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Furthermore, Wooley is always the appropriate standard when speech is compelled as a 
form of punishment because of the existence of available alternate forms of discipline. 
A review of the scholarly literature and nineteen cases addressing the 
constitutionality of compelled speech has highlighted the need for a comprehensive 
framework that courts can apply to ensure that students’ First Amendment rights are 
protected.  In the future, courts should apply the following framework to compelled 
student speech cases.  First, courts should determine whether the compelled student 
speech at issue in the case is a compelled recitation, compelled speech for mandatory 
education efforts, compelled speech as a form of punishment, or compelled speech that is 
both a form of punishment and part of mandatory education efforts.  Second, courts 
should apply the following standards to each category of compelled speech.  Courts 
should apply Barnette to compelled recitations and find that the school violated the First 
Amendment.  One possible exception exists to this general rule; Barnette may only apply 
to compelled recitations that deal with “politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion.”577  Courts should examine the government’s interests in cases dealing with 
compelled speech for mandatory education efforts.  The schools should prevail in these 
cases unless the government’s stated goal is a “sham pretext for an impermissible ulterior 
motive,”578 such as discrimination.  Courts assessing the constitutionality of compelled 
speech as a form of punishment and compelled speech that is both a form of punishment 
and part of mandatory education efforts should apply the Wooley standard.  Under the 
Wooley standard, courts should determine whether the government’s interest in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).   
578 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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compulsion of the speech is “sufficiently compelling” to overcome the student’s First 
Amendment protection against compelled speech.  Adopting this comprehensive 
framework will ensure that schools are able to carry out their educational mission without 
trampling on the First Amendment rights of their students. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The framework proposed in this thesis is applicable to compelled high school 
student speech.  Further research could focus on the appropriate standards for compelled 
student speech in a college setting because some courts and scholars have recognized 
different levels of First Amendment protections for college students and high school 
students.  This research may be especially important in light of the fact that some courts 
have applied high school student speech censorship standards to compelled speech in 
colleges.579   
Future research also could focus on the different situations where courts addressing 
the constitutionality of compelled speech have applied the rule in Barnette and where 
courts have distinguished the case at hand from Barnette.  In Marinello, the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi found that Barnette did not apply in that 
case because “First Amendment protection against compelled speech has been found only 
in the context of governmental compulsion to disseminate a particular political or 
ideological message.”580  The Tenth Circuit expressly rejected this approach in Axson-
Flynn.  The Tenth Circuit explained, “First Amendment protection does not hinge on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 See id. at 1285; Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., No. C 05-05328 WHA, 2006 WL 2355209, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006), aff’d, 315 F. App’x 7 (9th Cir. 2008). For more information on the controversy 
surrounding applying First Amendment protections for high school student speech in a college setting, see 
supra note 335. 
580 Marinello, 1996 WL 671410, at *13. 
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ideological nature of the speech involved.”581  Research focusing on different courts’ 
approaches to applying Barnette would be useful, especially given these conflicting 
opinions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1284 n.4.  First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla agreed with the Tenth 
Circuit’s reasoning.  See SMOLLA, supra note 24, at § 17:1.50.  Smolla explained: 
The First Amendment’s proscription of compelled speech does not turn on the ideological 
content of the message that the speaker is being forced to carry.  The constitutional harm 
— and what the First Amendment prohibits — is being forced to speak rather than to 
remain silent.  This harm occurs regardless of whether the speech is ideological.   
Id. 
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